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This study contexualises the relationship between the armed forces and the civil authority in 
Ireland using and revising the theoretical framework advanced by  Huntington. It tracks the 
evolution of the idea of a representive body for soldiers in the late 1980s, to the setting up of 
statutory associations under the Defence Amendment Act 1990. The study considers Irish 
soldiers political agitation and their use of peaceful democratic activities to achieve their 
aims. It highlights the fundamental policy arguments that were made against the idea of 
representation for the army and positions those arguments in the study of civil-military 
relations.  Utilising unique access to secret Department of Defence files, it reveals in-depth 
ideological arguments advanced by the military authories in Ireland against independent 
representation. This thesis provides an academic study of the establishment of PDFORRA. It 
answers key questions regarding the change in the position of Irish government who were 
categorically opposed to the idea of representation in the army. It illustrates the involvement 
of other agencies such as the European Organisation of Military Associations (Euromil) 
reveals reciprocal support by the Irish associations to other emerging groups in Spain. 
Accessing as yet unpublished Department of Defence files, study analyses tension between 
the  military authorities and the government. It highlights for the first time the role of enlisted 
personnel in the shaping of new state structures and successfully dismmisses Huntingtons 
theoretical contention that enlisted personnel are of no consequence in the study of civil-
military relations. It fills a gap in our understanding,  identified by Finer, as to how 
politicisation of soldiers takes place. This thesis brings a new dimension to the discipline of 
civil-military relations and creates new knowledge that will enhance our understanding of an 
area not covered previously.  
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Introduction  
 
The subject of this thesis concerns itself with the emergence of representative 
associations for members of the armed forces in Ireland between 1988 and 
1992. The series of events that led to the enactment of legislation providing for 
statutory associations included a public campaign by army wives, a deliberate 
pursuit of the right of association by serving members of the Defence Forces, 
and a constitutional challenge against the state in the High Court. The 
subsequent responses to the requests of soldiers and their wives by the state 
and the army authorities provide a unique opportunity to analyse and 
contextualise the perceptions and the actuality of the relationship between the 
military body and the government. It will be argued that the activities of the 
soldiers and the successful culmination of their efforts constituted a significant 
change in the balance of civil-military relations that had existed up to that 
time. In addition, the argument will be advanced that this study reveals a 
means by which soldiers in Ireland and possibly further afield can enjoy the 
right of association without any threat to the state, or to the exercise of 
command and discipline in the armed forces.  A narrative summary of the 
events is contained in appendix 11.  
Subject matter and context  
Since 1988 the Permanent Defence Force (PDF), comprising the Army, Navy 
and Air Corps, has undergone significant cultural, regulatory and institutional 
change. These developments have impacted at all almost every level of the 
force and have wrought important change in two areas in particular, internal, 
and Departmental human resource management. In addition and in a much 
wider sense, the framework, operation, and context of civil-military relations 
in Ireland may have been transformed forever. Internally, the relationship 
between the officer corps and the enlisted ranks has changed significantly. 
New structures have redefined their respective roles in specified areas towards 
each other. These same structures have also altered the context and operation 
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of the relationship between the civilian Department of Defence and the officer 
corps. In a very new departure there is also now a formal method of 
communication between the enlisted ranks and the Department of Defence. In 
the intervening period since the passing of the Defence Amendment Act of 
1990, the political and structural profiles of the Irish Armed Forces have 
changed, and with them, the political and structural contexts of civil-military 
relations in Ireland.     
The activities and aims that precipitated these events were at one time 
thought to threaten the exercise of command and discipline in the armed 
forces, and were most certainly in contravention of government policy. The 
level of control by a civilian authority over its armed forces is a crucial matter 
and the balance of power between the two must always be weighted heavily in 
favour of the government. This being the case, it is essential that an 
understanding of the events in Ireland, and the motivation for them, be 
understood in full. Matters that would prompt those in authority to believe 
there was a threat to the security of the state need to be understood. Equally, if 
fears proved unfounded regarding state security and army discipline, there is 
perhaps a benefit to be gained from the study of the particular circumstances 
in Ireland. Such a study may well help in the consideration of whether or not 
to provide similar structures to other forces in other countries.  
Background  
To many soldiers, sailors, and airmen, who would have enlisted as members of 
the Defence Forces or accepted a commission, the absence of representative 
associations or unions was accepted as a fact of life, a condition of service. Sgt 
Michael Gould (retired), maintained that during his entire military service of 
forty two years in the Irish Army, there was never a need for such bodies 
because, ‘the forces always looked after their own very well’. He believed that 
membership of any type of a representative body would indicate ingratitude 
xi 
 
and disloyalty to the service.
1
 In 1990 the Chief of Staff wrote that 
membership of any organisation (other than one approved by the military 
leadership and the state) would be ‘unnecessary and divisive’.2  One serving 
Naval non commissioned officer (NCO) remembers all hands being assembled 
in the mess on board the LE Deirdre for a formal parading, and their being told 
by the coxswain that seeking the right of association, or membership of any 
organisation seeking it, would be ‘tantamount to mutiny’.3  In any armed force 
the charge of mutiny is extremely serious. In Ireland if violence is associated 
with mutiny it becomes an offence for which conviction carries the death 
penalty.
4
 It is understandable then that many personnel who felt the need for 
representative bodies in the forces would have been reluctant to express their 
view particularly in the company of a superior officer. Commander 
McNamara (retired) who, at the time people were seeking the right of 
association, was commanding officer of the Naval Depot at Haulbowline 
Naval Base, opposed the introduction of representative bodies. ‘I would have 
seen them impacting very negatively on the Defence Forces and still do’.5 Yet 
despite these deeply held views and some negative interpretations of 
regulatory prohibitions, there were others who evidently believed otherwise 
and who thought it sufficiently worthwhile to endanger their careers in the 
forces to try to establish representative bodies that could speak freely and 
represent the interests of those  with whom they served. By 2007, after 
seventeen years of representation, the incumbent Chief of Staff when asked 
about the impact of representative bodies on the army as a whole, emphasised 
                                                 
1
 Sgt. Michael Gould (retired), personal interview in Co. Cork November 2007.  
2
 Lt. General O’Neill, circular to all Officers, NCOs and  Privates of the Defence Forces 27 
Juy1989. PDFORRA national head office, Dublin.  
3
 Senior Petty Officer Ger Curley (retired), personal interview in Cobh 18 September 2008. 
4
 See sections 128-130 Defence Act 1954. 
5
 Commander McNamara, Navy (retired), personal interview 17 November 2007, Cobh Co. 
Cork.  
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the ‘great contribution’ made to all aspects of the armed forces by the 
Permanent Defence Force Other Ranks Representative Association 
(PDFORRA) and the Representative Association for Commissioned Officers 
(RACO).
6
  These are the very same organisations that were once thought by 
his predecessors to be organisations that would undermine the whole structure 
of command and discipline, and would represent a possible threat to the state 
itself. 
The question arises as to how this sea change in hierarchal attitudes 
occurred. What measures were adopted, if any, to allay the fears of those who 
believed that the right of association leading to the ‘organising’ of military 
lower ranks was a danger to state security and to the integrity and command 
structure of the Defence Forces? How was the controlling civil authority - that 
is advised by the military hierarchy in these matters - persuaded to ignore the 
advice of the profession that is charged with all things military? Somehow, in 
Ireland, the difficulties that these scenarios would present to the delicate civil-
military relations were overcome, how? Does the Irish experience and the 
legislative and agreed regulatory provisions that were subsequently passed 
open up a new dimension to the conduct of civil-military relations worldwide? 
Unlike the American, British or French armed forces, Irish military 
personnel of the Army, Navy and Air Corps now have a structure through 
which they can negotiate at all levels of the Defence Forces and where 
applicable, to relevant government departments on matters of pay, allowances 
and certain conditions of service. For the first time enlisted personnel are now 
part of the machinery which would not be envisaged in Huntington’s concept 
of the operation of civil-military relations. These structures also provide the 
right whereby representatives can speak freely to the press and media about 
certain matters in the Defence Forces.  This constitutes another departure from 
                                                 
6
 Chief of Staff,  Lt. General Dermot Earley, personal interview 26 November 2007, Dublin. 
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Huntington’s  idea whereby only the officer corps is competent to advise the 
government in a ‘professional’ capacity. 7  
Until 1990, Ireland was similar to the above mentioned nations in that its  
enlisted personnel had no input into the decision making process that governed 
these areas. The independent commission established by the Irish government  
in 1989, which was chaired by Senior Counsel Dermot Gleeson SC, to look at 
the pay and conditions in the Defence Forces offered the first ever opportunity 
for enlisted personnel to express their opinions to any institution or body 
outside of the Defence Forces on matters that would have an impact on 
themselves.
8
 Today the two statutory bodies, PDFORRA and RACO, that 
were set up under national legislation, provide for a system of consultation and 
negotiation on a wide range of matters. Negotiations take place with elected 
representatives in an industrial relations type environment that was not 
ethically or legally possible before the passing of the Defence Amendment Act 
of 1990. The mechanisms by which this can now be done required significant 
cultural and regulatory change. This change did not occur from within. 
Although in the 1980s when most senior officers fully understood the 
frustration felt by their subordinates in matters of poor pay and conditions, 
both the government and the Defence Force General Staff strenuously opposed 
any developments that might have led to the ‘unionisation’ of the armed 
forces. The change was brought about by a sustained public campaign carried 
out initially by the spouses of soldiers and eventually by serving members of 
the PDF. It involved and incorporated the use of the media, political lobbying 
and, eventually, a High Court action.  However, during these events the 
government and the army, despite conceding that something had to be done to 
alleviate what was then being called the ‘army crisis’, both still opposed the 
                                                 
7
 See Huntington’s chapter on the rise of the military profession in The soldier and the state, 
the theory and politics of civil-military relations, (Harvard,1964). 
8
 Report of the Commission on remuneration and conditions of service in the Defence Forces 
(Dublin, 1990), p14. 
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formation of an independent representative association. What eventually 
changed their minds?   
Many areas and disciplines were encompassed by these events. They 
included the problems that prevailed in the Defence Forces in the late 1980s, 
the responses of the serving men and women to what they saw as low pay and 
poor treatment, the crucial role played by the National Army Spouses 
Association (NASA), the position and activities of officers of the PDF in their 
approach to representation - some of whom were in command of dissatisfied 
subordinates, the attitudes and activities of the various politicians who 
contributed to the debate on representation and the right of association, the 
influences of European political and military perspective and in particular 
those of the European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL),   
the detailed concerns of the General Staff of the army and the ramifications for 
managerial adaptation to the new reality including the motivation of the 
personnel involved. The influences that prompted the actions and reactions of 
the above stakeholders all contributed to shaping Ireland’s response to the 
demand for representation in the armed forces. The officer corps, most of 
whom were sympathetic and helpful to the enlisted personnel, had problems of 
their own. Their right to associate was affirmed in the wake of the initiatives 
that led to the passing of Defence Amendment Act 1990.  
Aims of thesis 
This thesis will analyse the initiatives surrounding these developments in order 
to ascertain the level and type of military ‘intervention’ that took place in 
Ireland. It will trace the emergence of the notion of the ‘right of association’ 
among Irish Defence Force personnel and their families, and their campaign 
that helped bring it about. It will look at a similar women’s campaign that was 
conducted in Spain at around the same time.  It will examine the ethical 
opposition of the army and will look at the public response to the arguments 
made by those involved. It will utilise the media reports and Dáil debates that 
helped track the lead up to significant alteration of official attitudes to the 
question of the right to representation in the workplace and of fundamental 
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freedom of speech to a particular group of Irish citizens. Comparisons will be 
drawn with other military. In considering these issues it will address the 
question that arises as to whether this was political radicalisation of an 
enforced apolitical section of the community or whether it was the acquisition 
from a reluctant government of a fundamental human right. It will endeavour 
to provide new knowledge in the study of civil-military relations regarding 
how the state and the army in Ireland interacted with each other during this 
period, in the context of previous events such as the so called ‘mutinies’ in the 
Curragh in 1914 and in the new state in 1924. It will seek to pinpoint the real 
issues that led to the reversal of thinking in the sensitive area of state security 
and policy. In unprecedented access to secret files of the Department of 
Defence it will provide an insight into the fundamental arguments made by 
either side in their pursuit of, and opposition to, representative associations. 
Finally it will contribute to our knowledge of civil-military relations by 
highlighting and adding a new dimension to it for scholarly consideration and, 
perhaps, its application in other countries in this field of study. These events 
and their analyses will be examined under an appropriate set of headings.  
Positioning of thesis in the appropriate field of study. 
The discipline of Civil-Military Relations is the best context from which to 
examine the emergence of representative bodies in the Irish armed forces. This 
field of study has a broad corpus of work that deals primarily with the 
relationship between the military and the state. The grievances of soldiers 
regarding their pay and conditions became the catalysts for their seeking the 
right of association. It could be argued that an examination or an analysis of 
these events should be grounded in the discipline of industrial relations or 
radical politics. Studies that concentrate a little outside of mainstream labour 
activities such as Devine, Lane and Puirséil (eds), Essays in Irish labour 
history (Dublin, 2008), would be enhanced by the inclusion of how 
representation came about in the armed forces. The continuing research of 
Forster, Edmunds and Cottey (eds), outlined in their series of studies such as 
Soldiers and societies in post communist Europe (Hampshire, 2003), could 
benefit from an examination of the events outlined in this thesis, events that 
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occurred in Ireland during the very period in which they ground their analysis. 
It is conceivable that a new chapter could be added to the next edition of 
Coakley and Gallagher’s (eds) Politics in the Republic of Ireland (Oxon, 
2005), regarding how the Irish government now interact with the military. 
However, while it is certainly true that there is an interesting study to be 
gleaned from these disciplinary perspectives, the primary impact of the events 
regarding the relationship between the military body and the government is 
more firmly positioned in the study of civil-military relations. It is at this 
interface that new knowledge emerges regarding the hierarchal relationship 
between the military body and the government in Ireland. It is from this 
perspective that the extent of military intervention can be gauged. It is during 
the events of the period that the deeply held attitudes to command and 
discipline in the Irish Army were not only forced to the surface but became an 
issue of challenge between the army and the state it served. Confining this 
thesis to the acquisition of the right of association and the consequent 
industrial relations machinery, may  provide an interesting chapter to the story 
of industrial relations in Ireland, but it would not provide new knowledge to 
the study of civil-military relations. This thesis does however, provide new 
knowledge about Ireland in a discipline that seeks to understand the 
complexity of relationships that exist between a powerful body with the 
capacity for the ultimate dispensation of violence, and the government that it 
serves.   
Up to now, countries from the United States (US) to Africa and from 
Asia to South America have been studied,
9
 and although much has been 
written on the early relationships of army and state makers in Ireland, there is 
                                                 
9
 See for examples; S. Huntington, Political order in changing societies, (Yale, 1968), also 
C. Welch, (ed), Soldier and state in Africa, a comparative analysis of military 
intervention and political change, (Evanston, 1970), and S. Webber and J. Mathers, 
Military and society in post soviet Russia, (Manchester, 2006). 
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still very little that has dealt with either enlisted personnel or representative 
associations Throughout writings and theoretical proposals to date, a common 
assumption would appear to be that this civil-military relationship is gauged on 
the interaction between the officer corps and the government on one hand, and 
the officer corps and their ideal of 'the state' on the other. Much of the work 
examines the propensity of the military to 'intervene', a term that covers 
everything from political lobbying by the military of incumbent governments 
in relation to procurement, budgets and pay, to mutinies and the full final 
military coup d’état. In his examination of post colonial African civil-military 
relations, Welch contends that there are three types of army ‘involvement’ in 
the politics of the state, the ‘non-involvement’ where there is a total absence of 
meddling in politics, the mutinous activity arising, in the main, over pay and 
conditions which he says is the first step in involvement of the military in 
political life, and finally, the full political involvement embodied in the seizure 
of control.
10
     
In his seminal study, The soldier and the state, Huntington suggests that 
the more professional the officer corps, the less likely the possibility of 
intervention.
11
 He dismisses enlisted personnel completely from any 
consideration in the context of civil-military relations on the basis that they are 
not professionals. Very little of the literature gives any consideration at all to a 
role for lower ranks. Finer's work Man on horseback, suggests that any 
political interaction with the government constitutes 'intervention' and asks 
how are soldiers 'politicised'.
12
 Many consider officer training, officer corps 
corporate identity, and their bureaucratic functions, as being crucial in the 
consideration of the level or complexity of civil-military relations in a 
                                                 
10
 Welch, Claude, Jnr., Soldier and state in Africa, a comparative analysis of military 
intervention and political change, (Evanston, 1970), p 6-19. 
11
 Huntington, Samuel P., The soldier and the state, the theory and politics of civil-military 
relations, (Harvard, 1964). 
12
 Finer, Samuel E., The man on horseback, the role of the military in politics, 
(London,1962). 
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particular country.
13
  In Ireland the events that led to the emergence of the 
representative associations could easily be categorised as falling within a 
definition of 'intervention' in the hitherto context of civil-military relations. 
What would be new to this field of study would be an examination of the Irish 
context, and in particular, the consideration of the fact that enlisted personnel 
played a central role in shaping a substantial alteration in the actual civil-
military relations of the state.  
The internal written requests of soldiers to establish a representative 
body, the political and social activities of the spouses group NASA, the 
political criticism of government by the opposition parties and the media, 
European parliamentary resolutions, European military representative 
associations and the propensity for a lengthy constitutional court case all seem 
to have culminated in the passing of the Defence Amendment Act, 1990 which 
de-facto sets out legislative parameters that define the basis on which elements 
of the military will 'relate', or engage with the government, in certain 
prescribed areas. These events at the very least constitute a shift in civil-
military relations in Ireland and a new formal division of relations between 
purely military matters and social/military matters.   Before examining the 
events that played out in the political arena that considered the situation as it 
prevailed in the Defence Forces at the time, it is important to outline the 
particular hierarchal environment in which a soldier operates. 
Taking into account the common perspective that the military are unique 
in their responsibility to the state, in what Huntington calls their capacity for 
the ‘dispensation of violence', the fact that no threat of violence was a part of 
the events in Ireland is worthy of consideration in the broader study of civil-
military relations elsewhere. This thesis will also highlight attitudes of the 
Irish 'officer corps' at the time, which will give an insight into their particular 
                                                 
13
 A variety of perspectives are explored in Permulterr and Bennet (eds), The political 
influence of the military, a comparative reader, (Yale, 1980). 
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perception of loyalty to the state versus loyalty to the government, an area that 
appears to be of great interest to the various contributors to the discipline of 
civil-military relations. In Ireland, an examination of the sequence of events, 
the relevant activities of the participants, and the comparative issues in the 
context of civil-military relations will best help contextualise and define what 
happened, and what it means. Apart from issues of pay and allowances which 
are common to all workers, the consideration of life under military law is a 
crucial element to the understanding of what happened in Ireland, and the 
positioning of this study in the appropriate discipline.    
Peculiarities of military life 
Prior to these events of the late 1980s in Ireland, the day to day running of the 
armed forces was encapsulated in the system of the military ‘chain of 
command’. This system, which traditionally positioned members of the Irish 
forces outside of the sphere of industrial relations as practiced in the 
workplace of the civilian population, relied on a hierarchal authoritarian 
system of discipline supported by military law, Defence Force Regulations 
(DFRs), and a tradition of obedience.  Personnel, for reasons of discipline and 
state security, could never be afforded the right to strike or withdraw labour. 
Both ethically and culturally, members were deemed to be ‘in the service’ of 
the state. As in most countries, the armed forces are seen as the last line of 
defence in the event of either internal or external threat to the people, 
institutions or jurisdictional integrity of the state. Professor Samuel 
Huntington suggested that national security policy, under which armies are 
raised and maintained, operates in three forms and on two levels: 
Military security policy deals with external threats to the state. Internal 
security policy deals with the threat of subversion- the effort to weaken or 
destroy the state by forces operating within its institutional and territorial 
confines. Situational security policy is concerned with the threat of erosion 
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resulting from long term changes in social, economic, demographic and 
political conditions tending to reduce the relative power of the state.
14
 
He goes on further to suggest that there are ‘operating’ and ‘institutional’ 
levels in the implementation of policy. While the operating policy deals with 
the requisite resources to meet the contingency threat, institutional policy is 
the manner in which operational policy is formulated and executed. It is here 
that civil-military relations constitute the principle institutional component of 
security policy.
15
  
In Ireland in the late 1980s issues emerged that gave rise to institutional 
consideration and responses in at least two of Huntington’s designated areas of 
security policy, namely, the internal security policy, and the situational 
security policy. This being the case, there is an opportunity now to examine 
the motivations, considerations and catalysts for the process in the Irish 
context, and in so doing, to gain a new understanding of elements of civil-
military relations as yet unexplored. It is all the more important, for the 
broader subject, that much of the evidence will be from internal sources, given 
the almost secretive nature of the day to day running of a military organisation 
such as Ireland's professional volunteer army. In addition to the internal 
traditions, codes and regulations of an operational armed force, there is a 
cultural reluctance and in most cases a regulatory prohibition on members of 
such forces engaging with the outside world in any public fashion. There is 
even less opportunity to challenge and seek change to existing frameworks 
from within.  
Everywhere, including in Ireland, the operation of any military unit is 
dependent on the exercise of command and control. It is worth examining the 
military environment in which a strict hierarchal system of discipline is 
                                                 
14
 S. Huntington, The soldier and the state, the theory and politics of civil-military relations, 
(Harvard,1964), p1. 
15
 Ibid., p1. 
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deemed to be of central importance to the successful operation of any military 
force. In this regard, Finer maintained: 
Centralisation of command, the hierarchal arrangement of authority and 
the rule of obedience, are all necessary to make the army respond as a 
unity to the word of command… 16 
Orders are expected to be carried out immediately and without question. 
Welch and Smith acknowledge that soldiers are trained to: ‘Follow commands 
quickly, efficiently and without questions’.17 There is a military imperative 
and cultural assumption that a superior officer by virtue of his rank and 
training will always be making the right decision in issuing an order, and even 
if that may not be the case, there is a regulatory requirement that his or her 
subordinate will carry out the order anyway. The underlying principle of ‘do it 
now, and if there is a question raise it later’, was well portrayed in nineteenth 
century French military regulations, where the right to protest was permitted, 
but only 'after the order had been carried out.
18 
In an examination of the 
loyalty and obedience of the German officer corps, Demeter observes: 
In any army there must be obedience; but in Germany every officer – senior 
officers included – had been taught for half a century (partly under pressure of 
the First World War) that obedience must be placed far away and above all 
other military virtues and treated as an absolute value, as a sacred taboo.
19 
 
Military training instils the need for immediacy of response to orders, an 
absolute requirement, if the mission is to be completed, which can often mean 
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the difference between life and death. Institutionally and culturally 
subordinates comply with the orders and requests of their superiors. There is 
no situation where a difference of opinion or a fundamental disagreement on 
how something should be done arises. In Ireland as in most countries, it is an 
offence against military law not to comply with all lawful orders. Paragraph 
131 of Ireland’s Defence Act 1954 is very specific: 
Every person subject to military law who disobeys a lawful command of a 
superior officer is guilty of an offence against military law and shall, on 
conviction by court-martial, be liable to suffer penal servitude or any less 
punishment awardable by a court-martial.
20
 
In addition to the strict code of discipline that prevails in military 
organisations there is a highly defined demarcation of tasks. These can often 
be more dependent on rank than on expertise. Decisions of major managerial 
impact, together with those of the most seemingly minor import, are usually 
required to have the approval if not the actual authorisation of a superior. 
Although there are numerous strata of ranks in different armed forces, there is 
a universal constant; that is, the division of the officer corps, to whom all 
middle and senior management is entrusted, and enlisted personnel who are 
basically the workforce of the organisation. In the Irish forces as elsewhere, 
this rigidity of structural relationships is backed up by the physical reminder of 
the subordinate/superior hierarchy in the form of rank markings and uniform.  
It is ever present in military life. Rank differences are visibly apparent even in 
everyday working dress. Separate dining, recreation and living quarters are 
assigned to the three strata of private, NCO and commissioned officer ranks. 
However the most distinctive differences really occur in the division of labour 
that rank imposes. Virtually nobody from among the enlisted ranks is ever 
tasked with any duties that would involve making representations on behalf of 
the military force or interacting with external agencies for that matter.   
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All proposals to the Irish government regarding military logistical and 
budgetary requirements were traditionally compiled by senior officers of 
Defence Force Headquarters (DFHQ). All military personnel assigned as Aide 
de Camp to the President and the Taoiseach are commissioned officers. All 
captains of state ships, pilots of state aircraft, and representatives at the United 
Nations (UN) are all drawn from the officer corps. In such a system there was 
little requirement or desire for the upper ranks of the commissioned officer 
body to consult with the lower enlisted ranks and it was not surprising that 
claims for pay for enlisted personnel were traditionally processed by senior 
officers. There would be a number of justifications for this. Senior officers 
would have had the resources through various sections of DFHQ, such as 
Planning and Research (P&R), where they could formulate claims. In these 
military sections they could research past claims by both military and civil 
bodies. They could gather information from public service pay trends, conduct 
research, and engage with employer organisation on remuneration and 
allowances. However, it was rarely the case that they would consult with 
enlisted personnel on these matters. The same senior officers were often also 
responsible for procurement, seeking resources other than pay from 
government and so would have been in a position to assign priority to various 
segments of the defence budget from which all funding comes. There would 
have been a traditional view that officers, having higher educational entry 
requirements, would have a better understanding of what needed to be done. In 
any event, it was the officers that always made the case for increases in pay 
and allowance for all ranks.  
In the late 1980s in Ireland, the whole question of poor pay and 
conditions in the army ended up as a subject of national debate. Perhaps, had 
enlisted personnel been better informed about the process whereby claims for 
improved rates were being made on their behalf, perhaps if they had been 
included in the process itself, the quest for the right of association may not 
have arisen among them. The military hierarchy at the time were making 
constant strenuous efforts to have pay and allowances increased. Former Chief 
of Staff, Lt. General Gerry McMahon, recalled his own efforts to improve 
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conditions in the Curragh command involving his making a decision to bring 
in and to consult NCOs about the amalgamation of colleges. General 
McMahon was the exception rather than the rule when it came to engaging 
with his senior NCOs in anything that resembled ‘negotiations’; however, he 
conceded, ‘but it was a different army then’.21 Whatever local commanding 
officers could do about local conditions the fact remained that at that time 
senior military personnel formulated the claims in respect of pay.  
In the area of pay and allowances military management was tasked with 
that. The 1980s were truly appalling as regards the economy. The Defence 
Forces were stretched with the border. The government were unable to 
support and pay an army that they were totally dependent on. They 
ignored them, the government, the Department of Finance, and their 
agents the Department of Defence ignored them. I remember being on the 
periphery of a conversation when the then Chief of Staff Lt. General 
Tadgh O’Neill expressed extreme frustration at the situation with the fact 
that nobody would listen to him anymore. I think the time for something 
like representation had come. But there were a lot of fears about it at the 
time.
 22  
When the notion of a representative body to make claims on pay first began to 
emerge, there was little enthusiasm for it among military management. 
Certainly, officers themselves, who would have been aware of the process of 
making pay claims to the Department of Defence and who had been involved 
in it, did not see the forming of representative associations as the answer to 
tackling the pursuit of better pay.  
Despite the extent of dissatisfaction with pay, allowances and others 
matters, the officer body, never saw representative associations as being a 
part of the solution.
23 
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It is noteworthy that during the period leading up to the reported ‘army 
crisis’, continuous efforts were being made by the military hierarchy to seek 
better pay and allowances. Their efforts were not successful. Nevertheless, 
regardless of any ongoing disappointment in this or any other field, the nature 
of military thinking is to keep going, regardless of conditions, and to carry out 
the task in order to always complete the mission. From the time of the earliest 
fighting forces, this tradition has served armies well in the context of military 
conflict, in many instances being a matter of life and death and of survival 
itself. Arising from this need, one of the most important if not central ethos of 
the military is the ‘can do’ approach. What this means is, that whatever the 
difficulties, the inconvenience, the challenges or perceived obstruction in the 
way of a task or the fulfilment of an order, it is imperative that orders are 
followed and that every attempt is made to fulfil the instruction as issued. In 
any army, complaints that might impede the fulfilment of a task or mission are 
neither entertained nor permitted. In recruit training there are a number of 
examples of how this culture is inculcated in newly enlisted personnel. One is 
taught to respond to any request or order from a superior by shouting, as 
loudly as possible, ‘Yes Sir’. During marching drill and exercises in ‘square 
bashing’ it is forbidden to use one’s initiative to avoid obstruction and instead 
to continue obeying the last order until a new one is issued. Petty Officer Jim 
Halligan who undertook his basic training on Spike Island and in Haulbowline 
recalls: 
When we were doing our square bashing training, the Petty Officer in 
charge of us marched us around the drill square and then down along the 
depot lines where he gave the order for us to wheel left. This routing had us 
marching down an inclined slipway towards the sea. When the lads in the 
front stopped inches before entering the water, the instructor balled them 
out.
24
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Responding and acting on orders without question or hesitation 
regardless of how bizarre they may seem is an integral part of military 
training. It is also part of the removal process of individuality and the capacity 
for an individual. (as a military person), to make certain assumptions or take 
certain actions based on their own view or experience. On enlistment, 
personnel are assigned a number, which stays with them for their entire 
service. Every item of uniform, kit and clothing is marked by the recruit with 
the number and, when responding to questions about who a person might be,  
personnel are trained to give number rank and name, in that order. The 
uniform itself prohibits the possibility of any individualism in terms of dress, 
as does the hair length regulations, the dormitory style accommodation and the 
prohibition of any movement or travel without a pass granting permission, 
despite the absence of ‘regimental duty’ being performed. Enlisted personnel 
are required to do what they are told, not what they think they should do. Finer 
outlines the importance of the principle of military obedience thus:   
This obligation to unquestioning and prompt obedience is enhanced by the 
depersonalisation of the soldier. The army is too big a machine to reek of 
individuals, and the soldier becomes a number. Extraneous considerations 
are thereby thrust aside, and obedience to superiors recognised by their 
rank and insignia becomes the dominant or sole criterion of action. 
25 
These practices and this tradition are thought to be absolutely essential to any 
military force from recruit or cadet training stage up to and including 
situations when a unit will be expected to complete its mission, either in a 
hostile area of conflict or in a passive administrative situation in peacetime. 
Welch and Smith describe these organisational characteristics as ‘military 
cohesion’: 
 In addition, a host of long standing army practices stress the totality of the 
institution and diminish the uniqueness of the individual. Consider the 
basic training given to a raw recruit in the American army. He is stripped 
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of his civilian clothing, his hair, even his first name (Joe Jones becomes 
Private Jones); incorporated into a large, impersonal organisation; severed 
for several weeks from friends and family. The uniform, salute, PX and 
clubs provide new forms of identification and stratification. Cohesion must 
be maintained in the stress of battle, hence the emphasis on solidarity 
found within the armed forces. 
26
 
Regarding these peculiarities of military life or any other matter in the Irish 
armed forces, the airing of any criticisms by serving personnel to outside 
parties was not tolerated and communicating with any section of the media on 
any matters relating to the forces was strictly forbidden by military regulation 
paragraph 27 of A7, which is promulgated under the Defence Act 1954:  
PART VII. - COMMUNICATION OF MILITARY INFORMATION AND 
PERSONAL PUBLICITY. 
Interviews, etc. - prohibition of: 
27. The granting of interviews or the divulging of information by any 
officer or man of the PDF to members of the public on matters pertaining to 
the service or to the conduct thereof is forbidden. Save in the circumstances 
mentioned in paragraphs 30 and 31 no officer or man will authorise or purport 
to authorise the publication of any matter concerning the service or having 
relation to public business or questions of politics. Comment, if any, in 
publications, lectures, broadcasts or talks, touching on questions of a political 
nature - whether national or international - shall avoid strictly any reference 
which might be construed as being of a controversial nature. 
27 
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If personnel felt the desire to complain there was an internal ‘Redress of 
Wrongs’ system provided under the same section of the DFRs, A7.  This 
system set out a mechanism whereby soldiers who either had a complaint, or 
felt that they had been wronged by a superior, were entitled to bring the matter 
to a higher authority. Despite this provision there was a perception among 
Irish military personnel that this self regulated internal enquiry system, which 
in theory could bring a complaint as high as the Minister for Defence, was 
flawed and unjust towards the person against whom the complaint was being 
made. It was often the first stage in administrative bureaucracy that saw senior 
colleagues supposedly investigating colleagues. Richard Condron, a former 
Company Sergeant and Vice President of PDFORRA gave an insight as to 
how this system was perceived in the army: 
Other than pay we always had grievances. Mostly, they were about 
courses and promotion. We always had grievance procedure but it didn’t 
work. The famous redress of wrongs never worked, the people that were 
involved in it were the same people that were hearing the case. It was an 
absolute joke. What happened was with the likes of courses and promotion 
you would end up with someone who was dedicated, who was qualified, 
and who would probably be the senior person, now not being promoted for 
some obscure reason probably because some commanding officer did not 
like him or maybe didn’t like the look of him. That person then became 
frustrated with the system.
28 
 
When an opportunity was afforded to military personnel to make a case to the 
Commission on Remuneration and Conditions of Service in the Defence 
Forces (later known as the Gleeson Commission), the team tasked with 
contributing submissions on behalf of NCOs did not spare any sensitivities. 
Part of their submission regarding the redress of wrongs system stated: 
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The procedure is now held to be a meaningless ritual with little or no hope 
of actual redress in the end. There is also the perception that if a person 
applies for redress he may become the subject of ‘special treatment’ or 
some form of victimisation. The procedure has now lost all credibility and 
is now more or less ignored by most NCOs. This has led to a good deal of 
pent up frustration on the part of personnel with grievances of one sort or 
another and a more effective system of redress urgently needs to be put in 
place.
29
 
The team went on to propose a whole new system of redress involving 
members of the judiciary, the labour court and a figure such as the Leas Ceann 
Comhairle of Dáil Eireann. The officer’s team recommended the 
establishment of a military Ombudsman operating from outside the PDF with 
certain investigative powers and the capacity to make recommendations to the 
Minister. Gleeson, in response, acknowledged the shortcomings of the system 
recommending an examination of the procedures with a view to introducing 
new ones and suggested consideration be given to the establishment of a 
grievance board made up of a serving officer, an official of the Department 
and a member of the (as yet to be established) representative associations. 
Later in 2004 legislation provided for the introduction of a military 
Ombudsman following years of lobbying and negotiations by the PDFORRA, 
who first raised the issue for the need for one as early as 1992. This sense 
among military personnel that their world was enclosed and complaints about 
it could not be articulated outside of the strict bounds of military regulation, 
adds to the peculiarity of life in the profession. Furthermore it increases the 
isolation and ‘apartness’ noted by Huntington and Janowitz as being one of the 
ingredients that need to be taken in consideration when assessing the state of 
civil-military relations in any particular situation.  
From the inception of the legislation in Ireland’s Defence Acts orders 
from a superior officer were absolute and any deviation from them resulted in 
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a subordinate being guilty of a serious offence.
30
 In such a cultural 
environment of the late 1980’s many would have believed that it would have 
been inconceivable to permit a situation whereby any of the activities of the 
military body as a whole would ever have been subject to a process of 
negotiation between the groups, that in an industrial relations model, would 
represent the ‘management’ and the ‘workers’.  However this was to become 
the case. The evolution of the trade union movement in Ireland and elsewhere 
sought to put management/owners and their ‘subordinate’ workforce on 
equitable if not equal levels for the purpose of negotiations. The process of 
respective consultation and negotiation assumes at some level the right of the 
worker to disagree or object to management initiatives or instructions. This 
concept however would be alien to the structured command and control 
system that was and is relied upon in countless armies around the world. 
Unlike a factory that may grind to a halt in a civilian context, as a result of 
industrial disputes with little but financial consequences, it can be argued that 
any impediment to the work of the armed forces could led to loss of life or 
even the undermining of the security of the state.  
Research questions 
Given the gravity of such scenarios and the subsequent establishment of 
statutory representative associations that now engage in negotiations, a 
number of questions emerge. How did the Army in Ireland find itself in a 
situation where many of its decisions would eventually become subject to the 
need for agreement or consultation or both?  What changes took place in the 
existing operating and situational defence policy and how did they impact on 
civil-military relations? Were developments in Ireland at the time indicative of 
an erosion of civil-military relations? To what extent, if any did the military 
intervene in politics? Does the political intervention of enlisted personnel 
represent a greater or lesser threat to civil-military relations? Does the 
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evolution of representative associations lessen the susceptibility of military 
intervention? Has intervention occurred in Ireland before? In the face of the 
emerging reality that such a particular scenario was about to evolve, how did 
the traditional military hierarchy respond to the request for such provisions, 
called for under the heading of the ‘right of association’? Did European 
resolutions and organisations help Irish soldiers formulate a perspective on 
these matters? Did Irish soldiers in turn influence European personnel in the 
pursuit of their aims? In the prevalent, military culture of the 1980s how did 
the armed forces and the government perceive the effect of serving personnel 
and their families who were publicly criticising conditions of service? What 
were their fears and responses to such events? The specific and trenchant 
opposition that was cited by the army and the government will be outlined 
later so what triggered a change of heart? The examination and understanding 
of these matters will provide new knowledge of the area of civil-military 
relations in Ireland and may provide a framework from which to examine 
whether the consequent structures would be acceptable or would work for 
other armies in other countries.  
Literature review. 
At time of writing in 2010, the events that changed the context and operation 
of civil-military relations in Ireland are quite recent and may in time attract 
much more attention. However, there are gaps in our knowledge regarding 
where the Irish experience fits into the broader study of the subject, and if 
what happened represents a new dimension for the consideration of the role 
that enlisted personnel and representative bodies may play in the profile of 
such relations.  In the broad corpus of work examining civil-military relations, 
there has been little scholarly attention paid to the Irish context. Much has 
been written on events that have helped shape Ireland’s social and military 
history, such as the War of Independence and the Civil War, but they have not 
been contextualised with regard to the wider study of the subject. Professor 
Huntington does not examine the Irish context in his work although it has to 
be noted that at time of his writing, the Irish army structure differed little from 
other structures such as the British and the American. He did not consider any 
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possible role or impact of enlisted personnel in influencing civil-military 
relations in the Irish or any other army, nor does he, or any of the main 
contributors to the field look at representative associations. This is not because 
they did not exist then. The Dutch armed forces sought to form representative 
associations as early as 1896. At the time of Finer’s work in 1962 the German 
and Danish forces were forming or had already formed representative bodies 
for their serving personnel and although he mentions democratic and legal 
means of intervention he does not deal in any way with the very organisations 
which can facilitate such action.  Broadly speaking, very little attention has 
been paid to the role of enlisted personnel and their effect, if any, on the 
relationship between the military and the organs of state and even less so on 
the role, if any, of representative associations. Although military intervention 
is widely considered in the context of the use of arms, there is a dearth of 
material regarding ‘democratic intervention’ by members of armed forces and 
even less material regarding intervention by enlisted personnel. Military 
‘intervention’ in Ireland is probably seen in the collective memory as the use 
of the army to maintain essential services such as dustbin collection or public 
transportation during the withdrawal of labour by civilian unions.  
 Finer does grade different levels of intervention and includes among 
them a level where influence of the military authorities is exercised in a 
legitimate way with the level above being where pressure is applied.
31
 
Although these grades could be applied to the Irish situation, his only 
reference to Ireland is in relation to the Curragh mutiny and the 
constitutionality or otherwise of British army actions that occurred before the 
foundation of the Irish state. In much of the work examining the corporate 
nature of the officer corps there has been a tendency to separate the 
‘corporate’ being from the citizen. The events in Ireland highlight a belief in 
the duality of membership of a somewhat separated element of society with its 
own corporate identity, traditions, laws and rules, together with membership 
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of the broader community of a democracy where citizen’s rights are 
constitutionally guaranteed. The Irish situation also reveals an informal code 
of honour among enlisted personnel that places the integrity of the state at the 
highest level. Little has been written about the concept articulated in Ireland 
by Irish soldiers (influenced by Euromil) of the citizen in uniform, and of the 
notion given expression in the European parliamentary resolutions that in 
peacetime a soldier should be afforded the same democratic rights as all other 
citizens.      
Since few have considered the Irish context, it is not surprising that an 
examination of what happened in Ireland has not yet found its way into the 
broader studies.  This is significant since the events, their implications and 
their effects present the opportunity to acquire a new knowledge and a new 
perspective on civil-military relations. An understanding of the background, 
motivation and methodology in the pursuit by Irish military personnel of the 
right of association, is crucial to the understanding of how and why civil-
military relations in Ireland were affected. This will lend knowledge to the 
field that may assist us in a greater understanding of civil-military relations 
elsewhere. Culturally, governments may embrace them or dismiss them, 
academically, scholars may ignore them as a legitimate part of the study of 
civil-military relations but either way representative associations and the 
pursuit of the right to form them has been a missing link in the study of civil-
military relations so far. Despite an Irish military thesis regarding the 
establishment of the associations, and the readiness or lack of same by the 
military authorities there, and another thesis that deals with the operation of 
representative bodies at barrack level, there is little else in the way of scholarly 
debate on this important element of the broader field of study.  Commandant 
Michael Gannon examined the advent of representative associations in Ireland. 
However his focus was primarily on the events themselves and his conclusions 
about apportioning blame to government and to a lesser extent the military 
authorities on the emergence of the associations, which he appeared to view as 
an undesirable development. This interesting study was about the internal 
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responses of the army and their preparedness and as might be expected for a 
military thesis, it is a perspective grounded in command and control.
32
   
Oliver O’Connor, a former member of PDFORRA explored the actual 
operation of the associations committees at barrack level. This study is set in 
the years after the body was set up and sheds no light on the broader impact of 
the emergence of the association and its impact on the field of civil-military 
relations.
33
 Apart from these studies, an examination of some of the leading 
works that follow reveal a complete absence of consideration of the Irish 
context or of the role and position of representative bodies as a whole in the 
conduct of civil-military relations.  
The Gleeson Commission report outlines the findings and 
recommendations of Ireland’s first ever independent commission, set up in 
1989 to address what was being described in the Dáil and the newspapers as 
the ‘Army Crisis’.34 It was chaired by Senior Counsel, Mr Dermot Gleeson 
and had the following terms of reference, ‘To carry out a major review of the 
remuneration and conditions of service in the Defence Forces having regard to 
their separate and distinct role and organisation and to make 
recommendations.’ The commission report presents its findings as a result of 
twelve months of deliberation during which two hundred and fifteen written 
submissions were considered, eighteen oral hearings were conducted, thirty 
military installations and posts around Ireland were visited, 3000 defence 
force personnel were met and the commission itself went to consult with the 
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Irish members serving in the United Nations Interim Force South Lebanon 
(UNIFIL).  Although a detailed submission was made by the NCO Team to 
the commission seeking the right to establish an association to be known as 
the Permanent Defence Forces Other Ranks Representative Association 
(PDFORRA), the report only refers once to representative bodies quoting 
impending legislation as a reason not to respond to or comment on the request. 
Apart from the findings of the report, what is significant in the context of 
civil-military relations is that this was the first time members of the armed 
forces had an opportunity to express their views to an incumbent government 
without having to go strictly through the usual ‘chain of command’. However, 
the report itself does not address the issue of representative bodies and their 
possible alteration of the civil-military relations of Ireland. In addition to the 
many individual and organisational submissions made to the commission, the 
one compiled internally by the Defence Forces represents the most 
comprehensive of all.
35
 It records the wish lists of the officers, non 
commissioned and privates in relation to pay, allowances and conditions of 
service. Only fifty copies were made. It is interesting to note that through the 
process of setting up of rank orientated teams making submissions to the 
commission, a temporary framework was established which provided for an 
opportunity for the military to interact with the government for a specific 
purpose and a specific time frame in a specific way.     
In his seminal work, The soldier and the state, Huntington proposes a 
theoretical framework from which to study the relationship between civil 
authority and the military.
36
 It has become a leading reference text in the field. 
He examines in detail the role of the military in society and how it interacts 
with its various levels  but in particular, with government. He contends that 
the relationship between the two is unique given the skills set of the military, 
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their possession of arms and the capacity of an army to interfere with or 
overthrow their political masters.  Having established the necessity of a state 
to raise an army for internal and external defence, the point is made that there 
is therefore a dependency on an entity that of itself can also be the greatest 
threat to the very state that raises it. Given the capacity by possession of arms, 
of an army to turn on a government, Huntington explores the propensity of 
intervention by members of the armed forces and concludes that the higher the 
level of military professionalism, the lower the risk of intervention. He 
expounds the skills of the military officer and the officer corps concluding 
they are a profession on par with civilian’s medical and legal professions. He 
dismisses the enlisted ranks as having any impact or role in civil-military 
relations. His theoretical framework is set in an American setting but he did 
not consider the Irish context.  
Writing much later, Finer seeks to provide an informed insight into the 
general structure of command in an army and sets out the strengths, weakness 
and desirability or otherwise of peripheral or full involvement of the military 
in politics. In his Man on horseback he provides examples of the 
organisational cohesion and efficiency of a military body, but he argues that 
an army is incapable of running even the most primitive of societies.
37
  Finer 
disagrees with one of the central contentions of Prof. Huntington that the 
increasing professionalism of an army is a factor in diminishing the likelihood 
of military intervention in political affairs. Finer does not examine the 
attitudes of the military in Ireland despite the fact that they now have formal 
interaction with politics through the representative bodies and, that in his own 
‘table of intervention’, the Irish armed forces were at least at the first level. A 
study of the Irish situation could lend some clarity on his musings about the 
fine line between ‘influence’ and ‘blackmail’.38    
                                                 
37
 Finer, The man on horseback, the role of the military in politics, (London, 1962). 
38
 Ibid., p141. 
xxxvii 
 
There have been some examinations of post communist European 
civil-military relations - particularly in the light of the ‘democratisation’ of 
former soviet bloc countries. Edmunds, Cottey and Forster assess the 
transition of civil-military relations from the communist era to the post 
communist era at a distance of 15 years.
39
 Although their book examines 
military societal relations, it does not include consideration of the existence of 
representative associations and what role they may have played in that 
process. In another work on a similar theme, soldiers and societies they had 
looked closely at the relationship between the military and the society it 
serves.
40
 This book examined the role of armies in a number of central and 
eastern European states in the wake of the fall of the eastern bloc. The events 
considered are set in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The book does not refer 
to the role, however small, played by western European military representative 
associations in the ‘democratisation’ process of the military personnel of 
former communist regimes. Nor does it consider the role played by Ireland's 
representative association PDFORRA in the process.  
In his book, Democracy and military force, Philip Everts considers the 
growth in the influence of democratic societies input in the decisions made 
regarding entering conflict.
41
 It explores the changing level of acceptability of 
war with regard both to the motivation for it and the perceived casualty levels 
that may result from it. It combines and updates a number of previous papers 
by the author and considers the issues raised with regard to the western 
societal responses to military intervention in Kosovo and Iraq. The author does 
not consider the views held by European and Irish representative associations 
that a soldier in peacetime is a citizen in uniform and has a stake in decisions 
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made by society about war and armed conflict. An understanding of the 
representative bodies that this thesis will explore could contribute richly to the 
issues raised in the book. The methodology of those seeking to establish an 
input into how decisions are made that affect them as soldiers, could be 
considered to be intervention.  
Welch and Smith examine the propensity for military organisations to 
intervene in politics. In Military role and rule they draw on 5 examples of 
varying degrees from military influence in day to day government decision 
making, up to a full coup d’état. 42 The countries examined are Peru, Nigeria, 
France, Thailand and Egypt. In attempting to identify any particular pattern or 
factors that contribute to the likelihood of intervention, they consider matters 
such as political awareness of the officer class and the social class or strata 
they are recruited from, the use of the military for civilian operations, military 
organisational cohesion and the perceived effect of government policy on both 
the economic welfare of the state and its attitude to the military. A recurring 
theme is the question of military loyalty and the difference between whether 
the officer body feels subservient to the government or to the state and its 
people. They conclude that while there is great variation in the instances and 
circumstances of military influence and intervention, ‘throughout most of the 
world the military appears to be in politics to stay.’  The authors do not 
consider the Irish context, and despite the proximity of the activities of 
representative bodies (in some European countries at the time of writing) to 
the body politic, they do not consider them either.  
In an American context, Waterhouse and Wizard related their personal 
experiences in their efforts to assist GIs to ‘organise’.43 In their account, 
Turning the guns around they indicate that the organisational aims of this 
group were more to do with being allowed protest against the war and the 
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practice of compulsory drafting than the right to organise itself. When taken as 
a comparison to what happened in Ireland, it highlights the much narrower 
aims of Irish soldiers to have only the right of association and explicitly 
renounce their right to comment on operational matters and policy. It 
illustrates the response of the military in the US to the notion of soldiers 
‘organising’ for whatever reason, and the threat that was felt by those in 
authority.  
Despite parallels of that fear among the military in Ireland, it was the 
spouses group here that initially confronted the government in the seeking of 
better conditions for their husbands in the army. They argued at the time that 
their spouses’ poor conditions reflected in the quality of their own lives. In an 
American study regarding military spouses and the challenges surrounding 
their employment and education, ‘working around the military’ was 
undertaken in 2004 under the auspices of the US National Defence Research 
Institute and was prepared for the office of the secretary of defence.
44
  It took 
place against a background of the US administration being mindful of the 
impact of domestic contentment on the retention of serving military personnel. 
The work examines which factors of military life inhibit or restrict the 
capacity of the spouse to seek or acquire education or employment. As part of 
the research. 1,100 subjects were interviewed from all levels of enlisted and 
commissioned ranks. The research confirms that although the occupational 
choices of military spouses are the same as that of civilians, they are less 
likely to be employed than them, and when they are employed, earn less than 
their counterparts for the same work. There are numerous recommendations 
regarding making life in the military more harmonious for families. The report 
does not consider an Irish context or the evolution of the National Army 
Spouses Association (NASA) who articulated a view in the late 1980s that 
military personnel and their families were being treated differently from the 
rest of society. 
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In The political influence of the military Perlmutter and Bennet provide 
a variety of extracts from well known and some lesser known scholars and 
authors on the subject of civil-military relations and, in particular the influence 
or otherwise that the three types of military soldier proposed by Perlmutter 
have on the political system.
45
   It does not consider the operation of 
representative bodies comprising exclusively of soldiers who can have a direct 
influence on the political system, albeit in a regulated fashion.  
In other studies of this subject of intervention Welch and others 
analyse factors that lead to military involvement in politics in Africa and the 
impact of military rule upon individual African states. 
46
 As part of the 
analysis, the primacy of the loyalty of the soldier to either government or state 
is raised. Three types of military involvement in politics are suggested; 
abstention from politics, mutinies aimed at forcing governments to improve 
pay or conditions and coups d’état considered to be full scale military 
intervention. There may be comparisons that can be drawn from the ‘political’ 
influences brought to bear by Irish soldiers on politicians in Dáil Eireann with 
those mentioned by Welch, but, at time of writing the Irish situation had not 
yet evolved.  
Throughout the period that soldiers were seeking the right of 
association in Ireland the Officer Corps was never publicly involved. In one 
sense they stood apart, seeing themselves as dependent on the good will the 
government had towards them in relation to improving pay and conditions. 
This thesis later explores the attitude of officers in their approach to the 
problems of the late 1980s and in particular their sense of a two way code of 
honour between themselves and the government of the day. Karl Demeter, 
drawing on extensive German national archive sources, presents conclusions 
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having looked at the whole establishment and evolution of the German officer 
corps, its corporate identity, esprit de corps and code of honour.
47
 He 
examines the role of obedience of the military to the state versus the 
government, and among other things he details the moral, legal and 
professional dilemma of officers having to pledge allegiance to leaders such 
Hitler. Demeter confines himself to the Prussian and German officer codes, 
and Ireland, before or after independence is not considered.  
A study by Paul Smith of the relationship between the armed forces 
and the British government between 1856 and 1990 sheds no light on the 
arrangement that hitherto had existed in Ireland. His book Government and the 
armed forces in Britain, traces and comments on the relationship between the 
government of Britain and its military chiefs.
48
 In particular, it focuses on the 
process of procurement and defence budget determination. The arrival of 
representative bodies and their competing for scarce resources from the 
national budget undoubtedly could impact on those relationships but they are 
not considered in his work.   
There has been a variety of studies and scholarly interest on the whole 
question of civil-military relations. The political, economic and security issues 
that have hitherto been considered by authors and researchers have not been 
able to take account of the impact or potential impact of representative 
associations because they have been generally unaware of them.  Equally, 
studies that attempt to understand the complexity of loyalty and what prompts 
intervention have not had the added benefit of considering the new knowledge 
presented by the examination and analysis of the events in Ireland that brought 
about the emergence of representative associations in the armed forces here. 
This thesis may well provide a whole new factor that has to be considered by 
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scholars when assessing the relationships that exist between military bodies 
and their civilian governments.  
Despite the lack of attention paid in the Irish context to the significance 
of the emergence of the representative associations in the armed forces, in the 
research of this thesis I have been very to fortunate to have had the kind co-
operation and assistance of the Secretary General of the Department of 
Defence, Mr Michael Howard, in accessing Department of Defence files not 
yet in the public domain. These files are unique in the sense that they came to 
be produced at a time when the Irish government were demanding explanatory 
perspectives from the military authorities with regard to their attitude and 
beliefs in the whole exercise of command and discipline, and the fundamental 
nature of the relationships between the military and the state. Equally the 
assistance of the former Chief of Staff, Lt. General Dermot Earley in gaining 
the co-operation of all units of the PDF, paved the way for widespread 
cooperation from personnel of the Defence Forces. Unfortunately, in the 
period between the time he provided me with such assistance and 
commentary, and the time of writing, he has passed away. Former and current 
serving members of the Army, Navy and Air Corps were most helpful as were 
PDFORRA headquarters of Staff and Secretariat. The presidents of Euromil 
and PDFORRA together with their General Secretaries were most helpful. I 
am sincerely grateful to them all.   
Methodology 
The methodology adopted in the approach to this thesis was to gather, collate 
and analyse all available primary source material surrounding the events that 
led to the founding of the representative associations in the Irish armed forces 
and to contextualise it in the discipline of civil-military relations. This material 
is considerable. There were numerous parliamentary debates focusing on the 
issue including those that took place prior to the passing of 11 Defence 
Amendment Act 1990. Newspaper coverage of the emergence of the National 
Army Spouses Association in 1988, and their campaign to highlight conditions 
of service of their husbands, still in the Army, but legally prohibited from 
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making public comment or engaging with the media in any capacity, provided 
a perspective on how the question of soldiers’ rights were seen. An interview 
with a leading campaigner of the women’s group provides insight into the 
thinking and motivation of the women belonging to the organisation that 
initially set the public agenda. In February 1990, the unauthorised public 
interview given by a serving member of the Defence Forces about matters 
pertaining to representation in the Defence Forces resulted in immediate 
country wide coverage and interest from newspaper, radio and television 
stations, that was to last for over two years. These sources provided insight 
into the perspectives of all the protagonists in what had become a national 
debate. Interviews conducted with personnel in the military hierarchy, the 
government of the day and the civilian Department of Defence who were 
directly involved at the time provided primary source perspectives on the 
interpretation of events.  
Interviews were arranged by written request to the Chief of Staff, Lt 
General Earley (RIP), a former Chief of Staff, Lt General (retired) Gerry 
McMahon, the incumbent Secretary General, Mr Michael Howard and the 
former TD and Senator, Dr Brian Hillery. It was crucial to the thesis to have a 
perspective from those who were in positions of authority and decision 
making at the time and also to acquire important perspective with the benefit 
of almost two decades of the operation of the associations.  The general 
context of questions was highlighted in the written requests to these 
individuals. Interviews with former activists such as Richard Dillon, founding 
Chairman of PDFORRA, former Naval regional Chairman PDFORRA Jim 
Halligan, and current General Secretary PDFORRA, Gerry Rooney were 
requested by telephone and advice given that the context of questions would 
be about their recollection of the events and the motivation for them. Any 
interviews conducted using a digital recording device were done with the 
permission of the participant with the device in full view. These have been 
transcribed and attached as appendices. Comments made by others during 
personal discussions appear as quotations in the text. In these and the 
previously mentioned interviews, consent forms were signed and these have 
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been submitted. It is intended to lodge all such material in the University 
archive for consultation by future researchers.  There were a number of minor 
interviews conducted using written notes only. These can also be made 
available to the collection. Discussions or interviews of a general nature for 
the gleaning background information, particularly in relation to Spain and 
Euromil, are also listed.  
In this regard the aforementioned interviews are categorised in the 
bibliography in three ways. Primary personal interviews were conducted with 
people who had prolonged involvement with the emergence of the associations 
or continued operation of them. General Secretary Michael Howard, former 
Chairman and founding member Richard Dillon, former Chief of Staff, Lt 
General Gerry McMahon, current General Secretary PDFORRA Gerry 
Rooney, former Commander Eoin McNamara, and former Naval Region 
chairperson James Halligan all fall into this category. Their interviews are 
transcribed and with their written consent, are attached to the work.  
Those who were involved at different but important times in the whole 
process and who offered their perspectives are categorised in the bibliography 
under  ‘secondary personal commentary’. They are quoted directly in the 
work, and include Richard Condron, former vice President PDFORRA and 
Company Sgt. (retired), Lt. General D. Earley serving Chief of Staff, Noel 
(Sam) Fealy, Senior Petty Officer Irish Navy and former activist and 
representative Naval Region PDFORRA, Dr Brian Hillery, former TD, 
Senator and emissary of government for talks to PDFORRA in March 1990, 
Jack Kiernan, former activist and National Welfare Officer PDFORRA, June 
Kiernan, former NASA activist and candidate for 1989 general election, James 
Martin,  Flight Sergeant (retired) and member of NCO submission team to the 
Gleeson Commission, Colonel Brian O’Keefe,  General Secretary RACO,  Lt 
Colonel Adrian Ryan, Deputy General Secretary RACO, and John Wolfe, 
former Squadron Quartermaster Sergeant, founding member PDFORRA and 
member of NCO Gleeson Team. All have provided their written consent with 
one exception, Lt General Earley passed away before the consent form had 
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been processed. Finally those who provided insight or context in the course of 
the research but not quotations are listed in the bibliography under the heading 
‘contextual background discussion’. 
The background to the court case that was undertaken in 1990, seeking 
an interlocutory injunction to prevent disciplinary proceedings being taken 
against the appointed spokesperson for the representative group whom 
government or military authorities had refused to recognise, was considered in 
terms of its timing and possible effect on government responses. The 
perspectives of those in the military of their comparative conditions of service 
in the Defence Forces and in other uniformed services of the state at the time 
was addressed, as was the report of the Gleeson Commission established in 
July 1989. The relevance and influence of resolutions of the European 
parliament in 1984, and the Council of Europe in 1988 concerning the 
provision of the right of association in peace time for members of the armed 
forces, was taken into account. The context of the relationship between army 
and government in the 1980s, was briefly compared to the two other recorded 
periods of strained relationship in Ireland, in the Curragh Mutiny and the 1924 
mutiny. The methodical analysis of the evidence has provided a chronological 
construction of the events while considering in parallel the main topics and 
considerations that influenced the outcome.  
An extensive examination of the currently restricted Department of 
Defence files outlining the detail of meetings between the representatives of 
the PDFORRA and the military and departmental officials provided great 
clarity into the thinking of the main stakeholders at the time and into their 
deepest fears and reservations. Access was arranged with the permission of the 
Secretary General Michael Howard. These files were classified as ‘secret’ 
with designated identification notation of P244 parts 1 and 2.  These files 
contain a variety of documents, minutes and letters pertaining to the 
emergence of the representative associations and the interaction between the 
various stakeholders. Throughout this work any documents from these files 
are referenced using the departmental notation and the date and title of the 
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document or letter as appropriate.  My own involvement in the events that led 
to the emergence of representative associations in the Irish armed forces 
presents a scholarly challenge that needs to be addressed from the outset. I was 
one of the signatories to the letter addressed to the Minister for Defence 
seeking the right to form an association. I was selected as the Naval 
representative for the NCOs team for the Gleeson Commission and I 
subsequently became the spokesperson for that group to the commission. I was 
elected as the secretary PRO of the ad hoc PDFORRA. I was the spokesperson 
who, in breach of military regulations, sought judicial relief in the high court 
with reference to the constitutional right of association. Later, I became the 
lead negotiator in the four phases of negotiations that took place i.e. between 
ad hoc PDFORRA and government representatives regarding the impending 
legislation; between ad hoc PDFORRA and the principle franchise officer; 
between the elected representatives, following the enactment of legislation, 
and the military and civil authorities and finally, as first elected general 
secretary of the statutory PDFORRA in the formal Conciliation and 
Arbitration Scheme (C&A) that was set up.  
It is not my intention to judge the merit or otherwise of what happened in 
Ireland in the late 1980s. I only wish to contextualise the events of that period 
in broader study of civil-military relations and to add new knowledge to the 
field. Although having been involved at the highest level, it is interesting to 
note that neither myself nor any of the main participants ever discussed or 
considered the works of Huntington or others in the pursuit of a change in the 
relationship between the military and the government. Where I have 
recollections of speeches or meetings, I have refrained from using them unless 
written evidence or other primary sources are available. During interviews I 
have recorded faithfully the views of contemporaries, some of whom would 
have been ‘political’ rivals or disgruntled superiors at the time.   
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Chapter 1 
The evolution of  civil-military 
relations in Ireland 1913-24 
Professor Huntington in proposing a theoretical framework from which 
to study civil-military relations suggested that any system of such relations 
involve the ‗complex equilibrium between the authority, influence and 
ideology of the military, on the one hand and the authority, influence and 
ideology of non-military groups on the other‘. They are he said, ‗two elements 
that are interdependent on each other, and no one of these elements can change 
without producing further changes in the other.‘1 The two broad elements to 
which he refers are the military body itself and the civilian community from 
which it receives its direction. In a technical sense any armed force cannot 
exist in isolation, they must have a community to serve. Even if this is not a 
single community, armies are headless alone, directionless unless a higher 
authority gives instruction and identifies objectives that utilise the unique 
skills that they possess in the application of violence.
2
  
Finer suggests that armies are precluded ‗save in exceptional 
circumstances, and for brief periods of time, from ruling without civilian 
collaboration and openly in their own name. Soldiers must either rule through 
civilian cabinets or pretend to be something other than they are.‘3  
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Apart from armed criminal gangs who exist purely for financial gain, 
rebel bands, insurgent armies and revolutionary groups serve some higher 
purpose or aspiration always bigger than the sum of the individual. In such 
cases they may well be seeking to establish a nation or a community but few 
armed groups exist purely for the perpetration of their existence alone. Given 
that most societies feel the need for an armed force to protect and defend their 
citizens and vital interests, a relationship based on service arises. That the 
nation‘s interests are being served is usually the justification for maintaining 
an army in the first place. However given that an army is going to be the most 
lethal force of any particular society, nominally capable of destroying those 
whom it serves, the way it provides service, receives its instructions and 
relates to those they are obliged to obey is what constitutes the various 
elements of civil-military relations.  
Identification of the ultimate authority for the armed forces to act 
becomes crucial. Do they serve the nation? If so, who or what is the 
embodiment of the nation? Democracy and other forms of governance usually 
identify a person or group, who supposedly represents the wishes of the 
community. This representation, if the elective process is legitimate, serves to 
provide the necessary leadership for the armed forces and embody the 
imperative to send them to war. But there are other scenarios. There can also 
be constitutional, legal, royal, governmental arrangements or tradition. In the 
case of the US there is provision for congressional approval of the decision to 
go to war, yet according to Professor David Kennedy this has only been 
exercised in five out of two hundred and thirty four decisions over the last two 
centuries that sent US military personnel into armed conflict. All other 
occasions were by executive order.
4
 If the legitimacy of the decision to go to 
war is in doubt, if the motivation of the figure or body who has made a 
determination of necessity is in question, then there are serious moral and 
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social issues that arise. The structures that govern who is responsible to who, 
with regard to the national interest being served, and the taking of decisions 
that impact upon it are crucial elements of civil-military relations. Is it the 
military themselves who decide when and where they are to act in the 
application of violence? Is it the entirety of government or a part of it which is 
responsible? Is there a point at which a military body acting in the belief that it 
will serve the public interest will challenge and/or threaten a sitting 
government or ruler. If not, what of the officers in the German army who tried 
to assassinate Hitler?  
Most societies abhor the very notion of military intervention which by 
and large takes the form of armed soldiers using their weapons to either 
forcibly remove or change the decisions of a sitting government. Such action 
is clearly recognisable and easily defined. A military force refusing to carry 
out the order of the government could be categorised similarly. Such 
manipulations of the government by the military are based on the threatened 
use or actual use of arms. Though skilled and exclusively trained in the 
administration of military force, can armies exert political pressure without 
them? Or is it reasonable to assume that any intervention whether using arms 
or not carries an implied threat to do so? Finer classifies military intervention 
in politics as ‗The armed forces constrained substitution of their own policies 
and/or their persons for those of the recognised civilian authorities.‘ He 
suggests that the factors that inhibit intervention include professionalism and 
esprit de corps, the principle of civil supremacy, and the possibility of self 
destruction or eventual abolition when a civilian power structure is re-
established, of them all, he quotes civil supremacy as being the most effective 
means of inhibiting military intervention. In considering motives that dispose 
the military to intervene, Finer suggests the following:  
The ‗manifest destiny of the soldier‘ in which it is claimed that the soldier 
enjoys a ‗sacred trust‘, almost a divine duty to act in the public interest. 
The belief that they hold most precious the national interest of the nation 
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in their actions and finally the motivation to act out of self interest, for 
improvements in their own careers or conditions.
5
   
Huntington however wrote that the disposition to intervene was made 
greater or lesser by the actual professionalism of the army officers, the more 
professional in training and ethos, the less likely to intervene. However both 
this argument and Finer‘s see soldiers somehow outside of the political 
process. Finer admits ‗we know little or nothing about the mechanism by 
which rival political ideologies are transmitted into and throughout the armed 
forces. On the whole, the military are effectively prohibited from participating 
in civilian party activities; and it is not through such participation that political 
ideologies are usually transmitted to and through them‘. He maintains that 
most countries strive to prevent military involvement in political parties and 
advances some ‗obvious‘ reasons as to why.6 While it is true that many 
countries prohibit the active participation of soldiers in political parties in an 
attempt, one presumes, to give effect to civilian supremacy, the fact remains 
that soldiers have a vote and are able to exercise it in favour of one party or 
another albeit in a secret ballot which is also true of any other citizen. The 
issue then is not about the exercise of the franchise, which has long been 
established as a citizen right and in some cases such as Australia as an 
obligation, but about the democratic activity that goes together with having the 
right to vote. The exercise of democracy however is not only about casting the 
vote. Citizens often wish to consult their politicians, to try to influence them in 
some way or another for community or personal entitlements. Politicians also 
want to garner support and will speak to all who have the capacity to install 
them in office, or remove them from it.  
The thorny question that arises when considering political intervention 
is as to whether the military should be assumed to be a different entity at all. If 
all citizens are free to engage in political lobbying as is their right in a 
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democracy, is there not a case to be made for soldiers? Professor Kennedy 
suggests that there was a time when the bearing of arms was considered an 
obligation which was conferred on those who were full and active citizens. 
There was a direct link between citizenship and the necessity of a community 
to defend itself.
7
 This effectively meant a direct link between citizenship and 
service in the army. If a community or group legitimises itself with democratic 
principles in the election of its leaders and the conduct of its business, and it 
further asks of some of its citizens to undertake the commitment to lay down 
their lives in defence of those principles, can it be argued that there is an 
inconsistency at play? On one hand seeking the ultimate sacrifice for 
something that is deemed a fundamental human right and on the other denying 
that right to the very people who are willing to defend it? The argument about 
political party membership causing division in the army could be equally 
applied to military personnel who support rival football teams, or enjoy being 
members of different religious beliefs. According to Professor Kennedy, the 
Weinberger Doctrine sought to extend part time membership of the armed 
services to ‗ordinary citizens‘ in the hope that more thought would be given 
before committing the country to war. 
8
 Even though there can be a distinction 
made between the traditional ‗citizen‘ armies such as  Greece and post 
revolution France and the ‗professional‘ armies of the UK, US and Ireland 
today, are not all soldiers full citizens of the country under which the army is 
raised? Given that to serve in the armed forces it is usually a prerequisite to be 
a citizen are we to assume that the citizens in the full time forces are less 
deserving of consideration in the decision making process that leads to war. 
Are there degrees of citizenship?  It seems on the other hand that there are 
examples of soldiers interfering with the political process in such a way as to 
hinder the work of government, and this is clearly undesirable. 
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In the events in Ireland that led to the emergence of representative 
associations, the idea of the democratic rights of soldiers was raised on many 
occasions during the campaign of soldiers to acquire ‗the right of association‘. 
The soldiers, at the time, perceived that the basis of this right was grounded in 
the Constitution of Ireland where all citizens are conferred with the right to 
form associations for professional interests. They clearly saw themselves as 
being entitled to rights that came with actual citizenship.  
Origins of the Irish Armed Forces  
In identifying the origins of the Defence Forces of Ireland there are numerous 
starting points that can be averted to depending on perspectives. One question 
that emerges is at what point is an army ‗the army of the state‘. Is it correct to 
identify a pre-independence group as a state army, or an army in waiting? If 
the central core of the study of civil-military relations is about the relationship 
between the two legitimate bodies of a state, to what extent can a 
revolutionary army and an unrecognised government and their relationship 
with each other be considered in the context that discipline?  The current 
definable continuous Irish Defence Forces were set up by proclamation in 
1924 as authorised by section twenty two of the Defence Forces (Temporary 
provisions) Act 1923.
9
 From this date the current PDF became subject to 
government control. From 1923 the ‗temporary‘ provisions were re-enacted by 
legislation each year until the Defence Act 1954 was passed providing a more 
permanent nature to the legislation governing the forces. Prior to the passing 
of the original 1923 Act the army can be said to have originated from elements 
of a revolutionary group that had participated in the armed struggle for Irish 
Independence. Humphrey and Graves, in their work on military law in Ireland, 
set the point of origin at the foundation of the Irish Volunteers, established by 
Eoin MacNeil in November 1913.
10
 In Duggan‘s  history of the Irish army he 
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also sets this date but acknowledges the changes in emphasis, name and focus 
of the group with a split in September 1914 over the thorny issue of fighting 
for the British Army in world war one.
11
 The formulation of an oath of 
allegiance to the Republic and the first Dáil Eireann that was sought by the 
government 20 August 1919 was seen by some as facilitating the 
establishment of an official state army. When the oath was tabled it was 
pointed out that the present constitution of the Volunteers ‗prevented them 
from being subject to any other body but their own executive‘. It was proposed 
that at their next convention they would be asked, as a standing army, to swear 
allegiance to the Dáil. The Minister for Defence on the day said he regarded 
the Volunteers as a standing army and that as such they should be subject to 
the government.
12
 It could also be argued that it was not until 1921 that the 
army was formally connected to the government when in the second Dáil on 
March 11 1921, at the height of the War of Independence; the government 
finally took responsibility for them and their actions. The President of the 
Dáil, Eamon deValera, said he felt that while in  America and since he came 
home, the Dáil was hardly acting fairly by the army in not publicly taking full 
responsibility for all its acts. He suggested that formal acceptance of a state of 
war being in existence would also position them to seek ‗belligerent rights‘ 
abroad.
13
  
 Ireland had up to this point a long history of struggle that had 
manifested itself in a variety of insurrections, attempted revolutions, uprisings 
and paramilitary activity. Earlier in history the assistance of other nations were 
sought to encourage Britain to leave her earliest and probably most 
troublesome colony. France and Spain in particular had been encouraged into 
the ongoing conflict of Anglo Irish affairs. Being on the side of the Irish and 
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against the British coincided with their own strategic interests. Neither was 
successful. Even the nominal villains of the First World War, the Germans, 
were courted for a time leading up to the Easter Rising in Dublin in 1916. The 
Easter Rising as it became known, was a military failure but certain events 
during and after it contributed to it being seen as a milestone in the lengthy 
history of Irish armed resistance. It was perhaps at this point that a relationship 
between those bearing arms for a nationalist ideal and the general populace 
began to grow into the particular brand of civil-military relations that was to 
evolve in  Ireland. On Easter weekend of 1916, the proclamation of the 
establishment of a republic was first read out on the steps of the General Post 
Office in O‘Connell St. Dublin, the epicentre of the insurrection, by Padraig 
Pearse. Although many Irish people seemed indifferent to the events that 
weekend and some Dubliners were more than peeved at the disruption the 
fighting caused, the subsequent rounding up of the insurgent leaders and the 
manner of their executions appeared to coalesce people‘s views towards the 
merits of independence and armed struggle. The shooting at dawn on 3 May 
1916 of Pearse, McDonagh and Clarke followed the next day by the 
executions of Plunkett, Daly, O‘ Hanrahan and Pearse‘s brother Willie and 
then the following day MacBride, shocked the Irish population. After a one 
day cessation Colbert, Kent, Mallin and Hueston were also shot. Finally on 12 
May Seán MacDermot and James Connolly (in his wheelchair) were both 
executed at Kilmainham Jail. Other death sentences followed but were 
commuted to imprisonment. Robert Kee suggests: 
In the Irish situation an extremely tense and sensitive emotional 
atmosphere had been created by these measures…even so it cannot be said 
that they need inevitably, in themselves, have led to the pronounced swing 
round of public opinion to the rebel‘s way of thinking which took place. 
They merely created a needlessly favourable climate for such a 
transformation.
14
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The hardening of opinion against British military treatment of those 
involved in the Easter Rising was seemingly balanced by an equitable 
softening of attitudes towards those who suffered execution, incarceration and 
internment. Augusteijn noted: 
The virulent British reaction to the failed rising of 1916 swayed the 
allegiance of many and, by identifying with popular issues such as the 
opposition to conscription, the republicans established themselves as the 
main representatives of nationalists in 1919. 
15
 
 The armed struggle did continue despite the execution of the leaders of the 
Easter Rising, the imposition of martial law, the arrest of over 3,400 of whom 
1,841 were interned and the ninety death sentences that were issued.
16
 Two 
years later on 14 December 1918 the parliamentary elections for Westminster 
resulted in a massive swing of support for Sinn Féin who had identified 
themselves closely with the events of 1916 and their aftermath. Of the 105 
seats contested, six former members of the Irish Parliamentary Party 
candidates were returned, twenty six Unionist and seventy three Sinn Féin. 
When elected they did not take their seats in Westminster. On 21 January 1919 
twenty eight of the available Sinn Féin elected representatives met and 
established the first Dáil declaring themselves to be the government of Ireland.  
It was also on this date that the ‗War of Independence' began.17 These new 
parliamentarians were men who had advocated military struggle and were 
identified with those who claimed they bore arms in the national interest.  
For those who had advocated the struggle itself it had not been a 
smooth transition from armed revolutionary group to subordinate disciplined 
                                                 
15
 J. Augusteijn, From public defiance to guerrilla warfare, the experience of ordinary 
volunteers in the Irish war of independence 1916-1921, (Dublin,1996), p335. 
16
 Adrian Hardiman, ‗Shot in cold blood: military law and Irish perceptions in the 
suppression of the 1916 rebellion‘, in G., Doherty and D.Keogh (eds.), 1916 the long 
revolution, (Cork, 2007), p225-249. 
17
 Gerard Humphreys and Ciaran Craven, Military law in Ireland, (Dublin, 1997), p2. 
10 
 
national army. Prior to the establishment of the state, the armed elements that 
constituted a revolutionary army, had taken their orders from, and pledged 
allegiance to, their own ‗army council‘. Many of the leaders of that council 
were also members of this first Dáil that had been formed arising from the 
legitimate parliamentary election of 1918 albeit for a different parliament. In 
March 1921 the government of the first Dáil endorsed the armed struggle that 
had become known as the ‗War of Independence‘.18  Two months later as a 
result of the Government of Ireland Act being passed in December 1920 
another set of elections were held for new parliaments North and South. Many 
of the same candidates who had made up the first Dáil were re-elected. The 
same approach was adopted as had taken place previously. The successful 
candidates established the second Dáil and ignored the institution for which 
the elections had been held. Throughout a heightened guerrilla war against the 
British military and administrative presence in Ireland, Michael Collins had 
been the Minister for Finance of the government while at the same time 
director of  intelligence who co-ordinated and directed the conflict. 
When Britain finally agreed to talks, Collins was directed by the 
government to participate in the group of plenipotentiaries that went to 
London to engage in a conference there on 11 October 1921. The resultant 
treaty signed by them was a source of sharp division among members of the 
republican government on their return. It fell short of the ideal of recognising 
the previously declared republic for all thirty two counties and yet took 
cognisance of the parliament that had been already set up for Northern Ireland, 
enshrining partition. The divisive debates that took place were to be aired in 
Dáil Eireann and the country at large. That same division was also prevalent 
among the men of the armed force who had been engaged together in what 
they saw as the fight for Irish freedom in the War of Independence. Robert 
Kee suggested it was the ‗army who had brought the situation in which there 
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was to be a treaty debated at all‘.19 Nevertheless, it was hoped that with a full 
debate in the Dáil, all views could be expressed and a democratic vote could 
be taken to resolve the matter finally and either accept or reject what had been 
offered by Britain. The plenipotentiaries who signed the treaty on behalf of the 
provisional government saw it as a stepping stone to acquire full freedom. 
Michael Collins stated:  
I am responsible for making the nation fully understand what it gains by 
accepting it, and what is involved in its rejection. So long as I have made 
that clear I am perfectly happy and satisfied. Now we must look facts in 
the face. For our continued national and spiritual existence two things are 
necessary—security and freedom. If the Treaty gives us these or helps us 
to get at these, then I maintain that it satisfies our national aspirations.
20
  
The government debate split the Dáil almost down the middle with 
those politicians opposed to the treaty losing the vote on 7 January 1922 by a 
small margin of fifty seven votes to sixty four. Immediately after the vote was 
taken, Eamon deValera contextualised his perspective on the authority of the 
parliament. He relegated the parliamentary debate to being just a ‗resolution‘ 
and suggested that there was already a ‗republic‘ which somehow had more 
authority because it had been established by the ‗Irish people‘:  
There is one thing I want to say—I want it to go to the country and to the 
world, and it is this: the Irish people established a Republic. This is simply 
approval of a certain resolution. The Republic can only be disestablished 
by the Irish people. Therefore, until such time as the Irish people in regular 
manner disestablish it, this Republic goes on.
21
 
                                                 
19
 Robert Kee, Ourselves alone, (London, 1976), p158.  
20
 Dáil debates, vol. 3, [32-33], 19 December 1921.  
21
 Dáil debates, vol. 3, [346], 7 January 1922.  
12 
 
In this stated perspective it would seem that the government of the day 
in deValera‘s view was secondary to a higher idealist entity. Perhaps at this 
point civil turmoil was inevitable. Led by Eamon deValera, those who 
opposed the treaty walked out of parliament and political debate degenerated 
into physical conflict. What had been a relatively united government with its 
own united, though somewhat independent, army during the struggle for 
independence was now a divided group of politicians followed by a divided 
group of armed personnel. This was a crucial point in the very birth of the new 
nation state and an immediate crisis in civil-military relations was about to 
emerge. Peter Young suggested that the foundation of the military 
organisation had been established before the War of Independence.
22
 Prior to 
the parliamentary walkout it could be argued that the civil-military relations 
were at their peak, with the body politic and the military establishment, such 
as it was, united in their aims if not in their strategy. Instead, a military body, 
although not a formal one, had many of its members rejecting the authority of 
the parliament and the democratic decision it had made, thus reflecting the 
wider social and political division among the population. Kee maintained that 
it was anti-treaty sentiment inside the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and their 
allegiance to their own leaders, not deValera which brought about civil-war.
23
 
It could be argued that this rejection and what followed was full 
military intervention.  The ensuing civil war consolidated the political division 
and also the loyalty of the men of arms to the respective sides of the conflict. 
Those who did not accept the provisions of the treaty fought against those who 
did. De Valera argued that the army were the army of the republic and that the 
disestablishment of the republic by the government could lead to civil war.
24
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The conflict and the targeted violence it generated was not confined to 
the fighters themselves, government Ministers of the new ‗Free State‘ became 
‗legitimate targets‘ in the conflict as did those who had left the government. 
During the treaty debate itself, Cork deputies had been circulated with a notice 
that they would be shot if they voted in favour of it. When it was brought to 
the attention of Cahal Brugha, in the Dáil on 16 December 1921 he refused to 
deal with rumours and asked for evidence.
25
 Later when he received a copy of 
the actual document he read it to the House: 
To all T.D.'s in the Cork No. 1 Area: 
(1) On December 10th the Staff of the First Southern Division and all 
Brigade Commandants met and sent forward to G.H.Q. a unanimous 
demand for the rejection of the Treaty proposals. 
(2) You are reminded it is your duty to support this demand. 
(3) To act otherwise would be treason to the Republic to which we have all 
sworn allegiance. 
Now I have given you my assurance that I am going to deal with the 
persons responsible for sending out that.
26
 
 If the Irish armed forces of the fledgling republican government were 
perceived to be the official army of the day it may be construed that the civil 
war constituted the highest level of military intervention by a large number of 
those forces as defined by Finer, Huntington and others.  Those soldiers who 
rejected the provisions of the treaty and fought against it were placing the 
pursuit of an ideal above civil authority. It could be also argued that since the 
ideal of the revolutionary army had not been fully met then the government 
that was constituted before realisation of the ideal was not a legitimate 
government and rejection of their resolutions was merely a continuation of the 
original struggle and not intervention. Lawlor maintained that deValera was 
responsible for the prolonging of the conflict in transforming what had 
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previously been, local allegiance of IRA units into a broader part of an ideal of 
the republic.
27
 That position would be somewhat weakened by their earlier 
participation in the deliberations of the government and their leaders 
participation in the democratic vote.  Lynch wrote that the signing of the treaty 
divided Sinn Féin between ‗separatists who wanted the reality of an 
independence that would enable Ireland to look after its own affairs, and those 
who wanted more, who opposed the treaty for a principle – the republic‘.28  
The details of the military engagements that constituted the ‗civil war‘ 
are not relevant to this study however the perspectives of those involved in it 
and their allegiance to a particular ideal or an actual government are important 
to the understanding of early civil-military relations in the new state. Although 
the anti treaty forces were thought to have been finally overcome in April 
1923, doubts remained among cabinet Ministers as to whether those who 
fought in the Free State army on the pro treaty side did so out of loyalty to the 
new state or to their former military commanders. It was imperative that in 
order for the new state‘s civil-military relations to be set on a solid footing, 
provision would have to be made to establish the supremacy of civilian rule 
and not have the country depending on the sometimes transient loyalty of 
those skilled in the use of arms. At this early point in the nation‘s new 
circumstances it was very clear that the concept of loyalty to the state far 
outweighed loyalty to the government. This was an important period in the 
establishment of the Irish state; that point at which the revolutionary soldiers 
hitherto dedicated to the downfall of the previous British civil-authority had to 
re-calibrate their efforts to support rather than suppress the new object of civil 
authority.   
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Early Civil Military tensions  
The timing of actions by ‗soldiers of the state‘ during a period when the very 
definition of statehood was in question, may well absolve those who opposed  
the democratic resolution of the new parliament whose legitimacy was being 
questioned, when they took up arms against the civil authority. However there 
were two other instances not far removed chronologically from those events 
which raise a more serious question about the nature of military intervention in 
Ireland. In one case prior to the foundation of the new Irish state soldiers of a 
different army owing allegiance to a different government threatened to take 
action that would result in orders not being followed. There was no confusion 
in the British Army in Ireland in 1913 about the legitimacy of the civilian 
government in London. Although the threat of armed insurrection did not arise 
in that instance, nevertheless there were certain soldiers who questioned the 
legitimacy or morality of government intentions and took a position that could 
be construed as mutiny. Equally, very soon after the foundation of the state 
and the subsequent civil war, Irish soldiers of the new legitimate army brought 
influence to bear on political decision making by threatening intervention.  
       In attempting to contextualise the events in the Irish armed forces of the 
1980s from a civil-military perspective it will be useful to look briefly at these 
two other periods in Ireland in the early twentieth century in which the 
relationship between the military body and their government were strained to 
the point that intervention was threatened and may have occurred albeit 
without the eventual use of arms. Unlike 1922, in both cases the State had long 
since established it legitimacy to govern the armies they now directed. The so 
called ‗Mutiny at the Curragh‘ by the British Army personnel in 1913 and the 
threat of mutiny by members of the Irish army in 1924 provide interesting 
comparisons when considering later events. It is useful for this study to 
examine briefly the stated motivations and perspectives that surrounded these 
events.  
16 
 
The Curragh Mutiny 1914 
A series of events that became known as the Curragh Mutiny occurred in 
Ireland among British armed forces there in 1913 and 1914. It could be argued 
that the institutions of the state were unable to implement democratically made 
decisions as a result of resistance in the army, to a particular government 
policy. It could also be argued that a number of officers made personal 
decisions to resign their commissions in the face what they saw as impending 
immoral orders. In the context of civil-military relations it would appear that 
the officer‘s loyalty to their own command structure may have been superior 
to that of the civil authority. The incidents in question arose between 
December 1913 and the end of March 1914, when the British parliamentary 
democracy at Westminster had indicated their intention to implement Home 
Rule for Ireland providing the country with its own parliament in Dublin.  
Strong opposition among protestant unionist citizens of Northern 
Ireland had been a continuing feature of the public debate on the issue. In 
February 1912, during a specially convened general assembly of the Irish 
Presbyterian Church, unanimous resolutions were passed at a series of eleven 
meetings in which the ‗unalterable opposition‘ to Home Rule was recorded.29  
Edward Carson, a leading unionist, ironically from Dublin, organised a protest 
campaign across Northern Ireland that rejected any notion of Home Rule and 
went on to threaten that if such a law was to be passed, the new Dublin 
parliament would be ignored and Northern Ireland would set up its own 
parliament and state. Significantly, this was to include the raising of its own 
army. Many leading British and Unionist politicians at the time pledged their 
intention to participate in this new Ulster government should it become 
necessary. Volunteers were sought from all over Ulster to come to the defence 
of the province and of their religion. Their leaders used existing laws to justify 
the gathering of large numbers of personnel who were about to be trained in 
arms and foot drill. Colonel Wallace, one of the members of the provisional 
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executive of the Ulster ‗government‘, applied to the courts ‗for lawful 
authority to hold meetings and drill men in the use of arms.
30
  The result was 
an army of volunteers openly drilling on the streets at first with mock rifles but 
later with the real thing. They rapidly became a formidable and well 
disciplined army, complete with signallers, motorcyclists, service corps and 
intelligence officers.
31
 Over 100,000 men marching in military formation were 
assembled for a march past their leaders at Easter 1912. With the situation 
deteriorating and the defiance and arming of the Ulster volunteers, it seemed 
serious resistance against the expected Home Rule legislation and the state 
itself was imminent. With the police force, the judiciary and the body politic 
in Northern Ireland, and a section of it in Great Britain, seemingly acting in 
concert with the volunteers, it appeared that it was going to be left to the 
British Army to uphold the implementation of the will of parliament and 
maintain law and order and the protection of property.  
One key player in midst of the politicians at Westminster was the 
Director of Military Operations, Sir Henry Wilson. He was on record as being 
sympathetic to the Ulster volunteers. He supplied Carson and opposition 
leader Bonar Law with ongoing updates regarding the intention of officers in 
the Curragh in Ireland, to resign and provided much of the information that 
would fuel fierce political debate in the House of Commons and the House of 
Lords. Wilson is credited with suggesting to Carson and Law that they should 
argue that the volunteers would be willingly deployed to ‗fight for England‘ in 
any upcoming European conflict.
32
 The government and opposition parties 
continued into the spring of 1914 attempting to resolve their differences or at 
least reach some sort of a compromise that would avert an armed 
confrontation and civilian casualties. They were not successful, the rumours 
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regarding a crisis in the British Army in the Curragh and the threat of 
defections and mutiny only exacerbated the difficulties in the talks. 
Increasingly worrying intelligence reports coming from Ulster suggested that 
advanced plans were afoot by the volunteers to raid government military 
arsenals and installations and commandeer their arms and munitions for their 
own use. These developments coupled with the declared intention of Carson to 
resist with arms any implementation of Home Rule persuaded the government 
to move to protect installations and mobilise the requisite British Army and 
Royal Navy units to Ulster. In a newspaper report at the time these actions 
were considered to be a ‗bullying‘ of the people of Ulster. The Irish Times 
reported on a Daily Mail article in which news of threatened resignations by 
officers in the Curragh were made public: 
Officers in Ireland on being ordered north to Ulster are resigning. This 
catastrophe faced the government last night and threatens to bring to 
nought all their plans for bullying Ulster.
33
 
While the Irish Times was broadly Unionist there was a very different 
perspective to be read in the nationalist Irish Independent. The lead article 23 
March 1914 stated: 
If it be true that any army officers have refused to accompany their troops 
to Ulster then we are face to face with a transaction that is discreditable to 
the army, menacing to the very existence of England and the Empire and 
awkward for the government.
34
 
The strategic arrangements designed to prevent raids and lawlessness in Ulster 
were organised by a committee of the cabinet that had been set up in early 
March. They decided that mobilisation would begin so that troops and ships 
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would be on station by 20 March. Wilson leaked the military arrangements to 
Carson who interpreted them as an act of aggression against Ulster. All the 
necessary military arrangements were completed by 19 March and British 
military forces stood by to go into Ulster and restore Westminster‘s authority 
there. On 20 March when deployment should have commenced, the War 
Office in London received a telegram from Ireland advising that all except two 
of the officers in the 5
th
 Lancers had resigned and there were fears that the 
same was about to occur in the 16
th
 Lancers and that the enlisted men would 
refuse to mobilise. It also reported that fifty seven officers of the 3
rd
 Cavalry 
indicated their preference to accept dismissal if ordered North.  
It is important to note here that senior professional officers of the 
British Army questioned the detail of a future action to be undertaken in a 
deployment that was in aid to the civil power. Furthermore, they adjudged that 
the orders at some future point may lead to illegal or immoral use of force. In 
the ensuing crisis, Brigadier General Gough, who was the senior officer in 
Ireland responsible for the mobilisation to Ulster, was called to London and 
given written reassurances that officers would not be deployed to ‗enforce‘ 
Home Rule on Ulster. At this point a civil authority, democratically elected, 
found itself subservient in the implementation of its policy, to a force it should 
have commanded. Although Finer contends that Gough did not disobey the 
civil authority 
35
, the placing of conditions on the circumstance in which one 
does obey amounts to the same thing. It would seem in this case that army 
senior personnel who had intervened in Government, and effectively chosen to 
select which orders they would choose to obey, won the day. 
There are a number of possible motives and a number of possible 
reasons for the officer‘s actions in this whole matter. Before exploring them it 
is evident that there was a very high level of interaction between soldiers and 
politicians. Aside from motivation or explanation it seems clear that the 
democratic process of Government was impeded. The decision, democratically 
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taken to extend Home Rule to Ireland was watered down, not just by political 
objectors who had a right to protest, but also by the threat of inaction of the 
defenders of the state. As a result matters took a particular course.  A 
legitimate plan of action by a sovereign state in response to a perceived threat, 
crafted as such things are in secrecy, was leaked by the military to those that 
represented the threat. The implementation of the government decision was 
further impeded by senior ranking military personnel, who bore responsibility, 
not just for their own actions, but for their subordinates too. The biggest 
impact of the officer‘s action in the Curragh was to erode the civil authority‘s 
control over the army.  
To what extent it damaged the army is unclear, although the apparent 
triumphant reception Gough got on returning with his written guarantee 
probably indicates that the internal morale of the force was strengthened rather 
than weakened by the affair. It is in the arena of civil-military relations where 
one must look to assess the extent of the damage. A parliament had to pander 
to the demands of a military civil servant because he was prepared, by 
whatever label one might attach to it, to withdraw service or labour from the 
state in an extraordinarily volatile situation. Why did the mutineers behave as 
they did? The question of pay did not arise. Neither was fear a factor as all had 
accumulated very real combat experience in theatres of war around the empire. 
It is difficult to claim it was humanitarian because mobilisation against the 
civilian population in other parts of Ireland or industrial workers in Great 
Britain had not precipitated a similar response. The idea of imposing by force, 
a political reality on a reluctant population was hardly a new departure for an 
empire on which the sun supposedly never set. Perhaps the officers in question 
had been taken in by the opposition‘s claims that an ill intentioned government 
was prepared to orchestrate a bloody encounter in Ulster to pander to 
Nationalist demands in return for parliamentary support. They may also have 
believed from the same source that the arming of the volunteers there and the 
moves to create a counter government in the event of Home Rule was the last 
patriotic stand of a group whose only crime was the desire to stay loyal to, and 
remain a part of, the British Empire. If they believed, as undoubtedly some of 
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them did, that they were to be the instruments of nefarious bloodshed, perhaps 
their position is somewhat understandable, but there are other possibilities not 
raised by Ryan in his research. Were the officers of the opinion that the 
citizens in the rest of Ireland were somehow not of their kind and that the 
upstanding citizens of Ulster were just like them. Did they have a military 
cultural abhorrence of the Irish people but considered unionist causes to be 
just causes? Did this racial perspective indicate racism in the army? Whatever 
the motivations, the Curragh mutiny of 1914 taught a government that the 
army were not indefinitely resolute in their loyalty to the instruments of civil 
power and that in certain, albeit rare, circumstances they would usurp that 
authority by their actions on a political level and their inactions on a military 
one. The stand taken by the officers of the Curragh defied a democratically 
elected government, chosen by an electorate that would have included the 
soldiers themselves.  This constitutes interference by military personnel in 
operational matters that should only be within the remit of a legitimate 
government. Although no government Minister was threatened with violence, 
their capacity to act in a manner they thought appropriate was impeded by the 
threat of inaction of the military. Though the implications of this may seem 
minor, the fact remains that a paramilitary force, established in Northern 
Ireland to oppose the decisions of the state, was supported by a legitimate 
army supposedly deployed there in the defence of the state and its decisions. 
These events come well within the parameter of military intervention explored 
by Huntington, Finer and others and raise questions about how such actions 
should be considered. It would appear in this particular case, the theory of 
increased professionalism among officers reducing the possibility of 
intervention, did not apply. Perhaps another feature that needs to be inserted in 
the quest for answers about the disposition to intervene is the political 
perspective of the soldier and his social identity with the target population of 
government policy. It seems evident that there was a huge empathy within the 
ranks of British officers with the unionist population of Ulster.  There was also 
a judgement made on the morality of imposing a particular political decision 
on a people with whom the military empathised. This is against the grain of 
most military training and if it had been the case in other theatres of war that 
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Britain found itself in, the empire would be a much smaller geographical 
entity that it grew to be.  
The Curragh mutiny also raises questions about the strength of internal 
military loyalty. Does the regimental loyalty supersede loyalty to the 
government or to decisions it makes? Are there considerations of morality and 
legality in the minds of soldiers deployed on missions that bring it into contact 
with a civilian population? As pointed out by the lead Irish Independent 
article: 
We take it that the government decided to send troops to Ulster, as a 
precautionary measure, for the protection of life and property. They are 
entitled to the services of the military for that purpose and for the 
repression of any armed violence which may be attempted within the 
State.
36
 
Clearly, for those who either advocated the Home Rule Bill, or those who 
feared the wrath of unionist armed opposition to it, the failure of the army to 
respond to threatened violence was a worry. Following their conceding, the 
government put a brave face on events and played down how close the British 
Forces in Ireland had come to full blown refusal to obey orders and effect a 
mutiny. The actions of the senior military officer in the Curragh who 
threatened to resign if deployed to Ulster, must also be examined. If a 
commanding officer announces his intention to proceed with a course of 
action that may be outside of the law or regulation, one must consider who 
may follow. The events in the Irish army that led to the emergence of 
representative bodies at times raised these very questions.  
The 1924 Army Mutiny 
The issues that surrounded the so called mutiny of 1924 contrast somewhat 
with the Curragh events of a decade earlier. In the case of the Curragh it was 
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clearly a concerted effort by military personnel to influence legitimate 
decisions of the civil authority and in the traditional sense can be defined as an 
incident of military intervention. The events of 1924 deserve a deeper analysis 
as they mark a very early opportunity to explore the relationship between the 
Irish military and the state. The definition of military intervention may not 
apply however political intervention into the military ethos may well have 
taken place. For the most part, civil-military relations, is an area of study that 
considers the relations between existing governments and their armies. That 
relationship is often determined by a combination law, tradition and political 
history. In countries such as Great Britain, the United States, France, Germany 
and others the relationship between government and military has been there 
for many years. Although trends and events such as war, internal upheaval, or 
even a change of government may alter the relationship, there still exists a 
tradition upon which the military and governments can engage with each 
other. Usually both groups claim a pedigree of entitlement to interact, one on 
the basis of the right to govern, the other on the premise of the tradition of 
service to the emergence and/or the survival of the ‗state‘ itself.  
In Ireland‘s case the government of that state, and the army it expected 
to serve it, evolved at almost the same time and in some cases from one and 
the same group of men. In fact the army, although not a regular professional 
one, was in place before the state. A state, it could be argued, that would not 
have come into being had not the army of the day fought the British presence 
on the ground. That so many of this group of armed personnel had by 1925 
accepted civil authority so swiftly  is of great import  because in doing so they 
were often acting in such a way as to undermine their own interests. In the 
existing theoretical framework of civil-military relations, Ireland‘s set of 
circumstances are worthy of examination. Until the emergence of 
representative associations seven decades later, there were three distinct 
phases of the development of these relations. Firstly the phase encompassing 
the War of Independence and the origin of the Irish forces where those bearing 
arms acted in unity to rid the country of what they saw as the common enemy. 
Secondly the phase of civil war in which the armed elements had split into two 
24 
 
distinct groupings, both of whom had opposing views on the extent of which 
their military objectives had been achieved. Both these phases have been 
averted to in the previous chapter on the origin of the Irish Defence Forces. 
Finally and perhaps as a consequence of the so called 1924 mutiny,  the phase 
that led to the acceptance by the military that the ultimate authority was that of 
the civil government.   
Prior to the establishment of the new state, although the ‗army‘ fought 
on behalf of the ideals of a proclaimed ‗republic‘, the elected government who 
were established long after armed resistance had begun, took no 
responsibilities for the actions of the armed force until four months before the 
cessation of hostilities in July 1921.
37
  In a technical sense then, during the 
War of Independence and before it, the ‗army‘ were fighting for themselves in 
the pursuit of an ideal. That the ideal was, to some, not realised later in the 
formulation of the Treaty goes to the heart of the issues that resulted in civil 
war and also to the core of the peculiarity of Ireland‘s early civil-military 
relations. In their ‗struggle for independence‘, groups of Irish men and women 
fought side by side as one to defeat a common enemy in the form of British 
military forces and government agencies. They sought to establish a legitimate 
government to rule a re-established idealistic nation-state. When that fighting 
brought their opponents to the negotiating table it was at a time when neither 
party had militarily completely defeated the other. By its very nature an 
‗agreed settlement‘ was never going to contain everything for everybody. The 
Treaty proposal that emerged from the negotiations was placed before the 
government for acceptance or rejection. Although many were unhappy with 
the proposal there was an option to reject it and many members of the 
government did so. The first fracture in civil-military relations emerged at that 
time before any ‗tradition‘ of relationships had had a chance to have taken 
effect. In the wake of the civil war and the attempts to round up all armed 
elements that had opposed the ‗Free State‘ forces of the new government, 
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instances arose where there was uncertainty about which side armed personnel 
had previously fought on. Some members of the fledging civilian government, 
despite the fact that they had defeated their opponents, still feared an internal 
insurrection from among the armed forces and the undue influence that former 
military leaders may have had on members of the army. The Ceann Comhairle 
stated there was a ‗question of national security arising‘ in March 1924 and 
Deputy Baxter asked:  
The ordinary citizens are wondering where they stand to-day between the 
armed forces, and want to know …what the real position is. We also want 
to hear from the other side what the position is as regards these officers in 
the Army and ex-officers. What do they really want, or what is the cause 
of their dissatisfaction? What do they want to do, or what is it they want to 
do with the country? 
38
 
As will be seen later in the chapter, there certainly seems to have been also 
circumstances where politicians like Deputy McGrath encouraged, or at least 
tolerated insurrection for nothing more than political gain. In effect the 
members of the army that sided with the anti treaty politicians and lent their 
military expertise to the opposing of the treaty could be said at that point to 
have been engaged in ‗military intervention‘. And although it is not generally 
deemed as an attempted military coup, primarily because there were elected 
politicians who fully endorsed the military activities, it could be said to be an 
attempted coup nonetheless, given that these armed actions were undertaken in 
opposition to a democratic vote of the parliament to accept the treaty. Kissane, 
however, is satisfied that the conflict met all the criteria of a full civil war, 
including that which requires, ‗a government fighting an organised opposition 
that seeks to replace it by armed victory‘.39  That these soldiers had used their 
arms and skills to oppose the new reality of government identifies them very 
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clearly as personnel whose allegiances were not, at that point, to the 
democratically elected body. It would be argued that their loyalty was instead 
to a higher ideal, that of a thirty two county republic which they felt the treaty 
would not provide. Thus for them they could argue that their military 
objectives in pursuit of the ‗ideal‘ had not yet been attained and from that 
point of view a military action must continue with continued loyalty to their 
military leaders. The Irish ‗government‘s acceptance of the treaty thus became 
an impediment to their ‗ideal‘ and in doing so became another obstacle to be 
overcome by force of arms. In this context  it could be argued that they were 
not guilty of any intervention but were merely continuing a military campaign 
for an objective not yet achieved, albeit against different enemies of or 
obstacles to that ideal. Many of them had never deemed themselves 
subservient to the state in the first place. Their former colleagues, and people 
that they had previously been comrades with, were, on the other hand, now 
expected to have allegiance to the new government. This, however, was not 
straightforward either. Although they fought and many died in defending the 
decision of the majority to accept the treaty and were afforded legitimacy by 
the government itself, there had still been no formal pledge of allegiance so it 
could be argued that until a republic had been achieved it would be premature 
to take the final step in swearing an oath of loyalty to the new Free State 
government. This ‗previous‘ pledge was certainly averted to later as a 
bargaining position for those who wanted to be considered more favourably in 
the demobilisation process.
40
  Even after the army of the new government had 
suppressed the insurgents, some of the Free State fighters themselves did not 
pledge allegiance to the civilian government. This it seems was because they 
had previously done so to their military leaders during the time that they were 
a ‗rebel‘ movement. These men had been sworn into the volunteer movement 
where membership required a particular oath of allegiance which included 
never laying down arms until an independent republic was achieved.  No 
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convention of the previously named volunteers to alter this provision took 
place. It could therefore be considered a matter of contention that until such an 
amendment took place; allegiance could be said to be only due to military 
leaders pursuing the ideals of the proclamation. Cognisant of this, the Minister 
for Defence Cahal Brugha sought the introduction of a new pledge of 
allegiance to government in an effort to strengthen civilian supremacy.
41
  
At this point it was in the interest of the government to formalise its 
army and the relationship between it and the process of democratic leadership. 
It was not to be easy. A revolutionary army fought a foreign occupation 
succeeding in bringing it to the negotiating table. They had not been 
subservient to any government during this time. Talks took place, a treaty was 
proposed and although there was sharp division, a democratic vote was taken 
by parliament resulting in an acceptance of the treaty. Members of the same 
army who had fought to achieve independence saw the acceptance of the 
treaty as a betrayal to what they had achieved in driving Britain out of most of 
the country. It was at this volatile period at the very birth of the new nation 
that the future positive civil-military relations had to be established. Adding to 
the difficulty of the government in establishing a peacetime structure for the 
armed forces, was the need for demobilisation. During the preceding years of 
conflict, the War of Independence had seen thousands of men under arms, 
most of whom continued fighting on one side or another in the Civil War that 
followed. At the end of the civil war most of those who had fought on the anti-
treaty side had been disarmed and either imprisoned or dispersed. The armed 
forces of the new Free State were the victors but with the War of 
Independence won and the Civil War over the new government had no need 
for such a large army. Cutbacks in numbers left many soldiers disaffected. 
Many lost their positions as the army transformed itself from a war time unit 
to a peacetime institution. There was a feeling among many soldiers that they 
had fought and risked their lives both in the War of Independence and in 
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defence of the new state in the civil war. Now they were to be disbanded and, 
as some saw it, cast aside. Lee commented on the implications thus: 
The most potentially dangerous threat to Cosgrave after the civil war came 
not from Sinn Féin but from a Free State army swollen in size to 55,000 
men and 3,300 officers by the end of hostilities. 
42
  
Eventually this relationship between those who saw themselves as the ones 
who facilitated freedom and those who were trying to establish the supremacy 
of the civilian government came to a head in what has been described as the 
army mutiny of 1924. The events of that year and the army officer challenge 
to the government had their roots in the foundation of the state and the nature 
of the struggle that had precipitated independence. Thus the relationship 
between the men of arms and the politicians was central to the challenges that 
emerged. Irish civil-military relations had not had the benefit of tradition. The 
only formal military presence in Ireland for centuries previous had been the 
British Armed Forces. Their government and institutions had highly developed 
civil-military relations. Anybody that had taken up arms in Ireland to try to 
achieve independence had, of necessity, to belong to a revolutionary group 
that had only a violent relationship with the military presence of the British 
government of the day and virtually none with any civilian leadership. Many 
Irish personnel had served in the British Forces for many years and understood 
the tradition of the military ethos, but there was no existing tradition of how 
the military might interact with a wholly different Irish State structure. 
In a general sense the normal convention is that a government raises an 
army from citizens. It demands loyalty from them. Senior Departmental and 
military personnel are appointees and at all times subservient to government 
usually through a Minister for Defence. In independent Ireland‘s embryonic 
period the group that was to become the new state ‗army‘ was in place before 
the government. This was part and parcel of the evolution of the state itself.  
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Under rule of Westminster a British garrison army had been loyal to 
the London Government. As has been described in the preceding chapter, in 
1913 the impending introduction of Home Rule for Ireland had precipitated 
the formation of a very large protestant volunteer army in Ulster. Set up to 
oppose plans to introduce Home Rule and forcibly resist any attempts to bring 
Ulster under any new Dublin government jurisdiction, the group with its threat 
of violent resistance won sweeping political concessions and eventually their 
own parliament. South of the border and disappointed with the progress that 
parliamentary and peaceful endeavours had achieved, a southern volunteer 
force was assembled to protect and promote the interests of those who sought 
independence from Britain. The vigour and effectiveness of Ulster militancy 
inspired nationalist with a mixture of outrage, admiration, and envy, 
culminating in imitation.
43
 This was the volunteer force in the south that was 
to become involved eventually in the War of Independence and different 
elements of it in the civil war that followed. Importantly however the 
volunteers were assembled and operating before the elections of 1918. That 
year, in the elections that had taken place to elect MPs to Westminster, Sinn 
Féin won a landslide victory. They did not take their parliamentary seats in 
London but used the mandate they had, to set up an alternative Irish 
government establishing the Dáil.  
Co-operation between the Dáil and the volunteer force was 
immediately established and they merged with leading figures from one group 
occupying leading offices of the other. Richard Mulcahy was at this time 
Assistant Minister for Defence while also being Chief of Staff.
44
 At this point 
both the government that had been formed, and the men of arms that were to 
be engaged in the War of Independence, all had the same aims.  As the counter 
government of the Dáil proceeded to meet, it remained unrecognised by 
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Britain. Political attempts at establishing the new state were matched by 
military initiatives and at this time the volunteer army which had come to be 
referred to as the army of the state, conducted their operation independently of 
the government but kept them appraised at all times. The fact that both the 
Chief of Staff of the volunteers, Richard Mulcahy and the director of 
intelligence, Michael Collins, both had cabinet responsibilities ensured that the 
government was both informed and had some influence, at least theoretically, 
in the activities of the army. Mulcahy was also Assistant Minister for Defence 
and Michael Collins was Minister for Finance. This procedure worked 
reasonably well however there was no formal civil-military relations, no 
institutions and agreed relationships, arrangements based on personality, 
familiarity and cohesion of purpose sufficed until the government and the 
volunteers both split over the Treaty. It transpired that being referred to as the 
army of the state was somewhat premature in light of the differing views on 
what constituted the legitimate ‗state‘. 
The devastating effect of any civil war sees former comrades and 
family in conflict with each other. In Ireland men who had been fellow 
combatants now faced each other in a spiralling war of bitterness and division. 
Although the pro treaty side won a barely discernable victory, for the fledgling 
government these early years were full of uncertainty. There were many 
concerns among successive government Ministers regarding the loyalty of 
those in the forces with access to weapons and trained personnel. Valiulis 
contended that: 
The aura of uncertainty disturbed the government. It was worried about the 
loyalty of the army it had authorised and on whom its very existence 
depended.… Had soldiers simply followed their local officers or the 
leading figures at general headquarters in choosing sides in the civil war, 
or did their decision to support the Free State reflect a commitment to 
democratic rule? 
45
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These matters of relations came to a head in what Dr Maryann Valiulis called 
‗almost a rebellion‘. Also known as the Irish Army mutiny of 1924, the series 
of incidents that occurred underlines the necessity of formal institutions and 
clear cut relationships in the conduct of civil-military relations in an operative 
democracy. As the new government tried to recover from the ill effects of civil 
war, the thorny matter of downsizing the army emerged. An army Council was 
set up to oversee this work. On 9 November 1923 nine army officers who 
were served with demobilisation papers refused to accept them. Their 
reasoning and defence was that they had undertaken a solemn oath not to lay 
down their arms until a republic had been achieved. This was a classic case of 
the army feeling that they owed an allegiance to a national ideal rather than 
any manifestation of it in the form of a democratically elected government. 
Had the officers in question been representative of the whole army corps, 
clearly there were questions about the extent of control of the Irish 
government of the day. According to Welch and Smith: 
The establishment of effective political authority thus requires (1) the 
aggregation of consent, and (2) control over the means to organised 
coercion. If the armed forces thus exercise nearly total autonomy over 
their internal organisation and, in time of crisis, over the decision to 
support or not support the civil government, then civilian control clearly 
does not exist.
46
   
A civilian and unarmed government, in order to operate effectively, would 
always have to be secure in the knowledge that there would be no possibility 
of a military take-over or coup d‘état whether this was by way of acting alone 
or refusing to act. Such must have been the considerations of the Irish 
fledgling government of the day. This significant incident, particularly the 
notion of a body of officers remaining loyal to an aspiration that had been set 
aside by the government, challenged the whole idea of the supremacy of 
civilian control over the army and was a definite threat to the new state. In 
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Huntington‘s theory it could have been passed off as a lack of professionalism, 
one of the major contributing factors he suggests, as being the cause of 
military intervention.
47
  But the situation was to get worse than a few officers 
refusing their orders. Members of the army who had been Old IRA, those who 
had fought in the War of Independence, began to meet and discuss the moves 
being made by government to demobilise the former soldiers who had been 
active then. They eventually formulated a letter and sent it to the President of 
the Dáil  requesting a meeting. These former officers stated that they had 
accepted the Treaty only as a stepping stone to the ‗republic‘ and quoted 
Michael Collins saying that he had sworn an oath of allegiance to the republic, 
‗treaty or no treaty‘. In the ensuing meeting and conferences the officers 
claimed that in the present army 40% were Old IRA, 50% were former British 
Army personnel and 10% civilians, which they claimed would lead to a 
diminution of the ideals of a republic. They threatened to intervene by ‗taking 
steps‘ to ‗secure the Republic‘.48 This kind of threat derives from among one 
of the motives, Finer suggests, that disposes the military towards intervention:  
Sectional bodies all plead the national interest when making claims for 
their own benefit, but the military are especially well placed to do so. 
49
   
About sixty officers eventually refused to accept their demobilisation orders, 
they were demobilised anyway and ordered out of barracks without any 
financial remuneration. Amid continuing complaints the government 
established a committee to oversee the question of demobilisation and 
investigate claims of preferential treatment for British Army personnel. 
However, none of the sixty officers were re instated. Reports were received 
that other Old IRA officers up and down the country were organising 
themselves. These activities culminated in an ultimatum being delivered to 
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government on 6 March 1924. They reiterated that the Treaty had only been 
accepted by them as a stepping stone to a republic and that the government 
were now betraying that ideal. President Liam Cosgrave, to whom the letter 
had been addressed, read the letter into the Dáil records:  
To President Liam Cosgrave. 
Sir,— 
On behalf of the I.R.A. Organisation we have been instructed to present 
the following Ultimatum to the Government of Saorstát Eireann. 
Briefly, our position is this:— 
The I.R.A. only accepted the Treaty as a means of achieving its objects, 
namely, to secure and maintain a Republican form of Government in this 
country. 
After many months of discussion with your Government it is our 
considered opinion that your Government has not those objects in view, 
and that their policy is not reconcilable with the Irish people's acceptance 
of the Treaty. 
Furthermore, our interpretation of the Treaty was that expressed by the late 
Commander-in-Chief, General Michael Collins, when he stated: ―I have 
taken an oath of allegiance to the Irish Republic and that oath I will keep, 
Treaty or no Treaty.‖ We claim Michael Collins as our leader, and again 
remind you that even after the Treaty was signed, that drastic action was 
taken against enemies of the unity and complete independence of our 
country. Both in oath and honour bound, it is our duty to continue his 
policy, and therefore present this Ultimatum, to which we require a reply 
by 12 noon, 10th March, 1924. 
We demand a conference with representatives of your Government to 
discuss our interpretation of the Treaty on the following conditions:— 
(a) The removal of the Army Council. 
(b) The immediate suspension of army demobilisation and re-organisation. 
In the event of your Government rejecting these proposals we will take 
such action that will make clear to the Irish people that we are not 
renegades or traitors to the ideals that induced them to accept the Treaty. 
34 
 
Our Organisation fully realises the seriousness of the action that we may 
be compelled to take, but we can no longer be party to the treachery that 
threatens to destroy the aspirations of the Nation. 
LIAM TOBIN, Major-General, President of the Executive Council. 
C.F. DALTON, Col., Secretary to Executive Council.
50
 
 
It would be expected that any head of government would make a 
robust response to such a letter and President Cosgrave did. He said: 
Having heard the text of the document Deputies will have no difficulty in 
agreeing that it constitutes a challenge which no Government could ignore 
without violating the trust conferred on it. …The attempt, such as it is, is 
not against a particular Government; it is a challenge to the democratic 
foundations of the State, to the very basis of Parliamentary representation 
and of responsible Government. As such, it is the concern of every 
Deputy, of every party and of every citizen. 
In his statement it appeared that the government had moved swiftly to contain 
the situation and protect the integrity of the state. However the Minister for 
Industry and Commerce, Mr McGrath, resigned in protest against actions 
taken against men who were responsible for the ‗birth of the state and its life 
since‘, in the Dáil he stated: 
I am thoroughly satisfied in my own mind that I will convince you this is 
brought about by absolute muddling, mishandling and incompetency on 
the part of a Department of the State.
51
  
It transpired that following the ultimatum forty nine officers resigned 
and a further fifty absconded some taking arms and munitions with them. 
General Mulcahy in addressing the Dáil read out the letter of resignation that 
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had been signed by the officers involved. Having indicated that the total 
number of officers involved was at the maximum ninety, he reassured the 
house thus: 
So that from the point of view of national safety and security, the military 
position in the country is quite sound and the incidents that have taken 
place have been incidents of absconsion rather than of any definite attempt 
to take military action of any kind.
52
 
Despite Mulcahy‘s optimistic interpretation of this series of events, occurring 
as they did after the legitimacy of the government had been established, they 
represent a more concrete example of the type of military intervention which 
the study of civil-military relations analyses so often. This was a direct threat 
of action on the state by a minority group of serving officers. It marked a 
change in their allegiance which had been with the government of the day, 
supporting it not just in the War of Independence but through the Civil War 
too. Now it appeared to have been only been on a transitional basis. The 
military personnel involved were setting aside their ‗transitional allegiance‘ to 
the government which, in their minds, had some finite limit. Because their 
original and steadfast allegiance to the ideals of a republic had not been 
realised they were now setting aside the transitional for the original. In effect 
they were categorising the supremacy of the ideal over that of the civil 
government. But were their motives so idealistic or were there other influences 
at work? General Mulcahy reported to the Dáil some interesting commentary 
that may indicate a more mundane motive for the activities of the mutineers 
such as positions and pensions. By acting in such a fashion they chose the 
route of intervention. As the crisis unfolded it became a matter of contentious 
debate in the Dáil. The following day matters had taken a very different turn, 
the President read another letter from the original signatories indicating that 
they accepted fully the authority of the state in a seeming reversal of the letter 
dated six days earlier. It stated, among others things, that the authors 
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recognised that the army must be subject to the ‗absolute control of the civil 
authority‘.53 
The letter was signed ‗Liam Tobin, Major General and C.F. Dalton 
Colonel‘. There was a lot of confusion in the Dáil chamber. Only the previous 
day the President had talked about the threat that no government could ignore 
in referring to the ultimatum of the 6 March. On the face of it, the officers had 
written again, this time pledging their allegiance to the democratic institutions 
of the state.  Now it seemed that the second letter and the decision to set up a 
committee of enquiry was all that was needed to gloss over the threats that had 
been made to the security of the state. It certainly seemed at this point that the 
government had done an about face and were conceding to the threats made in 
the original letter by not confronting the authors with the full rigours of 
military or civil discipline. The threat of violence in British and Irish military 
law is usually deemed sufficient to impose harsh penalties.   
Tom Johnson spoke with great clarity about the import of events and 
their impact on civil-military relations he also referred to Ireland‘s embryonic 
stage in the establishment of civil-military relations he stated: 
 The army, I say, must not be judged as rigidly as, perhaps, an older army 
in an older State would need to be judged. But offences of this nature must 
not be condoned or overlooked.… The Dáil has a right to know, and to 
insist upon knowing to-night, whether the Government is maintaining 
authority, or whether it has submitted to the ultimatum.
54
 
Kevin O‘Higgins also had a very clear view of what type of relationship the 
army should have with the institutions of the state: 
That fact has to be faced just as the other fact had to be faced, that the 
disciplined forces of the State must be the disciplined forces of the State, 
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that the people who pay the piper must call the tune, that we turned on a 
section of our own countrymen and fought the conflict of the last two 
years for one issue, and one issue only, and that was the supremacy of the 
people—that the people in their collective wisdom or unwisdom in their 
collective judgement or lack of judgement must decide the future policy of 
the country. 
55
 
It seemed that the government had completely changed its approach overnight. 
That an enquiry should suffice to get to the bottom of what many called 
mutiny, is at least suspicious. Acceptance of the second letter also indicated 
that the authors had not been arrested as had been intimated. There was 
however a different perspective from regarding the all important esprit de 
corps, Major Cooper said: 
The spirit of an army is a very delicate and sensitive thing, and if people 
outside of the army are going to inquire into its organisation, into the 
whole manner in which it is carried on, you run a very grave risk of 
sapping the esprit de corps, the vague, intangible something, that makes a 
thing an army, and not an armed mob.
56
 
This position direct from the mouth of a military officer could be interpreted  
as indicating a higher value being attributed to the much valued esprit de 
corps than to the stability of the state. It is interesting to consider the status of 
the esprit at a time when officers were divided among themselves and also in 
their loyalties. The signatories of both the ultimatum and the letter of partial 
retraction were intervening on the basis that the policy of the civilian 
government was inconsistent with what they believed was the in best interests 
of the nation and what they believed was their duty in continuing the policy of 
their former leader, Michael Collins. Huntington proposed very specific 
responsibilities for the ‗military man‘ including representing the claims of 
military security in state machinery, professionally advising the state in 
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military matters and executing the strategies of government.
57
 It would seem 
that the actions of the officers in Ireland at that time in sending the ultimatum 
would fall well outside of what Huntington proposed was the desirable modes 
of practice for their profession and constitute ‗intervention‘.  
 In discussing the various modes of intervention, Finer has categorised 
it into six levels ranging from ‗influence‘ to ‗blackmail‘, he further contended 
that discussing or attempting to persuade a government to a particular view 
was legitimate however ‗threats of physical coercion or of disobedience are 
unconstitutional in any circumstances and that views accompanied by such 
threats are, clearly, blackmail.
58
 In view of Finer‘s definition it would appear 
that in Ireland at that time the whole integrity of the state and its authority over 
the military was under threat. President Cosgrave described the ultimatum as; 
‗a challenge that no government could ignore‘ on 11 March, yet the next day, 
he was happy to report to the Dáil that everything was resolved and that the 
measures that were to be taken, including the  commissioning of an enquiry, 
would suffice to address the problems at hand. 
59
 The brevity of his statement 
and the comments of Deputy McGrath who had proffered his resignation the 
previous day indicated that some sort of a compromise had been arrived at, or 
some sort of deal had been done. McGrath announced that he felt the President 
had ‗met the situation‘ so he would not be making any further statements until 
the enquiry took place.
60
 However others including Deputy Johnson were 
dissatisfied with the events as they were unfolding. He referred to the 
announcement of a ‗mutiny in the army‘ the previous Saturday, the response 
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that had been given by the President and finally the meagre statement issued 
by him.
61
 
These exchanges in the Dáil were indicative of members of a 
government wanting to elicit change in the army or perhaps not trusting those 
who were currently charged with responsibility for it. The previous army 
council comprising of, Minister for Defence and Commander in Chief Richard 
Mulcahy, Chief of Staff, General Sean McMahon, the Adjutant General,  
Gearóid O‘Sullivan, and the Quarter Master General Seán O‘Muirthuille had 
listened to criticism by the cabinet of their lack of progress in rounding up 
republican activists and in the general running of the army. This criticism 
continued to such an extent as to drive the council members to present their 
resignations.
62
 The complaints arose from numerous members of the cabinet 
who were impatient with the process of rounding up former civil war 
opponents, some of whom were still engaged in insurgency around the 
country. While this may have been the reason proffered, it is difficult not to 
contemplate that disgruntled former IRA soldiers were placing political 
pressure on their politicians to intervene and have them spared in the mass 
demobilisations that inevitably, had to take place.  
The resignations were initially rejected however that was to change in 
light of the ultimatum and the proffered resignation of McGrath. It would 
appear at this point that political consideration rather than civil-military 
relations became the focal point of the events as they played out. Firstly, the 
ultimatum and the threat it contained did not come from the appointed official 
leadership of the army. They did not see a widespread mutiny in the making, 
so the question arises as to how much the claims of a ‗crisis‘ were in fact 
scaremongering for political purposes. General Mulcahy, as Minister for 
Defence, assured the Dáil on a number of occasions that the revolt was not 
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widespread and generally the situation around the country was secure. In 
contrast, politicians of the Executive Council were questioning the loyalty of 
their own army. Deputy O‘Higgins said there was a view forming that the 
army were no longer an instrument of the people‘s will.63 These comments 
flew in the face of the initial government reaction to the mutineers. It was the 
mutineers who were not ‗instruments of the people‘s will.‘ On the other hand, 
Mulcahy and others were discharging their duties in very difficult 
circumstances. Secondly, those who issued the threat almost certainly had the 
support of members of government. Although McGrath claimed to be 
resigning as a result of the mishandling of army administration and 
management, he announced it on the day of the reading of the ultimatum and 
in any event his reason was found not to be valid by the enquiry that followed. 
Thirdly, the army officers who were in the invidious position of having to cull 
the numbers of their former comrades were being accused of favouring British 
soldiers when in fact, this was found not to be the case.  It seems there may 
have been political expediency at play in not wishing to confront the painful 
task of selection required for downsizing and demobilisation. Politicians at 
cabinet level would seem to have taken the side of the mutineers and in doing 
so undermined the integrity of the rest of the army and of the state itself. There 
were arguments put forward by members of government to justify the 
requested resignations of men who had served the state with distinction. 
O‘Higgins suggested that the men had fulfilled their function and it was now 
time for others to build on those contributions.
64
 
In the midst of the debates around these issues a routine military 
operation exacerbated the acrimony of the exchanges after a pub in Dublin 
was raided and a number of army personnel, who unauthorised, had gathered 
there with arms, were arrested. The arresting officer‘s report stated that 
Deputy McGrath came to the pub in question and interfered in a way that was 
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sympathetic to the armed group. He highlighted McGrath‘s attitude regarding 
the authority of the Defence Forces to act, when he claimed that the 
government had not authorised the raid. He even insisted on buying the 
detained soldiers a drink.
65
 
The Cabinet called for the resignations of the army council after the 
arrests and following this Mulcahy proffered his own resignation explaining 
that he could not ‗stand over condoning mutiny to such an extent as to foster it 
and prejudice discipline in the army‘. He quoted the provision of the Defence 
Act as being the basis on which the assembled soldiers had been acting 
illegally.66 The Act to which Mulcahy refers is the Defence Force (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1923. There were many provisions under that Act that placed 
the mutineers in breach of military law. Among them paragraph 36 which 
dealt specifically with mutiny and laid down the possibility of the ultimate 
punishment, that of the sentence of death.  
Every person subject to military law who commits any of the following 
offences, that is to say:— 
( a ) The offence of causing, conspiring to cause, attempting to cause, or 
joining in any mutiny or sedition in any of the Forces; or 
 ( b ) Being present, the offence of not using his utmost endeavours to 
prevent any mutiny or sedition in any of the Forces; or 
( c ) The offence of persuading, inducing or compelling or endeavouring to 
persuade, induce, or compel any person subject to military law to join in 
any mutiny or sedition in any of the Forces; or 
( d ) Having come to the knowledge of, or having reasonable grounds to 
suspect any actual or intended mutiny or sedition in the Forces, the offence 
of failing to inform without delay, a superior officer of the same; or 
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( e ) The offence of seducing or endeavouring to seduce any person subject 
to military law from allegiance to the State, 
 
shall, on conviction by Court-Martial be liable to suffer death or such less 
punishment as is in this Act mentioned.
67
 
As can be seen from this legislation not only is it an offence to commit mutiny 
but under paragraph (b) there is a direct obligation for somebody who is aware 
of such activity to prevent it. These provisions under what was then the law of 
the land underline a strong basis for the argument that Mulcahy was acting in 
compliance with the law. That his actions were not compliant with a policy 
procedure by the government designed to bring the mutineers round is 
arguable too. The dismissal of the General Staff in the immediate wake of the 
raid without any possibility of defending their actions, is within the remit of 
the government, and was provided for, under the Defence Act, however while 
it may have been legal is does give rise to a question of fairness. These men 
were legally endowed with the obligation of defending the state and 
maintaining discipline in the army. In doing so on this particular occasion they 
found themselves on the wrong side of supposed government policy. It would 
be difficult to accuse such men of plotting intervention. Those who threatened 
it on the other hand were protected by the political consideration of the 
government of the day. In this context, the fledging state got off to a very bad 
start in the establishment of the civil-military relations.  
General Mulcahy then addressed the whole question of the real reasons 
he believed had led to the situation at that point. He believed that the so called 
mutiny was not so much about the defence of ideals as the posturing for 
position in the new, slimmed down, force that had to be gleaned from the 
existing inflated force. He heavily criticised the way in which the whole 
episode was approached by the executive council and its impact on the force. 
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He pointed out the unsuitability of the appointment of General O ‗Duffy to 
take charge at a time of possible armed crisis: 
The extraordinary position has been taken up of placing a man who was 
away from military work —who had not been in touch with the work of 
the army, or the development of the army for many months past.68 
When the committee of enquiry finally reported to the Dáil deputy Mulcahy 
made a scathing attack on the conduct of it and felt vindicated in his criticism 
of the executive council. The whole basis of the resignation of deputy 
McGrath which had escalated the perception of a pending crisis had been 
based on his charge of the muddling and mismanagement of the army. 
Mulcahy pointed out what the committee had found ‗no evidence to justify a 
charge of muddling, mismanagement or incompetence on the part of the late 
Chief-of-Staff in carrying out his duties.
69
 
The so called mutiny of 1924 was probably not a mutiny at all or at least 
not a full blown military one. It bespoke of political intervention in military 
affairs rather than vice versa. While it is certainly true that a number of 
disgruntled members of the Old IRA sent a threatening letter to the 
government and that a number of officers absconded or stole arms, the vast 
majority of middle ranking officers, NCOs and privates did not participate. 
Kissane‘s contention that it can be socio-economic considerations which may 
have more to do with the longevity of civil conflict, than higher principles, can 
probably be applied when contemplating the motivation of those involved in 
the mutiny.
70
 Had the episode ended some other way, the conflict or a part of 
it may well have resumed. It would appear however that the intention of the 
mutineers was not so much to ‗take over‘ the country as it was to threaten 
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violence to get their own way.  What is manifest in this case of ‗mutiny‘ is the 
compliance or even participation of a faction of government in the 
manipulation of public fears about instability.  
The army leadership of the day appeared balanced enough in their 
approach to demobilisation, the figures given in the Dáil do not support the 
claims by the Old IRA that total favouritism was being afforded to former 
British Army service men. In the case of their approaches to the downscaling 
of the army, the subsequent commission of enquiry could find no evidence of 
favouritism. Likewise the charge put forward by deputy McGrath of muddling 
and mismanagement in the administration and running of the army was 
reported as being unfounded.  If this was the case it would seem that elected 
members of parliament manipulated the integrity of the army officers who had 
tried to undertake the difficult task of demobilisation as fairly as possible. 
Equally the primary excuse that was proffered in the call for the resignation of 
Mulcahy was hardly sustainable. He is purported to have undermined the 
authority of a superior, the recently appointed General Eoin O‘Duffy, by not 
informing him of the raid that took place on the premises of Devlin‘s in 
Parnell Street, and in doing so undermining the policy of government. 
However military regulations and tradition would prohibit the gathering of any 
armed members in circumstances outside of normal duties. The authority to 
intervene in such circumstance does not ordinarily require a reference to a 
higher authority and in fact it is more usual to be the duty of any NCO or 
officer to intervene in any such circumstance.
71
  
One could expect that the apprehension of a group of armed men, 
meeting in secrecy, who had threatened violence to the state, would have been 
lauded as a heroic act. On the contrary, a politician saw fit to arrive on the 
scene and buy a drink for those who had been caught, to later seek the 
resignation for those responsible for the capture of men who were prepared to 
use arms against the organs of the state.  The fact that the enquiry 
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subsequently confirmed that the Old IRA had at no time, any intention of 
recognising the authority of the state and that those who had quoted Michael 
Collins had also been fermenting dissent even prior to his death, is indicative 
of the validity of Mulcahy‘s policy in launching the raid. It would appear that 
in Ireland at that time, the civil-military relationship between those charged to 
run the army and those in power was not what it should have been. However 
more blame can be attached to the government side than the military. Kissane 
alludes to the possibility of government not always being in concert with the 
wishes of the wider population. He distinguishes between civil society and the 
government of the day and highlights many instances where organisations, 
movements and groups of interested citizens, disagreed with, and tried to 
dissuade both sides from engaging in violence against each other in the 
conduct of the civil war. In defining what constitutes civil society, he excludes 
not only the anti treaty forces but also the state forces, on the basis that they 
too were part of the conflict that civil society did not want.
72
  
The Old IRA members in the army were members of a group that, 
despite their positions, did not recognise the supremacy of the civil authority 
of the state and were not prepared to respect its democratic right to govern. At 
their army council convention in March 1922, they had resolved that the IRA 
should remain ‗the Army of the Irish Republic‘ without regard for the 
authority of the provisional government, the Dáil, or Mulcahy‘s headquarters 
staff.
73
  Their political influence among members of the cabinet was to muddy 
the civil-military relations at a time when the utmost of clarity was what was 
needed.    A request for Mulcahy‘s resignation may have been justified on the 
basis that he had joined a secret organization like the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood (IRB), however this organization was not the one who had 
threatened the state. In fact its founders had claimed they were reconstituted to 
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prevent irregulars and members of the Old IRA from undermining the army 
from within. That the Old IRA managed to do so is more a reflection on the 
politicians of the day than it is on Mulcahy and his comrades.    
That the government should have taken any action other than to arrest 
the mutineers has probably a lot to do with the volatile period that marked the 
early years of parliamentary democracy in Free State Ireland. Nevertheless, in 
the context of civil-military relations, it was an episode that weighted the 
desired relationship in favour of a rogue element of the military. That this was 
short lived was fortunate for the establishment and growth of those relations in 
Ireland. It was not for another sixty five years that the notion of something 
approaching a widespread mutiny was even contemplated. The emergence 
later of an organised body within the Defence Forces, bringing pressure to 
bear on the government, albeit political pressure, rather than the threat of 
arms, was to raise once again questions regarding the relationship between the 
civil authority and that of the forces. And while during this period there was 
never a threat of armed insurrection, it could be argued that a political 
insurrection took place. The similarities between what happened in the late 
1980s and in the early 1920s lies in military personnel influencing a 
government in both cases against the better judgement of the Chief of Staff. 
To what extent this is detrimental to civil-military relations is a moot point, 
one thing that it does prove however is that civil authority supremacy has been 
the profile in Ireland since the 1920s even if that supremacy was abused or 
misguided on occasion. Huntington writing long after events in Ireland 
recognised the conflict between military obedience and political wisdom but 
argued the supremacy of the political system in all cases:  
The criteria of military efficiency are limited, concrete and relatively 
objective; the criteria for political wisdom are indefinite, ambiguous and 
highly subjective. Policy is an art, military science is a profession. No 
commonly accepted political values exist by which the military officer can 
prove to reasonable men that his political judgement is preferable to that of 
the statesman. The superior political wisdom of the statesman must be 
accepted as a fact. If the statesman decides upon war which the soldier 
47 
 
knows can only lead to national catastrophe, then the soldier must fall to 
and make the best of a bad situation.
74
 
Valiulis looks on the impact of the political manoeuvring that went on 
during the crisis as positive, a demonstration of the changes that had taken 
place within the army.
75
 However these positive changes, wherein the military 
were conscious of civil supremacy, were already well under way before it and 
the threat of instability and a return to violence that year came not from the 
established senior generals of the army but from a disgruntled Old IRA vying 
for better positions in the aftermath of demobilisation. Different forms of this 
dissidence would evolve in later years and even in the present day there are 
remnants of an organisation that do not recognise the supremacy of the state. 
They are no longer in the army of today. They never held any sway in 
Mulcahy‘s vision of the army either. Whether or not the intervention by 
political figures in the Irish army crisis of 1924 prevented national disaster 
will probably never be known. To what extent the threats of the old IRA 
would have been implemented is equally unclear. That they were assuaged by 
the political wisdom of the day may have averted another civil conflict or may 
not. One way or another, the incidents clearly outline an established civil 
supremacy that sustained itself even at the expense of decent men.  The 
professional attitude that has marked the civil-military relations between the 
Irish armed forces and their government since then, survived despite the 
sacking of Mulcahy, not because of it.    
In the intervening period between the 1920s and 1980s the Defence 
Forces underwent significant change. The demobilisation of the Civil War 
period reduced strength in terms of manpower, however new services and 
units were established in accordance with perceived needs and the emerging 
complexity of the PDF grew in parallel with that of the nation. The 
‗command‘ system of the early 1920s that had been established by Mulcahy 
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divided the operational areas into eight zones in the East (HQ Dublin), the 
West (HQ Athlone), the Southwest ( HQ Limerick), the Northern (HQ 
Stranorlar), the Cork (HQ Cork), the Kerry (HQ Tralee), and Waterford (HQ 
Kilkenny), areas. The number of commands was later halved to four 
comprising of the Eastern, Western, Southern and Curragh Command. 
Formations like the Air Corps and the Naval Service would come later. 
Further demobilisation took place into the late 1920s.
76
  
The raising of a volunteer force in the late 1930s facilitated an 
expanded body of men under arms for the period of the Second World War 
when the Irish government were adamant that they would maintain their 
neutrality. Reductions in numbers had to take place again in the post war 
period however the establishment of the United Nations (UN) soon after it 
resulted later in a basis for some new roles for the Irish Army. Despite the new 
roles, the PDF seemed lacking in up to date means and equipment. Col. Walsh 
in his thesis remarked that:  
Irish governments have failed to address the Defence needs of the State. 
During the 1920s the pattern established was to be repeated by successive 
governments, the armed forces were placed in a disadvantaged position 
relative to the manner in which the armed forces were treated. In the 
Congo there was obsolete dress, equipment and failure to exert a proper 
command and control system. 
77
 
 Pay and allowances may always have been an issue. Duggan notes a 
Department of Finance Order from 1924 that lays down that the army was not 
professional enough to merit full pay and suggests ‗It is arguable whether it 
ever subsequently changed its mind‘.78 The late 1960s were marked by 
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increasing civil strife in Northern Ireland which over time drew the Irish 
armed forces into duties that provided aid to the civil power along dangerous 
borders. By the 1970s Irish army personnel were being formally posted along 
the border with Northern Ireland as the administrations in both jurisdictions 
were grappling with deteriorating internal security. In addition to the 
expansion and contraction of the physical size of the Irish armed forces and 
their changing role since their foundation, there had been no satisfactory 
standard set in the determination of military pay and allowances between the 
1920s and the 1980s. In 1924 wage rates were fixed by a pay commission. 
Although there had been an expectation of parity with the Gardaí, this was not 
to materialise. The military authorities would contend that many proposals 
were made over the years to the Department of Defence to improve matters 
but to no avail. In 1969 a working group was set up by the Minister for 
Finance and after a protracted period of over three years recommended an 
improvement in pay. National wage agreements in the 1970s heralded a 
linkage of some grades to the civil service but by the 1980s dissatisfaction 
with pay in the army continued. 
79
  
In the Gleeson Commission report, no fewer than 27 instances are 
listed during these decades where some element of army pay, was reviewed, 
reported on or implemented.
80
 In the context of civil-military relations, serving 
members of the military had developed a very loyal if somewhat frustrating 
relationship with their civilian masters.  
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Chapter 2 
The gathering storm: Growing 
tension in the 1980s 
 
Civil-military relations after 1924 
In the stable democracy that is Ireland today, fears of the propensity for a civil 
war conflict or a mutiny may seem remote, yet in the period between 1924 and 
the present there have been many instances elsewhere around the world where 
military personnel intervened, influenced or even dramatically usurped elected 
governments. The close mixture of military power and political authority 
sharing the same chamber and an equality of influence is seen as clearly 
undesirable. Writing in 1974 Welch and Smith observe that: 
Nearly half of the member states of the United Nations are ruled by 
outright military regimes, in which officers fill senior political positions; 
or by military-civilian coalitions, in which officers exercise paramount 
influence behind a façade of civilian control.
81 
 
While any government may concern itself with civilian disaffection and 
protesting, having an army hierarchy or part of it openly dissatisfied and 
critical of the government is an entirely different matter. In Huntington‘s 
compelling ‗Political order in changing societies‘, while comparing the threat 
posed by protesting citizens to protesting soldiers he contends that:  
The military can be cohesive, bureaucratised, and disciplined. Colonels 
can run governments; students and monks cannot.
82
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Finer however believes that armies are incapable of running anything 
other than a very simplistic society. Among other reasons quoted regarding 
their competence in administration he highlights lack of moral mandate as 
being the principal restriction on which armies may fail. If they are in a 
position as a result of the threat of violence it will not be too long before they 
are usurped themselves:  
Rule by force alone, or the threat of such force, is inadequate; in addition 
government must possess authority. It must be widely recognised not only 
as the government, but as the lawful, the rightful government.
83
 
In Ireland, the soldiers who had fought in the War of Independence 
certainly wanted a government to be established in order for the population to 
be able to rule themselves. While some of them went into politics, it had not 
been with the intention to ‗take over‘ the country at the end the War of 
Independence. As was shown in chapter one, the early leaders of the military 
such as Mulcahy and his General Staff, deferred to the greater authority of a 
civilian government. This was evidenced by their willingness to resign at its 
request even when the stated reasons were hard to justify and were not 
subsequently proven. Nevertheless other elements of the army who were 
members of the Old IRA maintained divided loyalties. In an effort to formalise 
the subservient/superior relationship between soldier and state, and as a result 
of the ‗army crisis‘, an amendment to the Defence  Act copper fastened an 
important element  in the context of civil-military relations in law. Enacted on 
the 1 August 1924, the ‗Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1923 
(Continuance and amendment) Act, 1924‘, contained a provision that updated 
oaths for those joining the forces. This provision was intended to prohibit any 
recurrence of divided loyalties and ‗secret society oaths‘ to another cause 
above that of the state. The chain of command in Ireland since 1924 is clear-
cut and unambiguous. The President, acting with the approval of the 
government, is the supreme commander of the Defence Forces. The powers 
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are set out in Article 13 of the constitution and command itself is exercised 
through the government by way of the Minister for Defence under the Defence 
Act 1954.
84
  
As the army in Ireland evolved however, there was increasing 
administrative consequences in the way in which the superior/subordinate 
relationship was maintained. Today the Department of Defence, for which the 
Minister is responsible, is unique among other government departments in 
Ireland, in that it has two distinct sections to it, the civilian section and the 
military section. Both sides have responsibility to the Minister for Defence. 
The military Chief of Staff has direct access to him as does the Secretary 
General on the civilian side. Until recently, the civilian Departmental side 
administered the entirety of the Department and controlled its budget. That has 
changed following a number of reviews that placed more budgetary 
responsibility on military commanders, however up until the 1990s it was the 
civilian section of the Department that was responsible for implementation of 
government legislation, ministerial instruction, statutory regulations and 
government pay and expenditure policies.  All matters relating to government 
budgetary policy including what was to be allocated to the military section 
came through and from the civilian section. This included pay, allowances, 
capital expenditure and day to day budgetary subheads that dictated how much 
could be spent in a particular area. As a result, all capital expenditure requests 
emanating from the military section, even the most minor of purchases had to 
be eventually approved or processed by the civilian side. One administrative 
result of this is well demonstrated in the commentary of a former naval officer. 
Petty Officer Jim Halligan served in the Army with the Corps of Engineers for 
three years before transferring to the Navy. Being a technician he was 
frequently exposed to delays and frustration caused by difficulties in acquiring 
stores or spare parts that were needed to complete his work: 
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Somewhere along the administrative purchasing line there could be an 
eighteen year old civil servant with little life experience and no military 
inkling who would be endowed with the capacity to delay, question or 
even seek justification for the purchase.
85
  
While such arrangements were probably manifestations of the supremacy of 
the civilian authority, they often led to the military section becoming 
dissatisfied and frustrated with what they saw as a burdensome system which 
was being administered by a civilian section that had little understanding of 
the needs of a military force in a general sense and the specific needs of 
individual members of such a force. Gleeson observed: 
The centralised bureaucracy and the slow processing of decisions through 
extended chains of command create a sense of powerlessness and 
disillusion among military personnel, resulting in lower morale and 
widespread feeling of frustration.
86
  
In some respects the present structure of the Irish army hierarchy reflects the 
earlier concerns that prevailed at the time of the ‗army mutiny‘ of 1924. All of 
the leadership of the military are subservient and reporting to the civilian 
Minister for Defence. The supreme command of the Defence Forces is vested 
in the President of Ireland however the actual command is exercised through 
the government by the Minister for Defence, all of whom are civilian. The 
Minister is advised by a Defence Council comprising of Minister of State for 
the Department of Defence, its Secretary General, the Defence Force Chief of 
Staff, deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), and deputy Chief of Staff (Support).   
Although the military General Staff officers may report directly to the 
Minister, it is the civilian Secretary General who is the principal officer of the 
entire Department of Defence. In Ireland the military Chief of Staff does not 
himself exercise command over any troops. Command of the soldiers 
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throughout the country is exercised through four Brigadiers, each of whom is 
on an equal rank par with his colleagues, the inference being that no one 
officer could mobilise the entire forces of the state. In addition there are each 
of the three members of the General Staff, the Quartermaster General, the 
Adjutant General and the Chief of Staff all of whom have independent access 
to the Minister for Defence. In the years following the foundation of the state 
these arrangements were to consolidate the subordinate relationship of the 
army to the government. They became the enduring ethos that permeated the 
modern Defence Forces. To this day the army has no authority to deploy any 
armed force of its own volition. Operational armed soldiers engaged in any 
security operations in Ireland are deployed only when requested by the civilian 
police force An Garda Síochána. Although the broader intention of the 
structures and reporting arrangements in the Irish armed forces had their origin 
in the well intentioned imposition of civil authority, their strict boundaries and 
observation often led to strained relations between the constituent parts of the 
Department of Defence. In addition, the role of the army and the type of 
mission assigned also impacted on the relations between the army itself and 
the government or the soldier and the government.      
Significance and Role of Civil-military relations 
The legislation governing the respective roles of the different elements of the 
Department of Defence outlined in the preceding paragraphs, provide a 
framework for the intended boundaries and practice of civil-military relations 
in Ireland. In some respects it attempts to establish supremacy of civil 
authority and also remove the presence of the military from political activity. 
However, the statutory provisions are not the only influence. Relationships are 
also influenced by role and perspective.  For much of the period between the 
1920s and the 1980s the stated mission for the Irish Defence Forces had been 
to, ‗defend the state against external aggression‘. The current mission which 
will be explored in a subsequent chapter amends the phrase ‗external 
aggression‘ to ‗armed aggression‘. While the distinction of dropping the word 
external may seem small, much has been written about the importance of the 
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mission for an armed force, with particular regard to its relationship with the 
civil authority. According to Finer:  
The army is a purposeful instrument. It is not a crescive institution like a 
church; it comes into being by fiat. It is rationally conceived to fulfil 
certain objects. One may be to assist the civil power, but the principal 
object is to fight and win wars. The highly peculiar features of its 
organisation flow from this central purpose, not from the secondary one, 
and in it find their supreme justification.
87
    
In considering the impact of ‗internal‘ missions on the propensity for military 
forces to become involved in politics, Smith and Welch proposed ‗state 
involvement of the armed forces in internal pacification- in short duties 
usually assigned to the police - inherently and inevitably brings the military 
into political disputes. Accordingly they suggested, ‗the likelihood of military 
intervention rises should the armed forces become involved in primarily 
domestic police type or counterinsurgency activities.‘88    
In light of these observations it is interesting to consider the 
emergence, in 1988, of the political campaign by spouses of soldiers and later 
the soldiers themselves in Ireland, at a time when troops were deployed in aid 
to the civil power that was operating on the border with Northern Ireland. The 
question remains whether these duties and the soldiers‘ exposure to internal, 
police type duties, resulted in an increase in their ‗political‘ activity and 
posturing. If Smith and Welch‘s proposal were to be accepted, Irish troops 
being deployed along the border in aid to the civil power contributed in the 
politicising of the troops.  Certainly soldiers had already begun to consider the 
remuneration they were receiving in a different light. If a soldier‘s function, as 
has been suggested by Huntington, Janowitz, Finer and others, is combat, then 
while engaged in it, they only have their own compatriots with which they can 
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compare. If on the other hand they are utilised as a kind of Gendarme force or 
a militia, it is perhaps inevitable that they will draw comparisons with their 
civilian counterparts. Does this then lead to the soldier considering himself 
something other than a unit of combat? Does the public perception of the 
soldier up to now disregard the social dimension of his or her life? And, if they 
are not off fighting wars where do they fit into the normal non military routine 
of the civilian community in which they live? 
For many personnel in the Irish Defence Forces, they were only really 
soldiering on overseas missions such as UNIFIL in South Lebanon. Most 
soldiers who have served overseas enjoyed the experience; the proof of this is 
in the fact that in the Irish Defence Forces, until very recently, all deployments 
of personnel to UN missions were voluntary. While this has now changed it 
was the case for most of the duration of the mission in Lebanon. In the marital 
profile of Irish soldiers of the late 1980s outlined by Secretary General 
Michael Howard, many soldiers while deployed in Ireland would have been 
returning home from duty on a daily, or weekly, basis. There would have been 
the requisite daily or weekly transition from soldier to father/husband, 
wife/mother and the necessity for the military men and women to adjust, and 
at least while at home, begin to consider themselves in the context of their 
family role as opposed to the classic image the public would have of the 
toughened military personage. Studies undertaken on the impact of this on/off 
role and the difficulties that it precipitates in family life, have been undertaken 
in the both the Irish Army in respect of overseas missions, and in the Navy in 
respect of the absence from home while ships are deployed.
89
 In some cases 
the time spent throughout the year on three and four week patrols around the 
Irish coastline far exceed the total number of days a soldier may spend away 
from home in any given year while deployed on a UN overseas mission. While 
these observations reveal that there are consequences for the family in this 
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on/off adjustment, there has been little consideration given to the fact that 
most personnel of the armed force in Ireland live among the local civilian 
population. This differs to living in the larger isolated self contained bases that 
would be a feature of the armies of the US, Great Britain and elsewhere. In 
countries like the US and UK, recruitment is conducted on a national level 
with personnel being deployed to any number of distant locations from their 
home. Another important distinguishing factor of military life in considering 
civil-military relations is the physical isolation of the troops from the wider 
community. In Ireland, the practice of large scale barracks being built in 
remote locations, isolated from the community, never really arose. The 
historical positioning of barracks around Ireland was mostly the result of 
Britain‘s military needs down through the years. These varied from coastal 
defence from archrivals France and Spain, to the consideration of a good 
geographical spread that would enable speedy response to the threat of internal 
attack by those who saw military resistance as the best way of achieving Irish 
independence. As a result, the barracks system was spread geographically all 
over Ireland. Apart from the Navy and Air Corps, most recruitment was 
traditionally conducted at a local level where new recruits were drawn from 
the local community. One of the effects of this system was that the soldier 
lived out of barracks and maintained ties with family, friends, local 
organisations and clubs. During the examination of numbers of soldiers living 
in barracks undertaken by the Gleeson Commission it was found in 1989 that 
of 13,233 only a small number lived in barracks: 
A survey conducted at the request of the commission indicated that a total 
of 1,608 army personnel were classified as ‗living in‘ on the 30 November 
1989, while only 1,424 actually slept in barracks on that night.
90
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This represented only 11% of the total Defence Forces and in the intervening 
period this figure has probably reduced even further. Thus the question arises, 
in the absence of larger isolated military communities and the propensity for 
Irish military personnel to ‗live out‘ of barracks, are they in fact more exposed 
to or involved in political activity?   
Membership by personnel of the Defence Forces of any political party 
is prohibited by the Defence Act 1954. It states: 
A member of the Permanent Defence Force shall not join, or be a member 
of, or subscribe to, any political organisation or society or any secret 
society whatsoever.
91
 
The reality is that most soldiers in Ireland, who live in traditional civilian 
communities, would be well aware of who their local politicians are, and may 
even be active for certain political parties, if not actually members of those 
parties. During Spring and Autumn of 1989, when soldiers had taken matters 
into their own hands in the pursuit of the idea of a representative body for 
serving personnel, active members of the fledgling PDFORRA made daily 
visits to Dáil Eireann. There, they engaged with sitting politicians and lobbied 
for the necessary changes in legislation, while at the same time informing 
them first hand of the deteriorating conditions that prevailed in the Defence 
Forces at the time. In this instance there were serving soldiers, not quietly 
influencing politicians in the background but physically visiting elected 
representatives in a democracy and making their case. This sort of very direct 
influence certainly made the political debate in the Dáil chamber far more 
interesting and better informed that it had been before. Richie Condron was a 
Company Sergeant in the Eastern Command, he was involved in the initial 
stages of the establishment of PDFORRA and served at all levels of the 
organisation, from barracks to national executive. He became the Vice 
President of the association and probably had more contact with the politicians 
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of the day than any other activist. He was passionate about the political system 
and how it might be best utilised to improve matters in the Army. While still a 
Company Sergeant in the Irish Army he remembers one time visiting the 
public chamber of the Dáil in the late 1980s and listening to a lengthy 
parliamentary debate about the wisdom of using loose leafed tea, or tea bags, 
and which would be best for the army to purchase. ‗I couldn‘t believe that so 
much importance was being afforded to such a trivial issue, when there were 
huge very real problems with pay and conditions‘.92 
While many issues contributed to great dissatisfaction being expressed 
by soldiers in their local communities to their local politicians during 1988 and 
1989, they seemed rarely to have complained about conditions while on 
overseas service which were sometimes worse than anything at home. Most 
soldiers spoke in glowing terms about service overseas in which they clearly 
perceived themselves in a different role. It is also noteworthy that when on 
overseas missions, the subordinate/superior relationship between the military 
and the occasional visiting civilian members of the Department of Defence 
was very much reversed. In the field, the supremacy of the military function 
and role of the soldier was very much the dominant force. The role and 
mission of the army in Ireland, consisting of mainly, aid to the civil power and 
overseas peacekeeping missions, are significant in determining how the 
individual soldier perceives his or her role in the local community, and their 
relationship with it. They are also factors in influencing perspectives among 
others, including civilian personnel of the Department of the Defence, about 
the value or status of members of the armed forces. Military personnel would 
have had a very different view.  
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Perspectives on status and role of the military 
Military personnel in Ireland saw themselves as unique in their service to the 
country, prepared to lay down their lives if necessary in its defence. They 
believed that for this unswerving loyalty, the state should ‗look after‘ them, 
and that they were special. The military felt they should not have to argue 
about getting decent pay and conditions because of the very special place they 
occupied in society and their role in the protection of its interests. Loyalty to 
the state was a given in the officer corps. In 2008, Brian O‘Keefe, General 
Secretary of RACO, was already a Colonel, he had come through the Irish 
Army cadet training scheme. Having served at all the officer rank levels from 
Second Lieutenant to Colonel, he was a proud officer, proud of his rank and 
status, and protective of his subordinates. His perspective on the relationship 
between the military and the state was clear. ‗Officers were of the view that 
we owed absolute loyalty to the government‘.93 This is an important 
perspective from a career officer, particularly when you consider it comes 
from a person trained in the application of violence. The uniqueness of the 
military and its role in society has been acknowledged throughout the study of 
civil-military relations. Welch and Smith maintain that the responsibilities of 
the armed forces are unique in the burden of protecting the state which is their 
only patron.
94
 Janowitz suggests that their uniqueness derives from the 
requirement that members are specialists in making use of violence and mass 
destruction.
95
 Desch contends that the military are undemocratic because of 
their hierarchical organisation and their near monopoly on coercive power in a 
state, which he says if not under firm civilian control, can represent a serious 
threat to democracy.
96
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Consistent in these perspectives is the belief that the military and their 
role is unique in society but that they can pose a threat to the very body they 
serve. In Ireland in the late 1980s the well establishing tradition among 
military personnel was that the use of such violence was only, at the request 
of, and in the interests of, the State. Given the deadly skills that are inherent in 
military expertise, it is all the more important that personnel perceive 
themselves as being especially loyal to the State.  This loyalty manifests itself 
in numerous ways. Military personnel in Ireland appear to accept their 
responsibilities to the furthest extreme, willing to give their own lives for the 
greater good of the society in which they live. Even in peacetime, long hours, 
absences from home and the rotations to and from foreign missions all 
required a special dedication from soldiers in their service to the country.In 
considering the dual nature of the Department of Defence as earlier outlined, it 
is not surprising perhaps, that the civilian employees  did not share the 
perspectives of ‗uniqueness‘ held by the military personnel. Civilian 
departmental staff did not see their own role as unique; they saw their function 
as being similar to any other department operating within the same 
government policy and budgetary constraints as everybody else. It was a job 
for them. Nine to five Monday to Friday, holidays off and all the benefits that 
go with steady employment. While many were as dedicated to their job as 
anybody else, they did not have the requirement of ‗living‘ on the job, of ever 
having to lay down their lives for it.   
These different perspectives of the military and the civilian elements in 
the Department of Defence were to have an important impact on the respective 
responses of both sides to problems that arose in what was termed, a crisis in 
the army in 1988 and 1989.  Both parties had very different views of the 
situation with regard to pay, allowances and conditions of service in the armed 
forces. Both on occasion blamed each other for some of the problems that 
were highlighted across the front pages of the national media at that time. 
Reports of very bad pay, poor opportunities for promotion and unfair 
treatment were soon to be the topic of national newspapers, radio chat shows 
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and prime time national television. Irish Times articles in 1988 reflected the 
mood: 
Inevitably, what has come to be seen within the Defence Forces as a 
consistent policy of official neglect, is beginning to take its toll on morale. 
Last year 35 army officers voluntarily resigned the highest number of 
voluntary retirements since 1960 and it‘s not just the lack of clear defence 
policy that is causing this haemorrhage. Many army officers are finding 
that they are poorly paid in comparison to civilian colleagues, while there 
is also a lack of career structure for many younger officers.
97
 
 
In recent months NASA has enjoyed great success in highlighting what 
they believe are appalling levels in pay in the army and a general crisis in 
morale, which has been sapped by the virtual embargo on promotion and 
recruitment.
98
  
Although there was a certain amount of sympathy among the civilian section 
of the Department of Defence for the poor pay and conditions being described 
as prevalent in the army, it would be argued that they had little real 
understanding of the source of the soldiers complaints. In the Departmental 
side, the issues of pay and allowances were perceived as parts of a very broad 
public service sector pay policy. Individual members of the Department of 
Defence had no role in determining pay. It was the Department of Finance, 
acting on behalf of government that usually set the rates and ceilings.  Michael 
Howard was the Department of Defence Press Officer in 1989. He was a 
witness to, and actively involved in, the events and strategies that precipitated 
the introduction of representative bodies. He was fully informed of the claims 
military personnel were making about their pay and conditions, while at the 
same time cognisant of the government‘s need for pay restraint. Eventually 
rising to the highest position of Secretary General of the Department of 
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Defence, he recalled that a very stringent budget had been introduced in 1987 
and there was little room for manoeuvre in relation to pay. It was felt at the 
Department of Defence, at that time, that military personnel had a poor 
understanding of the constraints of public pay policy, and that the increasing 
age and marital profile of soldiers influenced dissatisfaction rather than the 
actual level of pay itself. 
99
 Although the military perspective on their 
uniqueness in their service to the state has merit, for the purpose of pursuing 
better pay, a case was often made seeking comparable rates of pay with other 
uniformed services such as on the occasion of submissions to the Gleeson 
commission. The problem was that the practice and traditional manner of 
according them payment was not recognised as being in need of any unique 
arrangements for remuneration. Gleeson remarked: 
The commission could understand why military personnel would make 
comparisons with other uniformed services which they would have come 
into contact with in the course of their work. However, having considered 
all the claims, the commission concluded that military duties were clearly 
in a distinctive category and that it would not be appropriate to fix military 
pay on the basis of a direct comparison with the pay of the Gardaí, prison 
officers and fire fighters. The commission decided that the fairest way to 
deal with military pay would be to compare the rates of pay in the Defence 
Forces with the pay of a wide range of jobs with roughly similar levels of 
responsibilities in a variety of employments in the public and the private 
sectors.
100
    
This seems somewhat contradictory. If they were not comparable with the 
other uniformed services of the state, and in a ‗distinctive category‘ why 
bother comparing them to others at all? Gleeson appeared to advocate that 
soldiers could expect no additional consideration over any other workers 
regarding their wages. These perspectives were also prevalent in the section of 
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the Department of Defence that dealt with pay. The army was no different to 
any other public sector in terms of administration and being subject to 
government policy. Although Gleeson did acknowledge the uniqueness later in 
the same chapter of his report, he did so to justify recommended increases in 
allowances but not pay:   
In addition to comparison with other employments other factors were also 
taken into account. In particular the distinctive features of employment in 
the Defence Forces are reflected in the recommended revised rates of 
military service allowance, which compensates Defence Forces personnel 
for the special conditions associated with military life.
101
 
 In the context of having a uniform mechanism for the payment of all public 
servants, the military service allowance was some official recognition of the 
uniqueness of military life. But it had been a very small allowance and was not 
reckonable for pension purposes. The Gleeson commission addressed both of 
these issues in the final report and made recommendations for a formative 
increase in the allowance and a new status which made it reckonable for 
pension. The recognition of the uniqueness of the military mission only 
extended to a recommendation to increase a military service allowance and 
underlined the different perspectives of the value of the military to the state. It 
came about long after matters had taken a new turn and after the relationships 
between the military hierarchy and the state had come under considerable 
strain. These relationships, established under pressure at the time of the 
foundation of the state were being tested in the respective responses of the two 
parts of the Department in the unfolding crisis.  
Organisational relationships in the 1980s 
Many civilian observers and commentators in the late 1980s had little 
understanding of the makeup of the Defence Forces. In listening to the daily 
complaints about pay and conditions, a civilian population began to identify 
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and sympathise with the members of the Irish armed forces. It transpired that 
the issues that came to the fore at the time were not just only about pay. 
Internal relationships in the forces were being criticised too. Some of the 
events that led to the establishment of representative bodies, where it seemed 
members of the army were being critical of the civilian Department and the 
government, may have brought some of the former doubts about loyalty and 
allegiance into sharp focus once more. The entire Department struggled with 
the problems that arose from the campaign that sought better conditions for 
soldiers. There were problems for the government in the Dáil, it seemed on a 
daily basis in late 1988 and the first quarter of 1989 that the Minister for 
Defence was being challenged and criticised by members of a very vocal 
opposition. The civilian Departmental side, responsible for the compilation of 
answers to parliamentary questions, constantly had to prepare and brief a 
sometimes bedraggled Minister, under pressure from the media and others. 
The Department of Defence Press Officer had to contend with new stories, 
emerging unexpectedly, of depravation in the army. From mid 1988 military 
commanders on the other hand were having their barracks gates being 
picketed by women with their children, seeking better conditions for their 
husbands. Soldiers had to be deployed on missions that took them from their 
homes and for which the commander had no means of recompensing them. 
The Chief of Staff himself appealed to the Department to have something done 
about pay.  All were concerned with the suggestions of low morale and all felt 
the need to defend their particular record in the abundance of criticism being 
aired by all sections of the media in what became known a second time as ‗the 
army crisis‘. Although there are distinct operational, cultural and physical 
differences in the respective missions and roles of the three sections of the 
PDF, control and supervision of the armed forces is quite centralised. In all 
cases senior management of the various military units is provided by 
commissioned officers who for the most part have been trained in cadet school 
where they learn the craft of military management, motivation and leadership. 
The junior managerial functions are undertaken by non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) from among enlisted personnel who enter the military as recruits. An 
extremely important element of any military institution is the ‗esprit de corps‘, 
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and the morale of the troops. The officer corps, who manage all armies, make 
constant reference to that spirit that binds them. They are the military 
professionals. Their craft is military leadership, logistics, resources and 
strategy. They are expected to be leaders and in the conduct of any military 
operation this is their most valuable skill. In all branches of the forces, officers 
will often require additional specialist skills. At the base of the three part 
hierarchy beneath the officer and NCO body, is the largest group comprising 
of the privates. These far outnumber the other two and in the past were 
thought to be the essence of an army‘s strength. It was the privates that were 
most needed to fight wars. It was the privates who needed to be motivated and 
it was the privates who, by and large, gave effect to whatever weaponry and 
arms that an army possessed for utilisation in pursuit of its military aims. They 
were also the ‗manual labour‘ detachment of an army. The middle group of the 
military force is the NCOs. They are supervising managers, with all the skills 
honed as privates added to by further training, education and most importantly 
experience. They are the constant feature of the lower army management 
structure. Their time in a particular posting or position is usually far longer 
than either privates or officers.  
In many countries there is a practice of utilising the skills and experience 
of selected NCOs by training them to become ‗commissioned‘ officers. These 
are generally referred to as ‗Commissioning from the ranks‘ schemes (CFRs). 
The French Army at one time had almost half of their officer body coming 
from the ranks.
102
  Although such a scheme does exist, there are relatively few 
officers in Ireland commissioned from among the enlisted ranks. Professor 
Huntington suggests the transition from one to the other is problematic as one 
has a vocation while the other has a profession. He claimed in 1964 that 
‗enlisted personnel have neither the intellectual skills nor the professional 
responsibility of the officer.‘103  Huntington‘s generalisations regarding the 
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intellectual skills of enlisted personnel made well have been valid in the US in 
1964, but certainly, such conclusions would not be sustainable in Ireland 
twenty five years later. It is not unusual today to find many instances in which 
the enlisted personnel are better educated and have greater intellectual skills 
than their ‗military‘ superiors in the commissioned ranks. Nevertheless there is 
reluctance in the Irish Defence Forces to promote their enlisted personnel into 
the commissioned ranks. Despite the existence of the Irish PDF CFR scheme, 
the frequency and application process make it little more than a token gesture 
to the principle. In the twenty five years between 1962 and 1987 there were 
only 6 courses under this scheme with an average of twenty five NCOs on 
each.
104
 That represents about five enlisted personnel per year in a force of 
over 12,000. In the British Army while 80% of commissioned officers are 
cadet trained, the remaining 20% come through various other scheme 
including officer training courses for serving soldiers.
105
 This was one of the 
issues raised by enlisted personnel themselves in their submission to the 
Gleeson Commission when it was felt that not enough personnel were given 
the opportunity to go on courses of training that would lead them to a 
commissioned officer status. 
106
 Contrary to the impression that Professor 
Huntington might have expected, Gleeson, in responding to their proposal 
found something altogether different:  
During the course of its investigations, the commission formed the 
impression that considerable scope exists for greater involvement of NCOs 
in the management of the Defence Forces. A number of senior NCOs in 
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particular, appear to have extremely good middle management qualities 
which are not fully utilised merely because they are not officers.  
107
  
In a footnote to the above, Gleeson records the fact that between 1962 and 
1989 only 140 NCOs were commissioned from the ranks. Despite the 
recommendation by Gleeson in the final report of the commission, that a 
review should take place, little has changed.
108
 In the subsequent scheme that 
was introduced the actual criteria for eligibility was narrowed rather than 
widened, by reducing the age eligibility and specifying the number of years 
served, the number of  opportunities that personnel had to apply for officer 
training actually narrowed. 
Perhaps Huntington‘s conclusions still carry some sway among the 
military hierarchy in Ireland. It may also be that the perspective in the armed 
forces in Ireland comes from the early British military model where the officer 
class came from the aristocracy and maintained a cultural separation from the 
enlisted ranks by institutionalising their social differences in the day to day 
operation of the army as an entity. While the aristocratic system was not 
present in Ireland of the late 1980s the tradition that had prevailed was that, 
once a candidate successfully completed cadet school to become an officer, 
the seniority and career progress was generally assured regardless of ability or 
suitability. Janowitz maintained that because of the simplicity of the skill 
structure and static nature of the military organisation, military authority was 
derived, among other things, from social position. He contends there where 
authority was ascribed, rather than earned, promotion came on the basis of age 
and not ability.
109
 Although commissioned officers, NCOs and privates 
operationally work and live in very close proximity to each other there are 
many imposed divisions that separate them. From pay, conditions of service, 
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allowances, career expectations and pensions down to where they eat, sleep, 
live and socialise. It is a highly hierarchal institution. Janowitz remarks: 
 Since by definition the military establishment is a comprehensive and all 
embracing hierarchy, the career soldier is assumed to be an ideal example 
of the professional operating under bureaucratic authority.
110
 
This system facilitates a managerial/worker or superior/subordinate type of 
management that defines the organisational relationship which is further 
solidified by the wearing of uniform. Such uniforms, in all cases, externally 
portray the actual rank of the individual. Thus, as in most armed forces of the 
world, any subordinate coming into contact with any superior will be 
immediately and explicitly aware of their superior/subordinate relationship 
and vice versa. This causes the smoothing of the imposition of authority. It 
helps speed the response and context of military orders and instructions. Finer 
comments: 
Further to this each echelon in the hierarchy is immediately and 
objectively identifiable by rank and distinctive insignia. Authority is 
depersonalised it is owed to the rank not the man. .… The importance of 
subordination and superordination is further enhanced by social practices 
prescribing a social distance between the superior and the inferior ranks.
111
  
The heavy importance that the Irish armed forces attached to rank 
insignia and uniform were to fully emerge in the period leading up to the 
establishment of representative associations. In 1990 and 1991 during the 
negotiations that preceded the setting up of the representative bodies, (which 
will be examined in the chapter five), the military authorities were to contend 
that the wearing of uniforms and the display of rank were ‗inextricably‘ linked 
to the exercise of command and discipline.  The issue almost derailed the talks 
that were set up to compile new regulations for consultation mechanisms for 
                                                 
110
 Janowitz, Sociology and the military establishment, p27. 
111
 Finer, The man on horseback, p6. 
70 
 
elected representatives at all levels of the army chain of command. These 
talks, commencing in July 1990, were made up of the elected representatives 
of PDFORRA on one side, and on the other, officials from the Department of 
Defence and senior officers of the army hierarchy. The matter of contention 
was that PDFORRA wanted elected representatives, in future consultation 
with army management, to be in civilian attire. They argued if meaningful 
‗negotiation‘ was to take place then all people at the table were to be deemed, 
for the purpose of the talks, to be ‗equal‘. Both sides were there in legitimate 
roles, either conferred on them by lawful orders as in the case of the military, 
or by elected mandate under statutory legislation in the case of the elected 
representatives of the associations. Nevertheless, the army side felt that the 
‗shedding‘ of the uniform for such talks in barracks or elsewhere in the army 
system would be totally unacceptable. The issue rumbled on for eleven months 
of discussion but was finally concluded when both sides seemed to concede on 
the issue. The resultant arrangements were set out in the Defence Force 
Regulation (DFR) S6. The details of the arguments made will be outlined in a 
later chapter.  
While the lesser ranked person is in all cases subordinate to their 
superior, and are compelled to carry out all orders or instruction received from 
them, the relationship is not just one way. The commissioned officer body 
have an ethical, regulatory and definitive ‗duty of care‘ to their subordinates. 
They are responsible for every aspect of their subordinate‘s life in the service, 
from providing them with clothing, accommodation and food, to granting 
them permission to get time off, apply for promotion and even get married. 
This duty of care is taken very seriously by most military commanders. In an 
earlier part of his military service Col. Brian O‘Keefe recalled the long days 
spent on military exercises at the end of which all troops were cold, exhausted 
and hungry in the Dublin Mountains: 
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Your first priority as a commander was to ensure the troops were fed and 
quartered; this was even before you had anything to eat yourself, famished 
though you may have been.
112
  
In Ireland as in many other countries the relationship was paternalistic. 
There were continuing instances whereby military commanders used their all 
encompassing authority to assist their charges in times of difficulty. Conscious 
that they had no control over pay rates, they did utilise their ability to provide 
time off to soldiers who were suffering family bereavements, domestic 
difficulties or even health problems. Commanders were also aware that there 
were personnel under their charge who were having difficulty in trying to 
make ends meet. It was believed that a number of privates in the army were 
eligible for a supplementary social welfare allowance as a result of the low 
level of their pay. To compensate, commanders often deployed such people on 
duties that attracted a subsistence allowance. Lt Colonel Adrian Ryan had 
wide experience as a Company Commander. He had witnessed first-hand, 
soldiers taking on additional civilian part time jobs to try and supplement the 
pay they received in the army in order to survive.  ‗You turned a blind eye to 
them having second jobs in civvy street (sic), which strictly speaking was in 
breach of regulations.
113
  
The Defence Act 1954 distinguishes only two groups among the 
members of the Permanent Defence Force (PDF); these are officer ranks and 
‗other‘ ranks. The cultural differences between these groups, and their 
relationships with each other, not surprisingly resulted in different approaches 
to the whole idea of representation and associations in the forces. Many of the 
officers serving in 1988 saw the calls for a representative body as the 
manifestation of their failure to provide good pay and better conditions for 
their soldiers. They sympathised with them and often articulated their 
frustration in being unable to assist in these crucial areas. Low pay and 
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insufficient remuneration were areas that officers felt were outside their 
control and although the military authorities submitted proposals to the 
Department of Defence for improvements, they could only do so in the context 
of the constant struggle for more resources to run the PDF and ensure it 
fulfilled its mission. Much of the blame for perceived penny-pinching was laid 
at the door of the civilian section of the Department of Defence and in this 
regard, officers, NCOs and privates were often united in the negative 
perception they held regarding the Department‘s approach to pay and 
allowances. ‗We are all in the same boat‘ was a phrase often used by superiors 
to their subordinates in any discussions that arose about pay. But as has 
already been pointed out, while everybody may well have been in the same 
boat with regard to their dissatisfaction with pay, there were different degrees 
of privilege in that boat. For many enlisted personnel there were far more 
problems in the service than just the levels of pay. Promotion through the 
ranks, career development, selection for overseas service, standards of food 
and accommodation in barracks, accreditation of training received, and 
subsistence eligibility were all matters that attracted criticism among enlisted 
personnel. The difference between these issues and that of basic pay was that 
the commissioned officers, in their managerial role, did have control and were 
directly responsible for the procedures, delays and defects in many of the areas 
where problems arose. There was a service-wide criticism among enlisted 
personnel that when officers retired from service or were deployed out of their 
units, a replacement was in place immediately. Applications for promotion by 
those eligible in the officer ranks, and the interview process that preceded 
promotion, were all carried out and in place prior to the vacancy arising so that 
when an officer did retire, the vacant position was filled immediately. With 
such a promotion there was a domino effect down the line that occurred 
literally on the day of departure. In the case of enlisted personnel, vacancies 
for promotion were only generally acted upon after the NCO had retired; the 
potential promotion created often remained unfilled for months or even years. 
It was in these areas, where the officer body did have control over the timing 
of interview boards, that criticism of the higher ranks in management arose 
among enlisted personnel. In their submission to the Gleeson Commission the 
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NCO team highlighted a 21% discrepancy between strength and establishment 
and an over use of personnel put into ‗acting‘ ranks where they had all the 
responsibilities but not the actual promotion.
114
  
Internal relationships between military commanders and their 
subordinates were therefore complex. While they shared their military 
uniqueness and both perceived the Department of Defence, in certain areas 
like pay, to be the ‗common enemy‘ there was also the internal dissatisfaction 
with the way in which non-pay issues were managed by officers in a position 
where they had absolute control of outcomes that impacted on the service of 
the enlisted personnel. Thus in the very public campaign that was about to 
unfold, organisational relationships between enlisted personnel and officers, 
between the Department of Defence and the army, between military body and 
the government were to come to the fore in a way that had not been 
experienced before. This exposure of the nuances of Irish civil-military 
relations was precipitated by the conditions that led to the call for 
improvements in the army and the establishment of representative associations 
in the Irish armed forces.  
Dissatisfaction with pay and conditions  
Despite the complexity of internal military relations and the broader civil-
military relations, soldiers involved in the day to day operations of the army, 
were confronted with what they saw as deteriorating conditions of service and 
pay which none of the structures were able to address. From the late 1960s, the 
continuing civil strife and paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland resulted in 
increasing numbers of Irish soldiers being posted along the border between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic. They were there by request of the civil 
power, An Garda Síochána. The practice of army support for policing 
operations in Ireland arises as a result of the main police force being unarmed. 
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If at any time the Gardaí require armed assistance there is a mechanism where 
they can request what is termed in the army, ‗aid to the civil power‘ or ATCP. 
Much of the Irish army‘s activities by the 1980s were associated with ATCP 
operations in support of what was essentially, police work. Cash being 
transported to and from banks had come under attack from different armed 
paramilitary groups. The Gardaí sought the aid of the army in the protection of 
the vehicles being used, and the ‗cash escort‘ military duty came into being.  
There were similar duties that emerged in the movement of legitimate 
explosives around the country for the purposes of mining. Finer expressed 
reservations about armies being used in this way for, ‗domestic‘ duties, and 
not for the role for which they were trained. He further maintained that the 
strain which such duties put on the loyalty of the armed forces is often too 
great and impels them to disobey or even to act against their government 
giving the Curragh mutiny as an example.
115
 
There is a certain irony in the fact that the British Army, as a result of 
developments in Northern Ireland, was accused of being mutinous and that 
Irish soldiers as a result of their work in the same area seventy years later 
would be labelled, by some, similarly. Finer‘s comments suggest the use of a 
standing army against mere ‗nationals‘, the implication being unarmed 
civilians or citizens. In fact, as has already been pointed out, the British Army 
of the day were supposed to be there to protect such people and property from 
a privately raised army who stood, armed, in defiance of a government 
decision. Their strategy was non-intervention as opposed to intervention. In 
effect, they sided with the private army rather than with the government they 
were meant to serve. What is an interesting aside is that the leadership of the 
mutiny held very selective views as to who were fellow nationals and who 
were not. Irish soldiers stationed on the border from the 1970s and through to 
the 1990s never contemplated not following orders, and although it seems 
inevitable, that some of them from that locality, may have held nationalist 
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views, there was no orchestrated effort to intervene and try to change 
government policy. The only suggestions of mutiny came from certain officers 
and some NCOs who maintained that people who were seeking the right of 
association were somehow mutinous. Although there was a type of collective 
action, among soldiers who were serving on the border at that time in trying to 
establish representative bodies, it bore no resemblance to the actions 
contemplated by British military personnel at the Curragh in 1914.  
Given the jurisdictional difference between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic, the border itself became a very strategic location for paramilitary 
activity. There were security requirements by both jurisdictions to secure the 
border and prevent its exploitation by groups seeking to move across and back 
thereby avoiding detection in one area for crimes committed in another. 
Explosives, bomb making materials, arms and ammunition were often moved 
by paramilitaries from the South of Ireland to the North and vice versa. The 
border does not follow any particular geophysical or manmade feature such as 
a road or a river, and in many locations it goes right through property owned 
by a single individual. It straddles farms, mountains and lakes.  Observation 
and control of sections of the border can be challenging in sometimes rugged 
terrain. Complete security is virtually impossible.   To this end, the Irish 
authorities established a series of strategic checkpoints along the border 
through the 1970s and 1980s. While the Gardaí manned the checkpoints to 
stop and search vehicles, the army provided cover. There had to be close co-
operation and consultation between these two security arms of the state. 
Working in such close proximity for extended periods of time it became clear 
to soldiers that there were several distinctive differences between how they 
were remunerated compared to the Gardaí. In 1988 policemen who were 
manning the checkpoints were deployed on an eight-hour shift basis. They 
were given expenses for food and incidentals and also received overtime in 
addition to their usual weekly pay.  In contrast, soldiers manned the same 
check points for periods of twenty four hours at a time. This was not unusual 
in the sense that all branches of the Defence Forces undertook a whole variety 
of duties of that duration. In barracks all over Ireland, on ships of the state 
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alongside at home or abroad, on UN missions, anywhere around the world, 
men and women did twenty four hour duties, usually necessitated by security 
and or safety. In most cases personnel who undertook such duties were 
compensated by way of a payment known as ‗security duty allowance‘. 
Depending on their rank, service or mission, personnel could find themselves 
‗detailed‘ or rostered for duty on any day of the year. In Ireland, the nature of 
paramilitary activity dictated the operational responses required by the 
security forces in the area. Kidnappings, abandoned murder victims, roadside 
bombs and the uncovering of arms dumps meant that the armed forces could 
be called out at any time of the day or night, three hundred and sixty five days 
per year. In the case of the personnel stationed in or near border counties a 
special allowance had been created in 1972 known as ‗border allowance‘. It 
was designed to compensate personnel for living in what was effectively an 
operational zone that lacked the predictability of many of the barracks and 
military installations in the more peaceful southern part of the country. The 
allowance did have some disadvantages. All personnel in receipt of it lost their 
entitlement to security duty allowance. This could mean that a soldier could be 
deployed in, ‗on the ground‘ military security operations, at a moment‘s notice 
and several times in any given week. Because they were in receipt of a semi 
permanent ‗border allowance‘ as an addendum to their weekly pay, they did 
not receive any additional remuneration for the 24-hour duty. Up to the end of 
1988 when an increase of 77% was made, the allowance stood at less than £3 
per day. 
116
 This seemed to be inequitable to some, who saw soldiers involved 
in barrack duties getting paid the same as those who had to operate in the 
unpredictable and uncomfortable environment of the border. Whether a soldier 
was on duty in the comfort of a barracks in Dundalk or Castleblayney, or 
deployed in a roadside ditch providing ‗cover‘ for a checkpoint, made no 
difference to their pay. The border allowance for those personnel who were in 
‗operational‘ units seemed poor compensation when compared with those who 
did not have to deploy ‗on the ground‘. In many instances ‗on the ground‘ 
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meant literally on the ground. Troops were often required to lie in ditches for 
hours at a time to provide field of fire cover for Garda checkpoints. All armies 
in any operational theatre must have the capacity to feed their troops and in 
some cases very efficient field kitchens were deployed on the border to do so. 
In many other instances however, food was prepared in the distant barracks 
and transported to soldiers near the checkpoints for consumption in position.  
Complaints were often received when this method was used from personnel 
who found the food was cold or had not travelled so well in the special 
thermal containers which were being used. In contrast, the Gardaí were 
relieved from their posts by their colleagues and went to the nearest hotel for 
meals. The armed soldiers, deployed for twenty four hours at a time, watched 
and saw their civilian counterparts rotating three personnel to complete the 24-
hour duty that just one soldier was expected to do. Comparisons were 
inevitably drawn. John Wolfe was an early activist in the pursuit of 
representative associations. He had met and spoken to many of the soldiers 
deployed on the border and raised the issue of their plight when he became a 
member of the Gleeson submission team for NCOs. John was among the 
original soldiers of the Eastern Command who founded the fledgling group 
that was to become PDFORRA. As a Squadron Quartermaster Sergeant in the 
Army he was very aware of the methodology and quality of rationing and 
feeding the troops. He complained that conditions on the border were 
horrendous:  
The police were getting 3 and 4 times the money the lads were getting. 
They were being picked up and brought to hotels for lunch and soldiers 
had to wait, sometimes for hours to get fed. They were really **** off up 
there and they wanted to try and do something about it.
117
 
Conor Brady in his study of the Gardaí noted that ‗It is remarkable that Ireland 
pays its police officers better than its teachers, its nurses and the bulk of its 
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civil servants‘.118 Suspicions developed among soldiers that the police were in 
receipt of much better remuneration, for much less time, deployed in the exact 
same location. Additionally, from the soldier‘s point of view, it was felt that if 
any trouble did arise they would be the first target as, being armed; they posed 
the biggest threat to potential assailants in such a situation. In the subsequent 
claim by the NCO team to the Gleeson Commission, the Gardaí were chosen 
as an analogue for determining new rates of pay. It was pointed out in their 
submission that in 1974 an army sergeant earned 10.5% more than a Garda, 
but by 1989, the Garda was earning 20% more than the army sergeant.
119
 
Charts were also compiled to show discrepancies in end of service 
gratuities.
120
 In another series of ATCP operations soldiers were again to 
witness what they felt was inequitable treatment. Sgt. Gerry Rooney, during 
his service in the army was attached to St Bricins military hospital in Dublin. 
Despite being a highly qualified technician he was deployed on numerous 
occasions in ATCP operations and on two occasions when prison officers and 
ambulance drivers were on strike. He became General Secretary of 
PDFORRA and recalls soldiers getting to see how prisoners were treated in 
terms of the food that was available and suggests that the food was better in 
Mountjoy prison that what some soldiers were receiving from the army. 
121
   
Because of the general security situation, the ATCP operations also 
included countrywide cash escorts where armed soldiers assisted the Gardaí in 
the transfer of cash to and from banks by civilian commercial security 
vehicles. These ‗cash escort‘ duties were also a source of dissatisfaction for 
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the soldiers, who often had to remain on guard outside hotels, while the 
civilian van drivers and Gardaí stopped for lunch. Escorts and armed cover 
were also provided to the prison service and Gardaí when paramilitary trials 
were taking place at Green St Dublin. The rising frequency and incidence of 
duty for ordinary soldiers as a result of the deteriorating internal security 
situation in Ireland began to encroach on the part time civilian jobs that were 
held down by members of the Defence Forces which, they argued were, 
necessary to make ends meet. Richard (Dick) Dillon was the founding 
chairman of PDFORRA and formerly of the 5
th
 Battalion Dublin. He was 
posted his entire career to an active operational battalion. With a wife and 
family, with his experience and service overseas, in Portlaoise and on the 
border, he was well positioned to understand the difficulties being encountered 
by soldiers in their multiple workplaces. He  recalled: 
When you were doing the part time work you could get along reasonably 
okay. But when that started to be eaten away with the extra hours for aid to 
the civil power, people got really tired of it and the women began to talk 
about it.
122
  
Soldiers also began to discuss what they saw as the noticeable difference 
between the treatment of the personnel of the uniformed services, and other 
sections of society. John Wolfe, a founding member of the representative 
association recalled comparing himself at the time with others who were in 
receipt of social welfare benefit: 
I seen people around me during that particular recessionary time who were 
drawing the dole and with similar family numbers to myself, similar age to 
myself, nixering like mad, 
123
 driving better cars, going on two holidays a 
year with their families, having more to spend, more disposable income 
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and here was I with my role in my family as being provider, and I couldn‘t 
understand why I wasn‘t as successful as these people were and yet they 
were not technically working. So I realised that the army was not 
providing for me or the needs of my family. So I began to play with the 
notion of what to do. 
124
 
It was not so much that soldiers begrudged the conditions enjoyed by the 
Gardaí or the Prison Service that were deployed in the same situation as they 
were, but they wondered would having a representative body be the main 
difference in the state‘s approach to the different services. Various internal 
committees and groups had been set up to address pay problems in the army 
but according to Richard Dillon ‗there was a great deal of cynicism about 
them and they were only seen as tinkering around the edges of the pay 
problems‘.125 He recalls that during this period a debate emerged on a radio 
talk show about alleged incidences in which Irish soldiers serving in Lebanon 
had been briefed to shoot stray dogs because of the danger, in the Middle East, 
of rabies. In the ensuing discussion one caller suggested there was more 
concern about the treatment of dogs than there was about the treatment of 
soldiers. It would appear that this particular debate prompted a number of 
soldier‘s wives from the border regions to begin to raise awareness in the 
media about just how bad conditions were for serving soldiers in the army.  
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Chapter 3  
Organised agitation: focus groups 
and issues 1988 
Pay and Conditions  
Despite the feelings among many military personnel that they alone were 
poorly paid, the Department of Defence and its officials were conscious at that 
time of the broader picture of public pay policy. Michael Howard, Secretary 
General in 2010 was also serving in the Department in the late 1980s, he 
recalls that the economy was in a desperate condition and that financial control 
was very ‗tight‘.126 Even if the Department of Defence had wanted to increase 
pay levels, government fiscal policy would not have permitted it. At the time, 
pay rates among different parts of the public service were effected through a 
system of ‗grades‘. These grades determined the rate at which people were 
paid, whether they were civilians in the Department of Finance, postmen in a 
general post office or nurses in a hospital. The problem was that an increase in 
pay in one sector had a knock on effect of increases throughout the public 
service. An additional difficulty was that if one grade increased, then the 
differential in pay between it and the next one up the line had to be 
maintained. With such a system in place the Department of Defence was 
restrained in making any improvements whatsoever in pay. The size of the 
combined services of the PDF at that time numbered about 12,500, apart from 
the cost of raising wages for such a large group, the knock on effect was the 
biggest fear among those responsible for maintaining pay restraint across the 
entire public service. In presenting the budget in Dáil Eireann in January 1988 
the Minister for Finance, Mr McSharry, was conscious of the preceding years 
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of industrial relations conflict and its cost, attributable in part to the absence of 
national pay agreements after the collapse in 1982 of the National 
Understanding agreement.
127
 He set out the financial difficulties of the 
country that would necessitate pay restraint particularly in the public sector: 
The approach for 1988 remains unchanged. There is no choice but to 
continue to reduce dependence on borrowing. The main emphasis must be 
on reducing public expenditure and already Government policy on this has 
been clarified. The only other course would be to increase taxation 
substantially but this is not a practical option.
128
 
One of the Minister‘s key strategies in maintaining a firm managerial grip on 
the country‘s finances was a return to a national wage agreement involving all 
the social partners. The broad based agreement, signed in October 1987 was 
known as the Programme for National Recovery (PNR) and it sought to ensure 
some form of industrial relations peace in return for which there were 
guaranteed, albeit modest, increases for those in the public sector. Over two 
million working days had been lost through disputes from 1982 to 1987 
inclusive.
129
 The Minister noted the budget was possible as a result of the three 
year agreement with the public service unions as part of the PNR that would 
contribute to orderly conduct in industrial relations.
130
 The social partnership 
model was a revisit to earlier arrangements that had broken down in 1982.  
Gunnigle, McMahon and Fitzgerald contend that the temporary demise of the 
consensus approach during the 1980s is attributable to the change in 
                                                 
127
 P. Tansey, Ireland at work, economic growth and the labour market 1987-1997, (Dublin, 
1998), p156.  
128
 Dáil debates vol. 377, [262-65], 27 January 1988.  
129
 Source attributed in Tansey‘s, Ireland at work, p156, to Labour Market and Social 
Statistics Division, Central Statistics Office, Cork, September 1997.   
130
 Dáil debates, vol. 277, [262-280], 27
 
January 1988. 
83 
 
Government from Fianna Fail to the Fine Gael/Labour coalition. They credit 
the 1987 Fianna Fail government with the resurgence of the social partnership 
approach. In the case of the unions, the diminutive increases in pay were 
traded off against a new input into a ‗wider economic and social agenda. 131 
For members of the PDF who were outside of the industrial relations 
process, these strategies left little room for any realistic hope of an increase in 
pay. The increases secured by the unions and other social partners were very 
modest and anybody getting anything beyond what was agreed would 
probably result in wide scale industrial unrest. Even the improvements in 
social legislation didn‘t particularly benefit military personnel. There was, 
more often than not, derogation for the application of measures to members of 
the Defence Forces, such as in the Employment Equality Act 1977 and the 
Unfair Dismissals Act 1977.
132
 Hillery‘s detailed surveys show that at the time 
that this progressive legislation was being enacted, the civilian workforce 
unions had no fewer than sixty six full time national trade union officials and 
ninety four full time branch secretaries working on their behalf.
133
 In contrast, 
soldiers had no representative officials or associations acting directly in their 
interests. In the absence of such representation others tried to highlight the 
problems.  It was not just opposition politicians in the Dáil or NASA that were 
complaining about condition for soldiers in the army . In a lengthy emotional 
appeal, the Head Chaplain of the Defence Forces wrote to the Chief of Staff 
on 27 April 1988. In a three page letter, Right Reverend Monsignor Dunne, on 
behalf of all chaplains throughout the country, outlined what he reported was 
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deep concern about the low state of morale, brought on by poor pay and 
extensive financial hardship. The Monsignor claimed that marital breakdown, 
material deprivation and  mental stress were at levels that made soldiers 
vulnerable to influence from subversives and moneylenders. The letter pleaded 
with the Chief of Staff to represent the interests of the members of the PDF by 
making a special case to the government.
134
  
A defence policy review had been initiated in 1987 by government but 
this was to examine the structure, strengths, roles and procurement procedures 
in the forces. Given that its primary purpose was cost saving, the possibilities 
of pay increases at the time were even more unlikely. An Inter-Departmental 
committee on pay was set up in June 1988 however it would report back in the 
context of the national strategy.
135
  Despite these restrictions, personnel at the 
Department of Defence who were responsible for the administration of pay,  
sympathised with soldiers regarding low wages, but they still enjoyed a unique 
situation whereby they did not have to deal with unions or representative 
associations for the army. Every other Department, when considering the 
imposition of pay policy, had to engage with the public service trade unions or 
associations. Because the military up to that point had never had a 
representative body or a union, the Department could implement policy in 
these matters in isolation and as they saw fit. A cursory examination of 
soldiers pay rates in 1990, after the Inter-Departmental committee had 
reported and their findings had been implemented would appear to compare 
similarly to other sectors of the civilian population in average earnings on a 
weekly basis. Factory workers earnings averaged £221.71 per week compared 
to a three star private at £215.10, clerical workers, £248.97 compared to NCO 
quartermasters at £254.36, managerial staff, £396.38 compared to an Irish 
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Army Commandant at £398.
136
 However, soldiers would argue that 
comparison with factory workers, who had the certainty of just forty hours per 
week, was unfair due to the high incidence of twenty four hour duties, and the 
danger and uncertain nature of military life. When public criticism by the 
spouses of soldiers arose in mid 1988, many of the issues they raised were 
about poor treatment of soldiers and matters other than pay.
137
 In some 
respects the Department was demonised by military commanders who blamed 
all of the ills of poor pay, lack of promotion and bad conditions on them.    
The National Army Spouses Association (NASA).  
These issues were a matter of discussion throughout 1988, not just among 
soldiers, but with their wives and families when they got home. The sense of 
inequity felt by them resulted in growing frustration but there was no way in 
which soldiers could publicly articulate their grievances. Many noted that An 
Garda Síochána had three representative associations for their different ranks 
with elected officials who could speak on their behalf about problems in an 
industrial relations type arrangement.
138
  These associations had replaced an 
earlier one that rank and file Gardaí believed had failed them in their pay 
claims in the mid 1970s. The origin of the new representative associations had 
necessitated members of the force initially meeting in breach of regulations.
139
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Serving soldiers at this time had no representative association and 
military regulations prohibited them from speaking to the media.
140
 The 
growing feeling of frustration about the perceived inequity led to soldiers and 
their wives believing that the lack of access to the media and the absence of 
any representative association were the main reasons for the situation in which 
they found themselves. James Martin, an Air Corps Flight Sergeant and John 
Wolfe, a Squadron Quartermaster Sergeant, were both PDFORRA activists 
who had been members of the same Gleeson submission team. They held 
strong views about an internal association:   
Without a representative body that had access to the media we would have 
been a toothless and silent organisation, suffering internally from the 
indifference of a management regime that hadn‘t the nuts to take on the 
establishment in the first place. What good would their designed structures 
be to us?
141
 Although never serious, the joking in the mess about a coup 
was an indication of the real frustration that people felt at that time and 
when I was contacted to meet some lads to talk about an association I 
went.
142
 
There were also many other issues perceived to be wrong for those who served 
in the Defence Forces. These included matters such as low pay, substandard 
living accommodation, poor promotional prospects through the ranks, lack of 
family support mechanisms, restrictions on career advancement training and 
educational opportunities among enlisted personnel. Flight Sergeant James 
Martin served most of his career in the Air Corps, he was the NCO 
representative for the Air Corps on the Gleeson submission teams and through 
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his deliberations was conscious of the many perceived shortcomings of the 
military structure in addressing problems foe personnel. He and the NCO team 
maintained that:  
It is considered by most NCOs and men that their views and needs cannot 
be adequately met within the present structures in the Defence Forces.
143
    
Representative associations and unions were not alien to Ireland. In the 
late 1980s most segments of the workforce and the professions enjoyed the 
right of association. Trade unions and representative bodies of one sort or 
another had existed in Ireland since the nineteenth century and before. 
Although not always accepted or recognised by employers, these bodies had 
become an integral part of the industrial relations landscape in Ireland. The 
Irish Trades Union Congress (ITUC) was established in 1894 in Dublin and 
represented a mixture of unskilled labourers and craft and trade unions. The 
Irish Transport and General Workers Union (ITGWU), representing an even 
broader base of workers became the largest union of congress soon after its 
establishment in 1908.
144
  The Irish National Teachers Organisation (INTO) 
though founded in 1868, affiliated to the TUC in 1918.
145
 By 1936 there were 
forty nine unions affiliated to congress that by 1939 represented 172,000 
affiliated workers, about a quarter of the workforce at large.
146
 Despite the 
recovery of falling numbers of members in the early years after the foundation 
of the state, Professor Jack Lynch contended that continuing difficulties into 
the 1940s ‗caused by the multiplicity of unions‘ saw unity being restored by 
the formation in 1959 of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU),
147
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which time there were sixty eight unions representing 409,000 members. 
During the 1970s discussions between ICTU and the government underlined a 
willingness by both parties to engage with each other. The idea of workforce 
representation was elevated to the highest level of social acceptability in the 
emergence of ‗social partnership‘. Negotiated deals between the trade unions, 
agricultural and business sectors and the government led to initiatives such as 
the  ‗Programme for National Economic Recovery‘ in which unions promised 
industrial relations stability in return for modest wage and conditions 
improvements coupled with social policy input. By the 1990s there were 
682,000 workers represented formally by affiliated unions of the ICTU. 
However the ICTU did not represent all employees of the state. There were 
numerous other bodies like the Gardaí associations, the Irish Bank Officials 
Association (IBOA) and others that had representative bodies but were not 
affiliated to the ICTU.  
In mid 1988, knowing that the serving Defence Force personnel could 
not engage with the media to highlight these issues, a number of soldier‘s 
spouses in the Dundalk and Dublin areas began to meet and founded what they 
eventually called the National Army Spouses Association (NASA). The stated 
aims of this group were very specific:  
2.    Aims. 
The aims and objectives of the association shall be:- 
a. To seek and improve the pay, allowances and conditions of single and 
married male and female members of the permanent Defence Forces. 
b. To develop a mutual comradeship between the families of serving and 
ex-serving members of the Permanent Defence Forces. 
c. To organise effective methods of setting up a modern military welfare 
service for serving members of the Permanent Defence Forces and their 
families. 
d. The setting up of a lawfully constituted representative body for 
members of the Permanent Defence Forces. 
e. To achieve all the above aims and objectives through peaceful and 
legitimate means. 
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f. The association shall be strictly non-political and non-sectarian and shall 
not have any affiliation with any political party.
148
 
The constitution was eventually adopted in June 1989 by which time there 
were branches and committees in Ballyshannon, Longford, Mullingar, Dublin, 
Kildare, and Dundalk. The women of this association conducted a very public 
campaign which highlighted the grievances of the Defence Force personnel. 
They held their first press conference in Dublin 26 October 1988.
149
 Their 
stated aims were to improve the pay and conditions of their husbands and to 
seek the establishment of representative structures for army personnel similar 
to that which the Gardaí had. The Irish media found this hugely newsworthy. 
Previously most of the information about life in the Defence Forces came from 
official military or Departmental sources. Not surprisingly this resulted in a 
very one sided portrayal of military life in Ireland. NASA attracted extensive 
media attention as it was highly critical of both the Minister for Defence and 
the army hierarchy itself. For the first time in Ireland, television news showed 
women and children picketing outside of army barracks with placards and 
posters, protesting about the treatment of soldiers by their military bosses. On 
3 November 1988 they marshalled hundreds of women to protest at the Dáil 
and called for the sacking of the incumbent Minister for Defence, Michael 
Noonan:  
Several hundred army wives, members of the National Army Spouses 
Association marched on Leinster House yesterday to intensify their 
campaign for improved pay and conditions for members of the Defence 
Forces. At Leinster House the women shouted slogans calling for the 
                                                 
148
 Paragraph 2, The National Army Spouses Association, constitution and rules, adopted 24 
June 1989. 
149
 Sean Flynn, ‗Army spouses are allowed to meet pay committee‘,  Irish Times, 27 October 
1988.  
90 
 
dismissal of the Minister for Defence, Mr Noonan who has refused so far 
to meet them.
150
   
This campaign was the subject of even more interest when the women claimed 
that their husbands were being intimidated by their commanding officers 
because of their spouse‘s involvement.151 The matter was raised in Dáil 
Éireann by Deputies Clohessy and Gregory who asked the minister if he was 
concerned about the allegations of threats in Cathal Brugha barracks, St 
Bricins military hospital and Baldonnel.152 Deputy Michael Noonan, Minister 
for Defence, denied being aware of any such activities and asked if evidence 
did exist that it be brought to him.
153
  
The ‘Army Crisis’ of the 1980s 
From late 1987 the government were being questioned on the level of morale 
in the Defence Forces. In that year alone, thirty five officers had retired, an 
increase of ten over the previous year.
154
 Typical questions of the period were 
posed by Deputy Molloy when he asked Deputy Michael Noonan, then 
Minister for Defence if he was concerned about the low level of morale in the 
forces and reports that the General Staff were recommending to middle 
ranking officers that they would be better off seeking employment outside. 
155
 
Minister Noonan strongly refuted these suggestions at the time but such 
questions continued and became focused on a variety of ailments across the 
Defence Forces. Deputy Molloy enquired about manning levels and lower 
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numbers impacting on morale because of increasing incidence of duties.
156
 
The Minister did not agree that morale was poor. By March of 1988 questions 
were being posed regarding the fact that numerous soldiers were eligible for 
Family Income Supplement (FIS) from social welfare. The Minister played 
down the query saying that a small number of the 11700 members of the PDF 
were in receipt of it. Deputy Patterson remarked: 
Is the Minister not aware that the FIS was brought in to help people on the 
lowest wages, and is it not of concern to him to find that members of the 
Defence Forces qualify for such assistance? By direct implication it says 
that the level of earnings is among the lowest in the country.‘157  
The public activities of NASA in September of 1988 also influenced the body 
politic and gave the opposition parties in Dáil Eireann additional material with 
which to criticise the government of the day. Much of the critical debate in 
1988 had focused on pay and the long awaited report of the Inter-
Departmental committee. The idea put forward by the women that a 
representative body should be established, was immediately criticised by 
government and others. Minister for Defence Michael Noonan was asked 
directly in December 1988 about the possibility of permitting the formation of 
representative associations in the Defence Forces. He replied that such bodies 
were ‗incompatible‘ with the system of command and policy: 
I am advised that the formation by members of the Defence Forces of 
associations or unions having a system of organisation and control 
separate from that of the Defence Forces, would be incompatible with the 
system of command essential in any defence or military force 
contemplated by Article 13 and 15 of the Constitution and provided for in 
the Defence Acts and the regulations made under those Acts. Apart from 
objections based on the legal considerations involved there would be 
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fundamental policy objections to any development towards the creation of 
unions or associations in the Defence Forces. 158 
Colonel E.D Doyle writing in a national newspaper, in considering the call for 
representative bodies in the army, raised the prospect of a pressure group with 
access to guns. He highlighted the difference between other pressure groups in 
the state and a proposed one in the army pointing out that ‗the people 
represented will have arms in their hands‘.159  The pressure they could apply 
as a group might become threatening when the state had a ‗weak or divided 
government‘. He maintained that a democracy like Ireland which had a 
‗flickering subversive threat‘, needed ‗loyal Defence Forces with good 
morale‘. These views were emphasising the perceived link between the idea of 
a representative bodies and disloyalty. Doyle addressed the necessity of 
obedience and the requirement that an army be ‗a flexible tool in the hands of 
all lawfully elected governments‘.  
Commander McNamara of the Irish Navy believed in the late 1980s 
that the introduction of representation would have a severely negative impact 
on the professionalism of the PDF. He believed that a country such as Ireland 
in 1990 that had ‗significant subversion, deserves of its military professionals, 
total commitment to the security of the State in every sense. The state requires 
a bottom line, a body of defenders who are totally committed to that state‘. 
McNamara quoted the introduction of ‗uncertified sick leave‘ being granted to 
members of the force as an example of a development that was detrimental to 
the exercise of command. ‗If the decision to come to work or get up in the 
morning is being left to the individual rather than the military commander, 
then command itself is diminished. He suggested that none of the ‗real‘ armies 
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such as the British and American, i.e. armies that win wars (sic), would 
contemplate representation for five seconds‘.160  
Aside from the total rejection of the idea of a representative body, the 
political leadership of the day placed much emphasis on the forthcoming 
report of the Inter-Departmental committee. Set up in June 1988 with a view 
to examining army pay, the committee was headed by Minister of State, 
Vincent Brady. The Chief of Staff, Lt General T O‘Neil had, in the early 
discussions about the forming of this group, managed to have the scope of 
their deliberations widened to include the pay of enlisted personnel.
161
 The 
deliberations and recommendations of this group were eagerly awaited in the 
Defence Forces. As the months passed leading up to autumn and Christmas, 
speculation began about the size of the award that may be recommended. 
Opposition spokesperson in the Dáil articulated their views about the pay 
increase percentage that was desirable. Deputy Connaughton of Fine Gael 
suggested that eighteen to twenty five percent would be appropriate. Cautious 
government responses did little to quell expectations in the public domain. 
There was however an overriding feeling among officers that despite the tight 
public finances and government pay policy, in the end, they would be ‗looked 
after‘ once the Brady committee reported. Lt Col. Ryan was told as much, ‗we 
understood a special pay award was going to come. General Officers 
Commanding (GOCs) briefed the officer bodies of their commands twice, 
advising them that this was the case‘.162 Percentages of the magnitude 
suggested by Deputy Connaughton and others continued to circulate while the 
public awaited the report of the committee. As the year closed and Christmas 
beckoned, opposition parties and soldiers wives campaigning for better pay 
and conditions increased calls on the government to finalise the Brady report 
and announce its findings. Reports began to emerge that the committee had 
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presented their findings to the Department of Finance who had rejected the 
magnitude of the recommendations and approved considerably lower amounts. 
Finally, on 22 December 1988, the committee made its recommendations 
public. An announcement was made that an increase of twelve percent had 
been recommended. There was little reaction in the PDF over the Christmas 
holiday period but word began to circulate in early January that the award 
announced was the same one that applied to the public service anyway, that it 
was to be paid in instalments, the first of which was not due for another six 
months. The National Army Spouses Association and members of the Dáil 
opposition parties reacted strongly:   
As anger and discontent grows, the National Association of Army Spouses 
said they intended to mount another protest campaign with pickets at army 
HQ in Dublin every Wednesday, which is pay day. And as army Chief of 
Staff Tadgh O‘Neill considered what response to make to the government 
on the pay issue after officers and other ranks made known their anger at 
the pay offer, Defence Minister Michael Noonan faces a political row 
when the Dáil resumes this month.
163
     
The political fallout following the announcement of the Inter-Departmental 
committee recommendations was extensive. There were a number of deep 
criticisms. Firstly the amount of the award was seen as small at twelve 
percent, particularly as there had been speculation that it could be as much as 
twenty percent. Secondly it transpired that it was not a special pay award at all 
and was in fact in line with the intended increases right across the public 
service. This meant that the perceived gap between army personnel and other 
similar employments was not going to close at all. Thirdly it transpired that 
there was to be no immediate payment because the first round under the 
national agreement was not due to begin until June, leaving six months to wait 
before any increase took effect. Again there had also been speculation that the 
award would be made before Christmas.  Fourthly it was discovered that the 
twelve percent was to be distributed in phases over the following eighteen 
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months. Finally in what was seen by many as the ultimate insult, the timing of 
the announcement just before Christmas holidays appeared to be deliberate 
and economically delivered so that personnel would not get an opportunity to 
question it until the New Year. NASA, who had been given the chance to 
make a submission to the committee during its deliberations, was incensed. 
Army officers, NCOs and privates were livid:  
It was a right kick in the teeth. We had been led a merry dance for months 
on end, made believe that a special look was being taken at us. Duped into 
believing that our just cause would reap an honest response, only to have 
our hopes dashed in the dawn of another new year of struggle on low 
pay.
164
   
Much of the criticism and blame was placed on Deputy Michael Noonan, who 
was the incumbent Minister for Defence serving for the first time as a 
Minister. He was reported to have made a number of promotions in the army 
to offset the morale crisis, but national newspapers reported numerous 
reactions by those in the forces. Unimpressed army sources said there were 
still three hundred vacancies left to be filled. Thirty promotions in one week 
brought the total in January to sixty five but NASA continued to picket 
Defence Force Headquarters, soldiers continued to seek permission to retire 
and the system whereby they could previously buy themselves out of the army 
was made far more difficult in the review by bumping up the cost to the 
applicant.
165
   
NASA produced a report that showed soldiers pay as much as £100 per 
week behind that of the Gardaí for similar hours and duties.
166
  The manner in 
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which the report had been announced, the lack of any great improvement in its 
recommendations and the continuing difficulties being articulated about the 
army heralded the beginning of 1989 which was to witness many 
developments in Ireland's, military, political and Departmental domains. The 
calls made by the women for a representative association for soldiers was 
about to be echoed and made by the soldiers themselves.  
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Chapter 4 
Conflict and Confrontation: the 
politicisation of  representative issues 
1988-92 
Soldiers consider representation   
In September 1988 at a fundraising evening for NASA in the ‗Seventy Nine‘ 
bar in Ballyfermot Dublin, two serving army sergeants, Sgt Richard Dillon 
and Sgt Michael Murphy, discussed the campaign being waged by NASA. 
Dillon recalled that they concluded that evening that the women‘s campaign 
would only get so far and that at some point the soldiers would have to do 
something themselves and relates the following sequence of events.  
Both men decided to speak to other colleagues in the army and explore 
would anybody be interested in looking to form some sort of an association to 
try to improve their pay and conditions. They set about speaking to their own 
peers and found there was a lot of support for the idea of an association. Not 
everybody was convinced it was the right way to go and some of their 
colleagues were fearful of the consequences of seeking such an association in 
the army. Some feared for their careers. Nevertheless a core of eleven serving 
personnel began to meet on a regular basis to discuss the idea of a 
representative body. Between January and July 1989, secret meetings were 
arranged in a public house called ‗The 12th Lock‘. This establishment was 
chosen for its quiet, almost remote location in Lucan and the manager of the 
bar was a former soldier and friend of Richard Dillon. The meetings took 
place every two weeks and the participants explored ways in which they could 
set up an association. Although fairly secretive in their deliberations Richard 
Dillon claims that all the individuals in that group were ‗pro government‘. 
They first met with representatives of the Garda Representative Association 
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(GRA) and later the Prison Officers Association (POA). The rule books of 
these associations were scrutinised and eventually were used as templates to 
write a constitution for an association for soldiers. Different sections of the 
GRA rulebook would be discussed each week with a view to re-shaping the 
format to conform to the structures of the army. When the first constitution for 
PDFORRA had been written in this way, the advice of a solicitor was sought 
and it was decided that everybody should write to their commanding officers 
and send them a copy of the constitution with a carefully worded letter 
explaining what they wanted to set up.
167
 The first of these letters were dated 4 
July 1989, although there was no significance with the American 
commemorative Independence Day. In order to garner publicity for the events, 
the group gave an interview to the media and told them that a number of 
sergeants were taking pre-discharge leave at the same time to highlight the 
problems that existed with army pay and conditions. 
168
 
This was to attract considerable media attention. Soldiers with more 
than twelve years service at that time were entitled to indicate their decision to 
retire from the PDF. When this was done, the accumulated annual leave or 
holidays that were remaining to the soldier, together with a special ‗pre-
discharge‘ leave that was granted before retirement, were calculated and could 
often be as much as ten or twelve weeks. The date for actual discharge was 
then taken to be the day following the end of the leave period. During this 
period of pre-discharge leave, intending retirees remained officially members 
of the Defence Forces and could withdraw their intention to retire if they so 
wished, to continue their career as before. Combined leave like this was very 
often used by serving soldiers to experiment and see what it was like to work 
in a civilian context and community. If employment prospects were poor or if 
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they found that civilian life did not suit them they had the safety net of 
continued service once they returned to barracks before the discharge date. 
That people took this pre-discharge leave was not unusual or illegal but when 
fifteen sergeants in the Eastern Command decided to take it together, it 
indicated some sort of collective action which could be construed as being 
inconsistent with military discipline. News of this action reached the 
newspapers and the wider Defence Force community. Prior to and after these 
events, the core of eleven soldiers had begun speaking to their colleagues 
about the need for a representative association. The template letter was copied 
as was the draft constitution and both were circulated to encourage others to 
write to the Minister seeking permission to set up PDFORRA. The core group 
began to travel to different command areas to tell other soldiers of their ideas. 
They visited and held information meetings in places like Monaghan, Galway, 
Cork, Athlone and Donegal. Eventually they organised a meeting for 
personnel from all command areas of the PDF to gather together.  
The emergence of the debate on representative structures to the Naval 
Base on Haulbowline typifies the way in which the word was spread. Senior 
Petty Officer (SPO) Sam Fealy was the army equivalent of a Quartermaster. 
Whether Irish Army, Navy or Air Corps all potential Quartermasters had to 
have completed a ‗QMs‘ course in order to be qualified to do the job. This 
course was usually conducted at the Curragh training camp and had a typical 
duration of about four months. People who did such courses together often 
established friendships and contacts that would last throughout their service. 
On his qualifying QMs course SPO Noel (Sam) Fealy had met and become 
friendly with Squadron Quartermaster Sergeant John Wolfe and remembers 
being contacted by him:  
I got a phone call one day from John who was one of the army lads who 
had been complaining about the conditions on the border and their pay. He 
told me that a group of them had met in Dublin to discuss the problems 
and see what could be done. The soldiers asked each other whether they 
knew anybody in other commands so that the word could be spread. John 
had said he knew me and had undertaken to contact me. I thought he had a 
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very valid point. It seemed there was an amount of frustration felt by 
soldiers from the border. 
169
 
SPO Fealy thought it was a great idea but decided he would have to be very 
careful about who he would speak to on the Naval Base. He contacted three 
friends of different ranks and divisions in the Navy and invited them to a 
meeting in Dublin where there was supposed to be military personnel coming 
from all over the country. He said, ‗there was a fair bit of excitement about the 
possibilities of an association but there was also a lot of fear. It was people‘s 
livelihoods at stake and they were fearful for themselves and their wives‘. In 
July 1989, personnel who continued to organise themselves around the 
country contacted each other and over the following three weeks organised a 
large meeting with representatives from all six operational command areas of 
the Defence Forces. These were the Eastern Command, the Curragh 
Command, the Naval Service, the Western Command, the Air Corps and the 
Southern Command. In a parish hall in Prussia Street in Dublin on 26 
August1989 two representatives from each of these areas were elected from 
among members drawn from all commands to a twelve man ‗National 
Executive‘. Richard Dillon was elected as chairman and Michael Martin a 
Warrant Officer of the Navy was elected secretary/public relations officer 
(pro). Because of restrictions on the right of serving personnel to speak to the 
media no public announcement was made, nevertheless the group had 
maintained legal counsel who had advised that there was a legal argument that 
all citizens had the right of association. The implication being that if one has 
the right to associate, one also had the right to act as a spokesperson for an 
association. This concept was to prove pivotal in later developments. The 
formation of the ‗ad hoc‘ national executive facilitated discussion among 
enlisted personnel from all sections of the Defence Forces. In the three months 
between May and August of 1989, when the ad hoc national executive was 
formed, there were numerous major developments that were to impact on the 
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emerging campaign for the ‗right of association‘. NASA had entered the 
political fray, soldiers had sent their first letters to the Minister requesting 
permission to establish an association, a general election had taken place and 
major announcements had been made about the Defence Forces by a new 
Minister for Defence.  
General election 1989 
While the serving personnel of the Irish Army, Navy and Air Corps were 
organising themselves around the country, the women of NASA were about to 
embark in a new direction. The highlight of the women‘s campaign came 
about as a result of their decision to run a number of candidates in the general 
election of 1989. These included June Kiernan from Mullingar, Carol Tiernan 
from Dublin and Margaret Kiernan from Monaghan. The election campaign 
was launched in Dublin on the 30 May 1989 and Carol Tiernan was chosen as 
their spokesperson. She reported that if any of the three candidates found 
themselves in the position of ‗power broker‘ in the new Dáil they were 
prepared to negotiate with whatever leader would provide the best deal for the 
army.
170
 The electoral policy of the candidates was outlined in a circular 
compiled by Mullingar NASA (undated): 
1. An elected representative association for all ranks. 
2. Equal pay with other members of state security within five years.  
3. Health, education, unemployment and environment.  
4. Appoint an experienced Minister who is sympathetic to the Defence       
Forces and understands military affairs.  
A special note stated ‗this is the first time serving and retired members of the 
Permanent Defence Force and their families have had a legitimate opportunity 
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to express the manner in which they have been treated by the present 
government and past governments. The candidates were themselves described 
thus: 
June Kiernan, Mullingar Army Wife 
Full time housewife, married seventeen years. Five children ages between 
six and sixteen years. Former member of parent teachers council, involved 
in community games and youth work. Former chairperson, PRO and 
delegate,  NASA Mullingar. 
Carol Tiernan, Dublin Army Wife 
Part time nurse. Married ten years. Four children four to eight years. 
Course in youth training. Involved in summer community project. Former 
PRO executive committee NASA. 
Margaret Kiernan, Monaghan Army Wife 
Full time housewife married eight years. Five children two to fifteen years. 
Teaches French, for a period studied accountancy, involved in Credit 
Union, community games youth work. Former secretary executive 
committee NASA.
171
 
Each of the women were described in their ‗former‘ roles in NASA to comply 
with the provisions of their own constitution at paragraph 2f which stated inter 
alia ‗the association shall be non-political‘.172 The spokesperson for the three 
women, Carol Tiernan said ‗we‘re confident we‘ll get elected and even if we 
don‘t, we‘ll have highlighted the army conditions. We hope too that even if 
Fianna Fáil return to office that we won‘t have the same Defence Minister‘. 
The women felt at the time there was a potential of eight thousand votes that 
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could be gleaned from the military, if every soldier got ten votes out. Minister 
for Defence Michael Noonan accused the women of intimidating the military 
vote and called on Defence Force personnel to stay ‗aloof‘.173 
Despite the extensive coverage received by NASA in the media, and 
the airing of the problems in the military, the mainstream parties did not 
provide the Defence Forces with any great priority in their respective 
manifestos and in only one case was a representative association mentioned. 
Fine Gael accused the government of callousness in their dealings with the 
Forces and suggested that the problems with morale should be dealt with 
urgently, the Progressive Democrats mentioned pay being linked to the 
average industrial wage but it was the Workers Party who openly called for 
the establishment of representative bodies for the Defence Forces.
174
 This is 
probably no surprise as Pat McCartan of the party had been a strong advocate 
of the idea. He had personally attended the meeting for the launching of 
NASA in Mullingar in February and was reported to have spoken ‗very 
enthusiastically about the army in general and NASA‘s efforts to improve the 
conditions of serving personnel.‘ Described as a very impressive speaker, he 
promised to raise army matters as often as possible in the Dáil. It was reported 
that at the same meeting a very negative response was received from Fianna 
Fáil ‗in general‘, and councillor Glynn in particular. Henry Abbott was not 
very helpful or enthusiastic‘.175  
Newspapers profiled the three ‗army wives‘ and media attention that 
they had generated around the country in the preceding six months was 
probably going to be a help to them on Election Day. On 22 February 1989 
NASA in Mullingar had placed their first picket outside the gates of Columb 
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army barracks, all local newspapers covered it. Three days later there was a 
national protest outside of the Royal Dublin Society (RDS). There was a 
simultaneous protest outside of Collins Barracks in Dublin when the Minister 
came to officially close down the barracks. The Ministerial car turned back 
twice during the afternoon and would not pass through the picket. On the 11 
April a protest by the women forced the Minister to use the back gate of 
McKee barracks where he had come to officially review the new battalion 
about to deploy on a peacekeeping mission as part of the United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon.
176
 Fianna Fáil party workers in the 
Cavan/Monaghan, Kildare and Longford/Westmeath expressed concern that 
the emergence of candidates from the army wives could damage the party.
177
 
Their fears were somewhat realised and the fact that none of the candidates 
gained a seat there was perceived to be political damage to the party.  
Margaret Kiernan ran in the Cavan-Monaghan electoral area and 
polled 1069 first preference votes.
178
 This was 2.01% of the total poll and 
while it was not enough to recover her deposit, it represented half the 
percentage drop in the Fianna Fáil vote for that area since the previous 
election. From the 1987 to the 1989 election that party‘s support dropped from 
54% to 49%. Tiernan ran in the Kildare constituency where many soldiers and 
their families were stationed in the numerous military establishments of the 
Curragh Camp. Although there was no discernable effect on the existing seats 
in the outcome, she did poll 2690 first preference votes.
179
  Despite the fact 
that a seat was not won it was felt by those involved in the NASA campaign 
that it was a great moral victory. They believed at that time that when 
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lobbying the government for anything, the only effective currency was votes. 
June Kiernan ran for election in the constituency of Longford Westmeath. 
Like Kildare, this constituency contained heavy concentrations of soldiers and 
their families based in the large military barracks in Athlone but also the 
barracks at Longford and Mullingar. June polled 3207 first preference votes, 
the highest number of the NASA candidates. Her story adds greatly to the 
understanding of the motivation, drive and determination of these women in 
pursuit of their aims. 
June Kiernan and her husband Jack, a corporal mechanic in Mullingar 
barracks, contemplated at the outset that she would run for election. Neither 
had any political party experience and had never conducted a political 
campaign. Despite their inexperience, their subsequent efforts shook the 
political establishment in Ireland and were probably the most significant factor 
in persuading the government to begin to consider the whole idea of 
representative bodies in the Defence Forces. The story of how this came about 
is crucial to the understanding of how a previously apolitical group were 
motivated and empowered by what they saw as unacceptable treatment at the 
hands of the army hierarchy and the government. It helps go some way 
towards answering the question posed by Finer in his consideration of the role 
of the military in politics, which suggests that ‗we don‘t know how politics 
gets into the military and establishes itself there‘. June recalled how she 
became involved:  
I first heard about the idea of a representative body for the soldiers on the 
news. Carol Tiernan of NASA was on the television. I talked to Jack about 
it. In the following months, because he travelled a lot with the army 
around the border area, he heard about the women‘s group and what they 
were trying to achieve.
180
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Jack was also impressed with the notion of representation and he too was 
exposed to newspapers, television reports and what he heard in the workplace, 
he remembers his reaction: 
The whole thing was a fantastic idea. Myself and my friend Pat Lynch, 
who himself had been a Quartermaster Sergeant in the army talked a lot 
about it and decided to support the girls if they were going to get 
involved.
181
   
June and her close friend Ita, decided after many discussions that they 
were going to see if there was any support locally for the setting up of a 
branch of NASA in Mullingar. Jack got a telephone number of a founding 
member in Monaghan, Margaret Kiernan (no relation) who told him there was 
a committee up and running in Athlone, contact was made by June and Ita 
who sought advice and information from them.  They spoke with Joan Carney 
from the committee there and decided to organise a Mullingar meeting to see 
if there was sufficient interest locally. At the first meeting held in February 
1989 in what was then Broder‘s Hotel about twenty women turned up. June 
recalls:  
We were at the top table, Ita and I, never having ran a meeting before. It 
was a very hard meeting with all the women talking about their husbands 
problems. I never realised there was so much difference in people‘s pay 
and the number of different jobs that people did in the army. A committee 
was elected but with difficulty because people were terrified of getting 
involved on it. The fear was that it would have a negative effect on 
promotion for their husbands and they would get dirty duties and such. 
182
 
As elected members June and Ita went to Athlone to meet with other NASA 
committees. They were made very welcome and aims were discussed. June 
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Kiernan said, ‗The way I felt about it was that soldiers were defending 
everyone else‘s democracy but nobody was defending theirs‘. The reference to 
democracy and democratic rights was increasingly used, not just by the 
women‘s group, but later by the soldiers themselves. When exposed to the 
other associations of Euromil later, this idea of a soldier being a citizen in 
uniform found easy passage in Ireland. Jack Kiernan, having been a mechanic 
in civilian life did not see why there should be ‗so much of a difference being 
a mechanic in another garage or one who had a uniform on‘. 183 The aim of the 
women at the Athlone meeting was to have the soldiers get their own 
representative association. In pursuit of that objective June Kiernan and many 
other women juggled children, home and husbands with a whirlwind of 
meetings, discussion and protests up and down the country. June herself owed 
a debt of gratitude to her mother, Mary Doyle, who ‗took the kids, made 
dinners and was an integral support to what I was doing.
184
 The Mullingar 
branch of NASA looked to meet the Minister for Defence and asked their local 
representatives to take their case to the Dáil for them. Together with the 
national committee they undertook interviews, wrote letters and conducted a 
very effective countrywide campaign that raised awareness of the low morale 
in the Defence Forces and the bad pay and poor conditions. Michael Howard 
suggests that while pay levels were always a concern of senior military 
personnel, a lot of the protest was about how soldiers were treated and the 
issues pursued by NASA and PDFORRA differed from the military in this 
regard.
185
      
In order to fund the activities of the women, collections were made at 
every meeting from the women who attended. They also assembled in groups 
using buckets which they placed outside of barracks on pay day. On these 
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occasions the women were always treated very well. In March 1989 June 
Kiernan recalls the weather being very inclement, with wind, rain and cold 
buffeting them outside the barracks gate.  NCOs brought them into the mess 
and gave them tea and sandwiches encouraging them in the work that they 
were doing. It was felt by the women that the politicians by comparison, did 
not respond to their complaints and efforts to rectify the problems in the army. 
June Kiernan maintained that although Fianna Fáil had always traditionally 
got the army vote, their sitting TD Henry Abbot would not meet them. In 
looking back at the period June Kiernan maintains, ‗I would never had run as a 
candidate for election if Henry Abbot had just met us‘.186 According to Jack 
Kiernan the idea to run as a candidate and to field a number of NASA women 
nationally was born in Jack and June‘s living room. ‗Pat Lynch and I were 
sitting down one evening, talking as we did every night about the NASA 
campaign and its progress. We both came to the conclusion that if the 
politicians were not willing to help in the whole process, we should try and 
have the women run against them‘. When they asked June she said she could 
run, but had absolutely no experience in the whole political field and feared 
that if she had any possibility of acquiring a seat in the Dáil that she would not 
know what to do. She was reassured however by family and friends, who 
asked her, what do the politicians at the moment know about life in the army, 
what are they doing about it? ‗When I thought about it, June said, I realised 
they were only knowledgeable about whatever issue they were running under 
too‘. Jack and Pat became the de-facto ‗directors of elections‘ and set about 
orchestrating what became a very effective campaign.   
Having decided that this might be a good strategy nationally, the 
Mullingar committee proposed at a meeting of the NASA national committee 
in Athlone that a number of candidates, in the areas where troops and their 
families were concentrated, should be run. This was adopted and in keeping 
with the NASA constitution it was a condition that anybody running would 
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have to relinquish membership of the association. During the campaign for 
election the women of Mullingar had occasion to knock on doors seeking 
votes. They came across many officers and their wives and got a great 
supportive response from them both in terms of money and moral support. On 
one occasion while in the home of a senior ranking officer speaking to his wife 
the officer popped his head in the room, went and made tea for the women, 
came back and said ―I won‘t stay to hear your conversation but the best of 
luck‖. These instances of widespread silent support from serving officers were 
countrywide and were augmented by many retired officers who openly sent 
letters encouraging the women in their efforts. Retired Col Jim Fagan pledged 
support and enclosed a £5 contribution to June‘s electoral campaign writing, 
‗Best of luck in the elections. You have my full support and we will vote for 
you on the 15th…keep up the fight because it will be a long battle‘.187  
Serving officers often felt that while they were very supportive, they 
could not articulate that support openly. Lt Gen. Gerry McMahon was a career 
officer with distinguished service. He served as a company commander in 
Ireland, a battalion commander at home and abroad and enjoyed the 
distinction of having missed completely, the controversial events of 1988 and 
early 1989 regarding representative associations. At the time he was the Irish 
military advisor to the United Nations Headquarters in New York and was 
domiciled there. On his return he was projected into the centre of the 
deliberations representing the military authorities and became familiar with 
the context of discussions with the newly elected representatives of 
PDFORRA. He remembers thinking when he heard the wives were running 
for election, ‗With all that is going on I am glad that somebody is taking up 
the cause of the Defence Forces‘.188 
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The eventual results of the election were a political shock for the 
government. While Kiernan did not win a seat, it is widely held that the votes 
she attracted prevented the return of a Fianna Fáil sitting TD. In the previous 
1987 election Fianna Fáil had held three of the four seats in the Longford 
Westmeath constituency with Fine Gael holding one. The 1989 election saw 
one of them losing a seat. Fianna Fáil‘s Henry Abbot who had received 8037 
first preference votes in 1987 only got 6733 in 1989. The poll of 3207 votes by 
June Kiernan was thought to have directly led to the loss of this seat. It was all 
the more frustrating for the government because they now had two Fine Gael 
seats where they had previously only one and both of them had polled less first 
preference votes than Abbot.
189
  The early responses of Fianna Fáil to the 
emerging NASA appeared to be a factor in the diminishing confidence in the 
party in Mullingar and Athlone. During their campaign, NASA did not 
withhold the dissatisfaction they felt at Henry Abbot for his claiming he had to 
‗toe the party line‘. They also were disappointed with the contention by Mary 
O‘Rourke, that she had not received a registered letter sent by the association 
to Dáil Eireann, for which they later unearthed a signed receipt of it having 
been delivered. These and other issues were made known to the military 
voting community at the time which was not just confined to existing service 
personnel. In March of 1989, the Organisation of National Ex- Service Men in 
Mullingar branch had also pledged support to the women. In a letter from the 
secretary dated 3 March members had congratulated NASA on their formation 
and pledged the help of seven or eight men for the upcoming Flag Day.
190
  
Fianna Fáil lost their overall majority in the 1989 election and single 
party government for them, at time of writing, remains an elusive aspiration. 
Long after their attempts at the ballot box NASA remained a formidable and 
active group. On December 31 1989 they held a very visible protest march at 
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the opening celebration of Ireland‘s presidency of the European Council of 
Ministers. In Dublin Mr. Haughey‘s brief speech was partially drowned out by 
banner waving members of NASA.
191
 Jack Kiernan recalled: 
It was a fantastic protest; we got a load of placards made up in different 
languages because we knew all the European press would be there. Loads 
of them came over to us as we were the only ones there that were 
newsworthy.
192
  
June Kiernan believed that this was a turning point in the attitude of the 
government towards the whole issue of a soldiers association. Mr Haughey as 
President of the Council was to be questioned within six weeks by a Danish 
parliamentarian regarding Ireland‘s treatment of members of the Defence 
Forces seeking the right of association. Member of the European Parliament 
(MEP) Jensen wrote: 
I have asked the Irish presidency about PDFORRA – an Irish soldier 
association, its status vis-á-vis the Irish constitution, its possibility to work 
unhindered and the recent imprisonment of persons affiliated to 
PDFORRA.
193
 
This was prompted by members of Euromil who had become aware of the 
PDFORRA and their efforts to get representation. The NASA media campaign 
and their arrival on the political landscape was one of the essential ingredients 
that led to the formation and public acceptance of a representative body for 
members of the armed forces. The Irish Times remarked of them:  
In recent months NASA has enjoyed great success in highlighting what 
they believe are appalling levels of pay in the army and a general crisis in 
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morale, which has been sapped by the virtual ban on promotion and 
recruitment.
194
   
Michael Gannon an Irish Commandant doing his military masters in 
1992 said of NASA:  
In highlighting their situation NASA lobbied politicians, arranged protest 
marches to Dáil Eireann, and picketed both the Dáil and selected barracks 
throughout the country. In this way it became a formidable pressure group, 
forcefully articulating the feelings and frustrations of non commissioned 
personnel in particular, who under military law could not do so.  
He also suggested it was the success of their campaign that inspired enlisted 
personnel to establish PDFORRA:  
The non commissioned ranks, seeing the success of NASA, then set about 
organising their own association immediately after the general election.
195
  
In fact the soldiers had been organising long before the elections and from as 
early as September 1988, a full nine months before the summer elections of 
June 1989, soldiers of the Eastern Command were meeting fortnightly to 
formulate a strategy to establish an association, produce a draft constitution 
and set about garnering country wide support from their colleagues throughout 
the Irish Army, Navy, and Air Corps. What the women did was to provide a 
platform from which to highlight the prevailing conditions in the forces and 
they did that very well. The women were speaking a language that the public 
understood. They talked about trying to make ends meet, about the absence of 
their husbands on long hours of duty. A lot of public and political sympathy 
was created. But the group did not serve merely to highlight problems, a 
crucial part of their message was that their husbands needed representation in 
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order to resolve their difficulties with army pay and conditions. The only 
regret that June Kiernan had about her whole experience was that Henry 
Abbot had lost his seat as a result of the whole thing.  
Election Aftermath  
The incoming government of 1989 would have been acutely aware of the 
impact of the NASA political campaign and the loss of the seat. They had 
witnessed a concerted opposition, over the previous eighteen months, raising 
the temperature of public debate about the army crisis, they had suffered 
politically at the hands of NASA and were now struggling to form a coalition 
government from among former opponents. Given that the national 
highlighting of the need for improvements in pay and conditions in the PDF 
and the calls for representative bodies for serving soldiers showed no signs of 
abating, once established, the government moved very quickly to placate the 
whole question of problems in the Defence Forces.  
It was against this background that on 27 July 1989, a week after the 
Dáil rose for summer recess, it was widely reported that a new approach was 
to be taken in relation to army pay. That morning the newspapers reported an 
imminent announcement from the Taoiseach and the Minister for Defence. 
Reports suggested that following a meeting of the cabinet the previous 
Tuesday and, in response to the loss of vital votes in the general election, the 
much criticised timing of the pay award for the Defence Forces was to be 
brought forward.
196
 This speculation was not entirely accurate. The 
announcement, when it came that day, was much broader and was to have far-
reaching consequences for the improvement in pay and conditions in the 
Defence Forces and the establishment of a representative association. Firstly, 
an independent commission, chaired by Senior Counsel, Dermot Gleeson, was 
to be set up to examine, report, and make recommendations regarding 
remuneration and conditions of service in the Defence Forces. Secondly, new 
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structures were to be set up to provide ‗ongoing consultation‘ on conditions. 
Acknowledging that the previous review committee‘s recommendations did 
not ‗meet the situation‘, the Taoiseach, Charles Haughey said:  
We know there is a problem, that morale is low and are anxious to solve it 
as quickly as possible. The fairest and most equitable way is to set up this 
commission which is what the members of the Defence Forces have been 
seeking.
197
    
In the case of the commission, the members were named and were given their 
terms of reference that day which included ‗carrying out a major review of the 
remuneration and conditions of service of the Defence Forces having regard to 
their separate and distinct role and organisation, and make recommendations‘. 
198 In addition, the Minister for Defence, after consulting with him, instructed 
the Chief of Staff to appoint three teams, one for privates, one for NCOs and 
one for officers. Each team was expected to present a case to the commission 
on behalf of their particular group. In the new government, Deputy Michael 
Noonan who had been the Minister for Defence in the previous Dáil was 
replaced by Deputy Brian Lenihan. This was seen in a very positive light 
among serving personnel in the forces. Brian Lenihan was a formidable, 
experienced politician and a very senior member of Fianna Fáil. As deputy 
leader of the party he was appointed also as Tánaiste, deputy leader of 
government. This was the first time that a Minister of such high standing was 
appointed to the Department of Defence. Mr Lenihan was also a very amicable 
man, known in political circles as being a ‗fixer‘ but a tough negotiator should 
the need arise. In the middle of 1989 his appointment as Minister for Defence 
was an exciting development in the new Haughey administration. The 
announcements were greeted with enthusiasm by many and it seemed as if the 
problems in the Defence Forces regarding pay and conditions of service were 
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to be given serious and unprecedented attention. Having seemingly ignored 
the letters of military personnel it now looked as if the government had at last 
responded to the demands for a representative association and better pay.  
These developments appeared to herald a major breakthrough given 
previous emphatic government opposition to such measures in the recent past.  
They were welcomed in some quarters. NASA however, only afforded them a 
cautious welcome saying they would give a more detailed response when they 
received further information.
199
 The serving military personnel who had been 
meeting up and down the country in preparation for forming an association 
were silent on the news. It later transpired that there had been no previous 
consultation with any of the personnel prior to the public announcements. In 
an unprecedented communication from the Chief of Staff, a letter dated 27
 
July 1989, addressed to ‗each officer, non commissioned officer and private in 
the Defence Forces‘, the Chief advised personnel of the creation of the 
commission and of his instructions from the Minister to set up a new system in 
the Defence Forces for consultation and information on pay and conditions. 
The letter caused doubts to arise immediately on the type and extent of 
consultation that was envisaged. The last paragraph was widely perceived as a 
threat among the enlisted personnel. It read:  
This will ensure that your views at unit level will be taken into account on 
an ongoing basis. I strongly recommend this new system. I am confident 
with your participation and support these new arrangements will work to 
the satisfaction of all ranks, thereby rendering your membership of any 
other organisation unnecessary and divisive.200 
Although it was not understood by the general public until sometime later, it 
was here that a fundamental difference of approach and ideology was to 
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emerge between what the Defence Force authorities and the government 
wanted on one side and those seeking the formal recognition of PDFORRA 
wanted on the other. The government had instructed the Chief of Staff to look 
at the introduction ‗of some form of representative body within the Defence 
Forces for ongoing consultation on pay and other matters‘. This was 
welcomed by many including NASA who were reported as expressing 
delight.
201
  The opposition spokesman on Defence, Deputy Ted Nealon, who 
had been campaigning for a representative association, also welcomed the 
move.
202
  It was not welcomed by the members of the ad hoc PDFORRA. As 
the NCO team submission to Gleeson Commission reflected, they wanted an 
organisation that would operate outside of, and independent to, the military 
chain of command. The difference in emphasis was a crucial point of principle 
although this did not become immediately apparent to the media or the public 
at large. Despite the instructions by the Minister to the Chief to look at 
structures and to consult with other armies, the Chief chose not to consult with 
the enlisted personnel in his own army. Requests by the Gleeson Commission 
NCOs team to meet and make recommendations for the Chief‘s ‗structures‘ 
were denied. The letters that had been sent through him to the Minister 
remained unanswered. Despite this dilemma those who were involved in 
seeking a representative body adopted a wait and see approach to the Gleeson 
Commission and the arrangements that were to be made for the submission of 
cases to it.  
It had been decided by the government that all personnel of the 
Defence Forces would get an opportunity to make recommendations to the 
Gleeson Commission. General submissions were to be made by representative 
teams which were to comprise of six personnel in each who would reflect the 
views of their colleagues at a particular rank. These representative teams were 
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drawn from the three strata of the Defence Force rank, that of privates, NCOs 
and officers. Of the six members of each team there had to be one from each 
of the six commands. Each command was to select a person of each rank from 
among their own ranks to go forward. This elective approach was unusual for 
the military.  
What was noteworthy about the NCOs and the private‘s teams was that 
most of those selected, albeit through the military system, were organising 
members of PDFORRA and supporters of the view that a representative 
association was needed. When personnel were selected they were instructed in 
August 1989 to report to the Planning and Research Department (P&R) of 
Defence Force Headquarters (DFHQ) in Dublin. The teams would meet there 
on a daily basis over the following months to compile their submission to the 
commission. One member of each team was elected as a spokesperson for his 
team-mates. Each of the three teams were also provided with at least three 
staff officers supposedly to assist in the better formulation of the cases to be 
made to Gleeson in both an administrative and ‗advisory‘ capacity. James 
Martin of the NCO team thought they had a different function. He said of 
them: 
Although they were presented as being at the disposal of the teams, they 
sat in on discussions and engaged in debate often trying to persuade the 
teams to take a slightly different approach. In our team it often led to 
accusations that these officers were trying to influence the cases we were 
making so that the army wouldn‘t be seen in a negative light. 203 
Prior to embarking on their work the teams were instructed to attend an 
official ‗briefing‘ by senior officers of DFHQ. Although it was inferred that 
each team could submit any claim or suggestion to the commission regarding 
pay and conditions it was strongly recommended that each team confine itself 
to the issue of basic pay. This, they were told, is what mattered to most people 
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across all ranks of the Defence Forces. It was also emphasised that time was 
short, all submissions had to be in by end of September, and since there was so 
much to do; it was now a matter of priority for pay. During the wrap up 
question time the spokesperson for the NCO group, Warrant Officer Michael 
Martin, asked if there was any problem in making a case to the commission 
about representative associations. The reply was that this fell outside of the 
remit of the commission and it was not permitted. He sought clarification 
asking ‗are we being ordered not to make any submission regarding 
representation?‘ You are, was the response.204 
Soon after the teams commenced work they were invited to meet with 
Mr Gleeson at government buildings.
205
 Although he met the teams 
individually each of them were accompanied by the assigned staff officers and 
in the case of the NCOs team by the assistant Chief of Staff. Having briefed 
the team on the aims of the commission and the modus operandi, Mr Gleeson 
asked if there were any questions. John Wolfe recalls:  
Our spokesperson, Michael Martin told Mr Gleeson that the team had been 
anxious to present a case in their submission for the introduction of a 
representative association but that their superior officers had told them 
they could not do so. Gleeson did not comment about the rights or wrongs 
of who said what or merits or otherwise of representation. He simply said 
that he wanted to hear everything they had to say and did not want to find 
himself in a position, in a number of months time, having published a 
report only to discover there were other matters that had not been aired.
206
  
From this point onwards the NCOs and by precedent the privates team 
could officially formulate a case to the commission on the right of association 
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for members of the Defence Forces. Very soon after this meeting the NCOs 
team sought a meeting with the General Staff to discuss this matter. It did not 
materialise and was refused until it was the subject of a complaint to the 
Minister by the team. Now that Gleeson had cleared the way for a submission 
on representative associations, the teams were not just free to submit their case 
but they also now had the administrative and logistical resources of the P&R 
staff officers to help them do so. This was utilised when the NCOs teams 
sought their help in acquiring the contact names, addresses and telephone 
numbers of all legitimate representative associations in Europe. The 
subsequent contacts that were made played a crucial role in later 
developments. Civil-military relations in Ireland were about to change at this 
point. The military hierarchy had lost a seemingly small element of control 
over their subordinates and the change had been precipitated by actions made 
on behalf of the civil authority. A new relationship was emerging whereby all 
matters of a military nature, previously raised solely by the military hierarchy, 
would now come within the remit of another segment of the military, those 
who had been charged with representing enlisted personnel. This new 
segment, comprising of unfiltered views of enlisted personnel, quickly brought 
external views to bear on their new relationship with the government. These 
were European views that had not been previously aired much in Ireland, 
particularly during the debates on representative associations.  
Euromil and the international dimension 
With clearance from Gleeson himself on the issue of making a case for 
representation to the commission, the NCOs team requested assistance from 
their assigned staff officers at P&R. They gathered the contact details of all 
European representative associations. A number of countries in Europe at this 
time had some sort of military representative bodies. Well established 
associations from Germany, Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Austria were all 
members of the European Organisation of Military Associations (Euromil) 
120 
 
This association, based in Bonn,
207
  had consultative status with the Council of 
Europe and was influential in the adoption by both the Council and the 
European Parliament of resolutions that called for all member states to afford 
their military personnel the right of association in peacetime.
208
 Euromil was 
established in 1972 with eight military representative associations from 
Belgium, Germany, Denmark and Holland. The stated objects were to: 
Encourage understanding and friendship among peoples, to encourage 
regular exchange of experience between the individual member 
associations, to promote general, ideal, social and career interests of 
soldiers and to represent member associations‘ vis-à-vis supranational 
organisations. 
209
   
 This was an organisation that existed for the purpose of encouraging the right 
of association in any country where it did not already exist. Members of the 
Irish armed forces who were seeking this right were to benefit greatly from 
engaging with such a group. Immediately after being provided with the 
relevant information by P&R staff, the spokesperson for the NCOs group, 
Warrant Officer Michael Martin (who was also Secretary/PRO for the national 
executive of PDFORRA) contacted Euromil and established a rapport with 
them gaining insight into the type of associations that existed elsewhere, how 
they operated and how effective or ineffective they were in pursuing the 
interests of their members. Following these exchanges an invitation was 
extended to the ad hoc PDFORRA group to attend the quarterly conference of 
the Euromil Presidium in Ringköbing Denmark to take place in February 
1990. In the meantime, the Chief of Staff pressed ahead with the task of 
establishing representative structures as instructed by the government but no 
invitation came to the Gleeson teams to elicit their views on the matter. The 
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submission that was made by the NCO team and the privates teams to the 
commission in November 1989 included a request for a representative 
association and contained the same constitution that had accompanied the 
original letter that was sent by thousands to the Minister through the chain of 
command. There were at least two important additions inserted by the Gleeson 
submission teams. These were independent access to the media, and 
independent financing.
210
  
In the last quarter of 1989 there were numerous strands of activity 
being conducted by the various stakeholders that could be collectively called 
the constituent parts of the ‗Defence Community‘.  The government had set up 
and were involved in facilitating the operation of the Gleeson Commission and 
were awaiting their conclusions. The Department of Defence, parliamentary 
draughtsmen and the Minister were busy preparing framework legislation to 
introduce new representative structures for members of the Defence Forces. 
The Chief of Staff was busy having structures designed, at the Ministers 
request, that would provide consultative structures in the Defence Forces. The 
Gleeson teams were compiling the cases that would make up the Defence 
Forces submission to the commission. Ad Hoc PDFORRA continued to 
encourage members of the PDF to join their association and send their 
individual applications to the Minister through the chain of command to seek 
approval for their representative association. Activists for the establishment of 
PDFORRA claimed in February 1990 to represent 8000 members based on the 
sending of these letters.
211
 Unhappy that the Chief‘s structures were not the 
subject of consultation the ad hoc PDFORRA announced on 11 November 
1989 that they had established their association under the constitution of 
Ireland.  
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Constitutional provisions and the media 
The idea that members of the Irish armed forces may have had a constitutional 
right to form representative associations was first explored in early 1989 by 
the group of Eastern Command soldiers who initially led the campaign for the 
foundation of PDFORRA. Legal opinion was sought from a solicitor who 
engaged Senior Counsel (subsequently Justice) Frank Clarke. 
212
 His opinion 
reassured soldiers that there were grounds for an argument under the 
constitution that soldiers had a right to associate. On the 11 of November 1989 
when a meeting of the ad hoc PDFORRA national executive decided to issue a 
press release announcing that they had exercised their right under the 
constitution to form an association they did so anonymously.
213
 The 
constitutional section that they referred to was under article 40.6.1° (iii) of the 
constitution of Ireland. This article states: 
6. The State guarantees liberty for the exercise of the following rights, 
subject to public order and morality:  
 
(iii)The right of the citizens to form associations and unions.  
Laws, however, may be enacted for the regulation and control in the public 
interest of the exercise of the foregoing right.  
The legal advice had been that although the constitution provides for the 
control and regulation of the right, significantly, it does not state it can be 
prohibited. The press release sought an early meeting with the Minister who 
indicated there was no prospect for such a meeting.
214
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Minister for Defence Brian Lenihan, ‗ruled out any negotiations 
between the army authorities and the unofficial representative group…‘. 215 He 
later argued he could not meet any group who had set themselves up without 
proper election and announced that he had instructed the Chief of Staff to 
investigate structures that could be established in the Defence Forces to 
represent the views of personnel and in doing so to look at other models in 
Europe. His refusal to meet led to the new group releasing a second press 
statement calling on the Taoiseach to recognise them officially and take 
cognisance of European resolutions calling for the extension of this provision 
in peacetime to all members of the armed forces.
216
 The call on the Taoiseach 
was particularly significant as Deputy Haughey was due to take over the 
European Presidency in January 1990. Subsequent requests for meetings with 
the Minister, the Chief of Staff and the Government went unheeded. During 
this period, close contact was also maintained with Euromil. As the eventful 
year of 1989 came to a close for the armed forces, the contrasting demands by 
members of PDFORRA and the Department of Defence, including the military 
authorities, became polarised. This was evident in both the questions posed to 
the Minister for Defence by opposition deputies and by his answers. 
Repeatedly he was asked would he recognise and engage with PDFORRA and 
repeatedly he responded by referring to the internal structures on which the 
Chief of Staff was working.
217
 Political pressure continued to be applied to the 
Minister and the government for what was referred to as the ‗crisis in the 
Defence Forces‘, questions on the pay problem and the recognition of 
PDFORRA were now augmented by queries regarding the findings of the 
Gleeson Commission with criticism being levelled about the delay in the 
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report on their findings. Ad hoc PDFORRA were still not revealing the 
identity of their spokesperson at this point as military regulations prohibited 
them doing so, nevertheless they continued to seek a meeting with the 
government to no avail.   
No name appeared on the press release regarding the 11 November 
formation of the association. In this action and in speaking to journalists 
whom they met secretly, members of ad hoc PDFORRA were in breach of 
military regulations. The solicitor that the soldiers had engaged for the initial 
advices at that point disengaged himself as legal advisor for the group.   
Conscious of their precarious position now in relation to the law, more advice 
was sought from another source regarding the way in which a perceived 
‗constitutional‘ right could be established to ensure that any dealings between 
the press and the association would not result in the penalisation of its 
members. The original idea had been that perhaps a collective action could be 
taken by members to establish the right of association if it became necessary. 
The advice suggested this was not possible. By late 1989 it was becoming 
evident that the government were determined in their plans to establish 
internal representative structures for the Defence Forces but without the input 
of enlisted personnel. This would mean that the ad hoc PDFORRA would 
perhaps continue to exist but would be ignored in favour of an official 
grouping set up by the Minister and the Chief under new legislation. There 
being no apparent way of stopping the Minister setting these up, the question 
of legal action became more urgent. The advice suggested that while it may 
not be possible to initiate a collective action, the best route to take would be 
(where an individual felt their constitutional rights were being infringed) to 
seek a ruling in the High Court. In such circumstances, if brought before it, the 
High Court had a duty to establish whether or not an infringement had 
occurred. Although the government and military authorities had not officially 
taken any action against those who had sought representation, none had 
apparently broken the law either.     
125 
 
The position was to change radically as a result of a radio interview 
given from Denmark by the secretary/pro of the association. In early February 
1990, Richard Dillon, the ad hoc PDFORRA chairman and Michael Martin, 
the secretary/public relations officer, both travelled to Rinköbing in Denmark 
to attend the Euromil conference to which PDFORRA had been invited. Over 
three days all the participating countries of Euromil were briefed on the 
situation in Ireland. They pledged their support to the efforts being made by 
PDFORRA Dick Dillon recalls:   
I remember reading about Euromil in a book somewhere, I showed the 
article to people at a meeting and I think you were there. I thought we 
should meet these people. They were a help but not as much a help as they 
believed themselves to be. They had representation and it worked but what 
we had turned out to be superior. They still have not managed to advance 
the cause of the Portuguese association after all this time. 
218
 
On 6 February while the men were still in Denmark, announcements 
were made in Ireland by the Minister for Defence that legislation was to be 
rushed through the Dáil to set up the new structures designed by the Chief of 
Staff.
219
 Despite the fact that these structures were for the use of enlisted 
personnel, no privates or NCOs had been consulted on them or asked for any 
opinion, contribution or suggestion. Crucially, the Minister also announced 
that elections were to be held for representatives into the structure 
recommended by the Chief of Staff. A circular had been distributed to all 
members of the Defence Forces outlining a broad internal structure.   
Michael Martin as secretary and public relations officer for the, as yet, 
un-recognised association, gave a radio interview on 6 February on the 
‗Morning Ireland‘ show on RTE Radio regarding the impending legislation 
and the constitutional rights of members. There was a widespread media 
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response to the interview with speculation mounting about what military 
sanctions would be brought against him. It was thought this was a very 
important development in bringing the whole matter into sharper focus. Not 
everybody was convinced however, Richard Condron, who was serving on the 
national executive at that time, felt aggrieved that the interview had taken 
place. He said of it:   
First of all, it should not have happened. The national executive knew 
nothing about it. I think that an element of it was Michael Martin was 
going for the job of General Secretary.  There was concern after it, like 
there had been before when we gave in our letters as to what would 
happen next. In terms of its importance, it made a point about us as a 
representative association but Brian Lenihan told me it was because of 
NASA and their showing in the elections that they eventually came to the 
table. 
220
 
Two days after the interview from Denmark the secretary/pro and chairman 
flew back into Dublin airport to a huge media presence, the subsequent press 
conference got extensive primary coverage. Tom McCaughran, an experienced 
and well known journalist at the time was the RTE television news security 
correspondent. He covered numerous controversial interviews but later 
commented on the enormity of a serving member of the Defence Forces 
defying regulations to pursue a right and said ‗we made history that day in the 
airport‘.221 
The national executive met in Limerick the next day and were briefed 
by the chairman Richard Dillon and the secretary Michael Martin who 
outlined the reasons for ‗going public‘. The PDFORRA minute books records: 
On receiving information with regard to the Minister‘s statement in the 
Dáil and the often varying and ambiguous press reports, the secretary 
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discussed with the chairman, the issues involved and reached a decision 
there and then to go public.…The general consensus at the end of the 
address was that the Euromil trip had been very beneficial and that from a 
public relations aspect it was far better than any advertisements in the 
press or radio and TV. 
222
 
There is no record in the minutes of any objections or adverse comments 
regarding the Euromil trip and the interviews to the media. Within days of the 
meeting the secretary/pro returned to duty at the Naval Base. He was 
immediately notified by his commander that he was to be charged in military 
law under article 27 of the military regulations A7. He sought judicial relief in 
the High Court on the basis that his constitutional rights may have been 
infringed by the application of this military regulation to him while acting as 
public relations officer for a legitimate association. Over the ensuing weeks 
there were a number of proceedings in the High Court during which Martin 
continued to conduct interviews with the media. Before the proceedings came 
to a conclusion the government indicated that they wanted to engage with the 
national executive of ad hoc PDORRA.    
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Chapter 5 
Conciliation and concession: 
resolution of  outstanding issues 1990-92  
The first indication that came to the members of the ad-hoc PDFORRA that 
the government had decided to speak to them was relayed by a phone call to 
the chairman of the national executive, Richard Dillon, in mid March 1990. 
An army officer telephoned some of the Eastern Command soldiers that he 
had served with to relay the message. The minute book of the national 
executive committee records:  
An approach was made to the Chairman and through an intermediary as to 
whether there was room for discussion. 
223
 
A meeting was arranged for the Ashling Hotel Dublin on 21 March 
which was just around the corner from the headquarters of the Department of 
Defence in Parkgate Dublin. Members of the national executive were called 
from various parts of the country and a room was arranged for 5pm. Dr Brian 
Hillery TD and Tom Kitt TD arrived to meet with members of the group. They 
were the chosen emissaries of the government and Dr Hillery was a skilled 
negotiator with an academic background in industrial relations and dispute 
resolution. He recalls the background to the meeting: 
I was requested by the then Minister for Defence Brian Lenihan to meet 
the group who at that stage were already calling themselves PDFORRA 
and to meet with the leading light of that group who was deemed to be 
Michael Martin. I had been aware of the spouse‘s associations especially 
in the Midlands and knew that the Gardaí had long since established a 
representative body which enabled them, on a limited basis to conduct 
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negotiations on behalf of their members, albeit in a manner somewhat less 
than that of the usual industrial relations sense.
224
   
This was the first occasion on which the committee claiming to represent 
a sizable body of personnel in the Defence Forces would interface with 
emissaries of the government. It was a significant development. Even during 
the deliberations of the Gleeson submission teams in the preceding months, 
enlisted personnel had never been afforded the opportunity to meet with 
members of the commission on their own. Although the commission had 
visited many barracks and spoke to many people about the problems in the 
Defence Forces, these encounters took place in a very controlled environment 
with all the necessary clearings and briefings that the army provided for those 
who may end up engaging with the commission members. In the Ashling 
Hotel on that first evening, it was enlisted personnel of the ad hoc association 
who themselves decided on who should be there.  
At this point in the evolving events, the government had commenced the 
passage of legislation through the Dáil. It was envisaged that this legislation 
would be a framework under which the structures that had been recommended 
by the Chief of Staff, would be enacted. As stated previously, the organisation 
being proposed by the Chief comprised of three groups or bodies, one each for 
the commissioned officers, the NCOs and the privates. There had been little or 
no consultation between the military authorities and various ranks that would 
comprise of the rank based organisation that was being proposed. PDFORRA 
had complained to the Minister for Defence, as had the NCO team of the 
Gleeson submission team that the Chief and his staff were setting about 
recommending structures for the provision of a representative association for 
people who they had not bothered to consult with. Richie Condron recalls 
strong opposition to the idea:   
                                                 
224
 Dr Brian Hillery former TD, advisor to the government,  personal interview, April 2010, 
Dublin. 
 
130 
 
Those structures, known as the white book had been rejected by everyone. 
We had our own constitution and people were not going to be swayed into 
the army one which was all about them and how they could control us.
225
 
In what was seen at the time as a very undesirable development, 
PDFORRA threatened that if the Chief‘s structures were to be enacted under 
the legislation, their members, who they said comprised of 80% of the enlisted 
ranks, would not participate in any elections for them. They claimed that if 
such associations were formed nobody would take up membership. To 
emphasise their point further, PDFORRA called national elections for 
candidates to fill their existing ad hoc organisation. Advertisements for these 
appeared in the national press.
226
 According to Dr Hillery the calling of any 
kind of public elections for members of the armed forces was of great concern 
to the government: 
There was concern at official and political level due to the unofficial 
nature of the elections. The immediate target was to meet with PDFORRA 
with a view to calling off the elections that were scheduled for Easter time 
but also to listen to the concerns of PDFORRA. I was to be a conduit with 
my colleague Tom Kitt and on the night Michael Martin and his 
colleagues had an agenda on a range of items.  I had been given a briefing 
but in trying to capture the general tenor of the period there was a 
willingness to resolve the issues.
227
   
The Ashling Hotel discussions went on for about eleven hours. 
PDFORRA had come to the meeting with a very specific set of aims. These 
were the same aims that had been proposed to the Gleeson Commission and 
were hand written and brought to the discussions on the day.
228
  Specifically 
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there were three areas that PDFORRA identified as being crucial to the 
success of any representative body and eight other matters that they set out as 
being necessary for any agreement. The specific matters included: 
Name of the association to remain as PDFORRA 
Total control of own finance to be raised by subscription 
Deduction at source facility 
Full independent access to the media 
Affiliation to Euromil 
Conciliation and Arbitration Scheme  
Officials of the Association to be seconded from military duties 
Elected members elsewhere facilitated with time off. 
Consultative status at all level of the military chain of command 
Financial assistance with provision of outside PDFORRA HQ 
A memorandum of understanding.  
The government concerns were that elections that were to take place 
would be seen as being the official elections and not a break off group of 
military personnel acting independent of command. Up to the meeting at the 
Ashling it had appeared that soldiers wanted a representative body and the 
government were taking steps to provide it with the assistance of the army. 
What was lost on many was that the representative body being proposed by 
the Chief of Staff was seen by the soldiers themselves as being an internal 
ineffective body that would still have to contend with all the existing 
restrictions that an internal army system featured. The NCO group in their 
submission to Gleeson had rejected the Chiefs proposed structures which 
when circulated eventually had offered the following:  
Private and NCO groups at barrack, command and DFHQ levels 
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Provision to make proposals that would not be altered 
Process of adjudication (not specified) 
Provision for a review of structures 
Provision for the dissemination of progress on the proposals. 
These outlines of the Chief‘s structures were circulated to all commands in 
January 1990. They were seen to fall far short of what was being sought by the 
soldiers.
229
 
PDFORRA had legal counsel available on the night and were in 
telephone communication with their legal teams to get advice on any matters 
that arose. Brian Hillery was also in regular telephone contact with a very 
senior member of the Department of Defence. As the discussions went back 
and forth items that were agreed were ticked off. Eventually to everyone‘s 
relief an agreement was made. Members of the PDFORRA Executive had 
drawn up a list of their demands, those of them that were agreed upon were 
printed and signed by members present but also by Dr Hillery and Tom Kitt.
230
 
Both parties seemed to have satisfied themselves that they had achieved 
enough to change the positions slightly. In the case of PDFORRA they had 
compromised on two issues, the cancelling of their planned elections and the 
cessation of the court case. On the government side they compromised on the 
crucial issue of abandoning the Chief of Staff‘s structure and providing, under 
the impending legislation, an outside independent body with access to the 
media.  
Dr Hillery had been aware of political concern and when he arrived into 
the Dáil the next morning he was summoned by the Taoiseach of the day, Mr 
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Charles Haughey, who he recalls was relieved that matters had been 
resolved.
231
 That same morning 22 March 1990, when Brian Hillery was at the 
Dáil, Michael Martin was giving a radio interview to the morning radio 
programme ‗Morning Ireland‘. The presenter, David Hanley, described him as 
being ‗very fresh‘ in view of the fact that he had been up all night negotiating. 
In that interview, speaking on behalf of PDFORRA he reported that a 
breakthrough had occurred and that progress would now be made on 
establishing proposed independent structures through which negotiations on 
pay, allowances and other matters could be made.  
Brian Hillery felt that there had been a strong case for a representative 
body and that there were many issues that needed to be addressed. The 
signatories that night on the document included Michael Martin, Michael 
Murphy, Richard Dillon and Richard Condron. This document would be 
subsequently held aloft as if it was a sacred covenant and a visible form of 
evidence that the agreement was solid. It has been photocopied many times 
and would be considered a physical manifestation of the first agreement 
reached between members of the, up to then, unrecognised PDFORRA and the 
organs of the state. The interesting aspect to this episode was that the military 
authorities were completely excluded from the deliberations. This was later to 
become a subject of complaint by the General Staff.  In the immediate wake of 
the agreement, arrangements were made to involve the Department of 
Environment, who were responsible for the organisation of state elections, in 
whatever arrangements that needed to be made in order to elect candidates for 
the new structures about to be enacted by the introduction of the Defence 
Amendment Act 1990. There was to be no prohibition on any personnel who 
had previously been involved in ad hoc PDFORRA in offering themselves for 
election into the new structure, which had been agreed, would be also named 
PDFORRA. 
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The Ashling Hotel agreement signified the beginning of the acceptance 
of PDFORRA by the civil authority. In excluding the military hierarchy from 
the negotiations that night an altogether new dimension of civil-military 
relations were enacted. Technically the government were about to do as they 
always said they would do, introduce framework legislation for representative 
structures, but significantly the structures that would be legitimised under the 
legislation were the same structures that the Chief had warned would be 
divisive and furthermore the structures that he had framed were now to be 
abandoned.  
First formal discussions. 
The elections that had been agreed between ad-hoc PDFORRA and the 
government TDs, Dr Brian Hillery, and Tom Kitt resulted in most of the 
former activists being returned. These were now recognised officially as the 
new legitimate representatives of enlisted personnel. The intention was that 
these representatives would engage with the Department of Defence in order 
to formulate and agree a new set of regulations that would take account of the 
1990 Defence Amendment Act which provided for the existence and operation 
of new representative structures in the PDF. The date for the first meeting was 
set for 10 July 1990. This encounter was the first of its kind where members of 
the enlisted ranks of the armed forces were present in their own right to 
engage with, and make representations to, the civil authority which was itself 
being represented by the Department of Defence with appointees from both 
the civil and military branches.  
A fundamental shift occurred here in the context of civil-military 
relations in Ireland. Legally and in a forum approved by the government, a 
group of enlisted personnel sat with a legitimate mandate to engage with 
officials of a state Department. All were there to create a set of regulations that 
would enshrine the way in which relations between the state and a large 
section of the armed forces would be conducted from then on. This first 
encounter was precipitated by legislation that could be argued came from a 
form of intervention by military personnel. Michael Howard, who was at the 
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centre of the events serving as Department of Defence Press Officer in 1989 
and 1990 maintained in 2010 that:  
I think you would have to say objectively that intervention took place. The 
settled policy position was that there should not be a representative 
association. The decision that there would be a system of representation 
was a political one. Like all political decisions it had come about because 
influence had been brought to bear. Governments in all democratic 
societies respond to pressures and influences. That influence was fostered 
by serving military personnel by a variety of means. 
232 
                       
It was intervention that began with political agitation by NASA who 
were not members of the armed forces but it was continued through the media 
and the courts by serving members, all of whom were enlisted personnel. It 
has to be noted here that Huntington‘s contention that enlisted personnel had 
no role in civil-military relations is no longer sustainable. Up to this meeting 
there had been a share of aggravation, disappointment and fear among 
personnel on both divides of the military establishment regarding the aims and 
methods of soldiers who were seeking the right of association. In addition, the 
government itself had been forced to contend with protests, opposition attacks 
and public criticism. In this first set of discussions, people who had been 
vehemently opposed to each other‘s aims were finally meeting to try to reach 
agreement on matters of great importance. Some fundamental principles 
regarding the exercise of command were challenged and scrutinised in these 
discussions, the relationship between the military authorities and State were 
brought to straining point and the demands of enlisted personnel were for the 
first time perhaps, thrown centre stage in the consideration of a state‘s civil-
military relations.  
Although the official Departmental side chose to ignore it for the 
purposes of these discussions, the elected representatives were fulfilling a dual 
role in that they were also members of the national executive of ad-hoc 
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PDFORRA.  On this first occasion the representative delegation comprised of 
the whole national executive, in subsequent meetings a smaller number 
attended. Present were: 
Mr. Richard Dillon, national chairman of the association and also a Company 
Sergeant of the army in the Eastern Command.  
Mr. Michael Martin, national secretary and a Warrant Officer in the Navy. 
Mr. Irvine Ferris, national executive and Flight Sergeant, Air Corps. 
Mr. Denis Whelan, national executive and Sergeant, Curragh Command. 
Mr. John Lucey, national executive and Chief Petty Officer of the Navy. 
Mr. Louis Parminter, national executive and an Acting Corporal, Curragh 
Command. 
Mr. Donal Coakley, national executive and Company Sergeant of the Western 
Command. 
Mr. Richard Condron, national executive and Company Sergeant of the 
Eastern Command 
Mr. Harry Higgins, national executive and Sergeant of the Air Corps.  
Mr. Geoff Keating, national executive and Private/Signalman in the Southern 
Command. 
Mr. Jack Kiernan, national executive and Corporal in the Western Command. 
Mr. Joe Power, national executive and Company Quartermaster Sergeant in 
the Southern Command.  
On the Departmental side the two branches were represented by the following: 
Mr. S. O‘Brosnachain, Secretary Department of Defence 
Mr. T. Conway, Department of Defence 
Mr. P. Kelly, Department of Defence. 
Mr. P. Hammond, Department of Defence.  
Brigadier General M. Downing. 
Colonel W. Phillips. 
Lieutenant Colonel P. Nowlan. 
Commandant M. Baynes.
233
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Richard Dillon the founding chairman of ad-hoc PDFORRA, and the one who 
had been campaigning longer than anybody else for the right of association, 
had mixed feelings that day:  
I certainly felt a sense of achievement on behalf of all those who had been 
involved in looking for representation all along. I also thought that day and 
for a long time after that the military side in particular were going to use 
every opportunity to delay the process.
234
 
Richard Condron who was subsequently to become part of the representative 
side negotiating team felt that: 
Attending that meeting that day meant that everything had been achieved. 
The military that were present were part of a group that had told us 
representation couldn‘t happen, they had said no to it. Now we were sitting 
down with them and doing what they said was impossible, that is 
negotiating about pay and conditions of our members.
235
 
This first meeting dealt with general operating arrangements regarding 
the conduct of the discussions and negotiations that would follow, these 
included areas such as the preparation of minutes, the compilation of the 
agenda, the size and location of the meetings, time-off and travel 
arrangements, office accommodation and liaison between the two groups. It 
was also confirmed at this time that the new regulations that were to govern 
the operation of the representative associations would be a self-contained 
Defence Force Regulation (DFR). The draft minute stated in paragraph eight:  
The regulations which will be drafted by the Department will be 
completed in consultation with the representative‘s side.236  
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When the minutes were presented at the next meeting three days later, there 
were a number of amendments sought by the representative side. They did not 
accept the wording of paragraph eight and successfully had it amended and 
adopted to read the following: 
The regulations will be drafted by the Department in consultation with the 
representative‘s side.  
Although the change seemed minor it is clear that the representative side did 
not want drafting of the regulations to be undertaken by the Departmental side 
alone. There was another problem with the minutes that day. This too seemed 
at first to be of little consequence but the reality was that it was to become one 
of the major issues of contention between the military and the representative 
side and later between the military authorities and the government. The 
representative side rejected the record of attendance at the previous meeting 
because they had been referred to using their rank. Thus Mr. Richard Dillon 
was documented as Coy Sgt Dillon. They proposed an amendment to delete 
the references to rank in the attendance appendix A and argued: 
The use of rank and uniform in discussions with their military superiors 
would place them at a psychological disadvantage; would inhibit them in 
the discharge of the representative role and could lead to an undesirable 
impact on discipline if that role was not clearly distinguished from their 
military duties. Precedents in relation to other military associations abroad 
and Garda representative associations were cited.
237
 
The Departmental side responded by arguing that: 
 The question appeared to be an issue because it was being made into an 
issue; ranks were laid down in the Defence Act and that it would be a 
pretence (and possibly contrary to the provisions of the Act) to set ranks 
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aside from a military standpoint. What was proposed would be at variance 
to military life as we know it in this country. In practice the special 
position of representatives in the representation forum would be 
recognised.  
The appendix to the minute was therefore not agreed. Apart from these matters 
a discussion document on the items to be addressed in talks was considered. 
The document contained headings that were felt could be used to formulate the 
items that needed to be discussed in the attempts to create new regulations. 
Headings included, he official name for the association, cognisance of the fact 
that the elected representatives were also association representatives and that 
the terminology the association used should be adopted, membership of the 
association and subscriptions and facilities. There were also a number of 
headings that the representative side wanted included in the document for 
discussion. These were: 
A memorandum of understanding. 
Affiliation to outside organisations. 
Channels of communication with the Department and the military 
authorities. 
Access to official notice boards. 
Inclusion on distribution list for routine orders.  
Provision of two sets of DFRs.  
Arrangements for movement of elected representatives at national level 
between commands and the facility to have expert advice at meetings.
238
 These 
and subsequent exchanges in the early meetings were to form the basis of 
creating the new regulations. They represented an interface between certain 
members of the armed forces and the state itself. In the only real area of 
disagreement, about the use of rank, the discussion went back and forth for one 
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and half hours of a four hour meeting.
239
 It was agreed that a statement of 
positions would be outlined in documents to be compiled by both sides and 
presented for the next meeting on 20 July 1990. The arguments that were 
subsequently presented go to the heart of relationships between military 
personnel and military service but also military personnel and the State.   
The military authorities and the representatives of PDFORRA both 
presented documents as agreed. In a ten paragraph position paper the military 
authorities set out the importance of rank and uniform. They opposed any 
circumstances in which the wearing of uniform and the use of rank would be 
discarded. From the first paragraph, the document set out the overarching 
consideration of the issue and the contention that practices were legally 
grounded, and strategically necessary: 
The use of military rank coupled with the wearing of military uniform is 
inseparably tied to the exercise of command and authority in the Defence 
Forces upon which the structures of control, organisation and discipline 
are based.…it is the assessment of the military authorities that any 
derogation from such customary military law will have a deleterious effect 
on the exercise of command and discipline…having regard to the present 
security commitments of the Defence Forces the mere possibility of such a 
development must not be allowed.  
The document went on to acknowledge the concerns outlined in the 
representative side arguments and promised to take cognisance of them but 
suggested that: 
…everyone in military life should have a rank and there is no provision for 
the dropping of rank.   
It finished by suggesting that the legal responsibilities of the military 
authorities merited their position to be the most important in these matters:  
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The misgivings about setting aside ranks/uniforms impinge particularly on 
the area of responsibility of the military authorities. While all ranks have a 
deep interest and concern in the maintenance of military discipline and 
control, the military authorities have the statutory responsibility in this 
area and, having regard to the position stated, their judgement in this 
matter ought to be paramount. 
240
    
The paper set out very clearly the crucial nature of rank and uniform to 
discipline and implied a heightened importance given the security situation 
that prevailed in Ireland at the time. It suggested that those who were subject 
to the Defence Act 1954 were bound to their rank as a consequence of their 
military life. There was no contemplation of any other ‗life‘ other than a 
military one, at least during membership of the Defence Forces. This 
perspective provides an insight into one concept of military service. In arguing 
that there is but a single identity recognised by rank and regardless of activity, 
does it portray a belief in a single dimensional existence? Is the idea that, once 
conferred with a rank under military law, there are no apparent circumstances 
in which that rank may be ignored. One can certainly understand the merit of 
institutional ranking; it defines relationships, establishes hierarchy and in 
many cases, identifies skills sets. In the context of any institution these are 
useful attributes, but in the mind of the modern soldier how far beyond the 
barracks gates in peacetime do they consider themselves ‗soldiers‘.  
The representative side submitted a five part paper under the headings; 
‗Representation as a military issue‘, ‗Effect of the uniformed revolving door 
role‘, ‗Psychological disadvantage‘, ‗A new forum‘ and ‗Historical policy‘. 
This paper set out the argument that soldiers are no longer engaged in total 
service and that they have another ‗life‘ outside of the constraints of the 
barracks. It also acknowledged the arguments made by the military of the 
importance of rank and uniform in the military context. In fact sections of their 
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paper echoed those of the military in relation to rank and uniform. But they 
clearly envisaged another co-existence in addition to their military life in 
particular during activities that they would consider being outside of military 
life and outside of the barracks, the paper rejected the idea of ‗total service‘: 
The concept of total service is as misplaced in peacetime as it is necessary 
in times of conflict and emergency.…the reality today is that a soldier 
enjoys another alternative type of existence outside of, and independent to,  
the military chain of command and the duties and life of that discipline…. 
241
  
While the military authorities argued that the endowment of rank and 
the wearing of uniform in themselves played a central role in the efficient 
operation of military discipline and command and argued that any change 
would undermine it, the representative side referred to the importance of 
training during what was referred to by them as the ‗transition‘ from one 
element of their lives to the other and referred to some limitations of the 
military chain of command: 
This transition can be effected with ease and speed as a result of sound 
training and the influence of the military ethos, the wearing of uniforms 
and the relationships between ranks greatly assists in this transition. The 
military chain of command by its very nature cannot possibly hope to deal 
with many of the issues that impact on the soldier‘s ‗other‘ existence.242  
From the opposing papers it can be seen that both military authorities and the 
representatives of the enlisted personnel had very different perspectives on the 
operation of authority and its ‗jurisdiction‘. It would appear that the Irish 
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model of military authority was grounded in a requirement for immediate, 
military disciplined responses to orders that are crucial for the successful 
fulfilment of any military operation. On the field of battle such requirements 
are self evident but do such models of authority have a place in peacetime?  In 
his examination of military hierarchy and authority Janowitz recognises that 
the type of authority may change as a consequence of changing circumstances:  
In the past authority in the military profession has been rooted in custom, 
tradition, law and heroic achievement. To understand the changing 
patterns of authority in the military establishment, the sociologist directs 
attention to the changes in the skill and rank structure, the status system 
and the techniques of discipline.   
He contends that the mission of the military in particular in relation to 
preparing for war, as opposed to deterring wars, plays an important role in 
determining which type of authority is appropriate:  
If the military is forced to think about deterring wars rather than fighting 
wars, the traditions of the ‗military mind‘ based on the inevitability of 
hostilities, must change and military authority must undergo transformation as 
well. 
243
  
 A question arises as to whether, in 1990, the concentration by the 
military leadership  in Ireland on the physical trappings of authority in the 
form of rank and uniform was appropriate for an army who was not at war, at 
least not in the conventional sense. The representative side it seems, were at 
pains to explain that the formal military hierarchal system of obedience was 
appropriate in the full military context but perhaps not in matters that they 
claimed were outside of the realm of military life. They also articulated 
recognition of the methodology used to maintain a skills or a managerial 
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distance between officers and enlisted ranks in order to attempt to better effect 
their authority: 
Discouraging of any social contact or relationships between them, the 
setting aside of any humanitarian qualities and the reliance on the 
influence of rank alone and not the professional ability or leadership 
suitability in order to exact the desired response from the subordinate. 
244
 
The representative side sought to separate the representative activities 
and divorce them from the normal trappings of authority. They argued that 
contrary to the fears expressed by the military, such a separation would in fact 
help discipline rather than hinder it. Neither side accepted the argument of the 
other. The military paper had emphasised in its title that it was referring to 
barracks and posts, however its content seem to go beyond these workplaces 
to extend to a military ‗life‘. The representatives of enlisted personnel 
appeared, to accept the need for strict enforcement of rank and uniform 
tradition in all things military, but saw military life in peacetime as being only 
one aspect of their lives in which, they intimated, the military authorities had 
no expertise or authority.  
One of the more interesting contexts of this debate was that a seemingly 
internal set of core values for the military, usually dealt with by them and 
them alone was now been articulated and argued in the presence of the 
representatives of the civil authority and while they may have had no real 
input into the finer points of the debate itself, they were a witness to it and 
would become the eventual arbiters. In this instance the relationship between 
the civil-authorities and the institutions of the military was altered or at least 
re-enforced. This was an early impact on civil-military relations that went 
almost unnoticed by those engaged in the debate. Despite the unique skills of 
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the army profession as has been pointed out, they are still subject to civil 
authority. This does not prevent the internalisation of standards and rules 
within the corporate identity of the army. Various definitions of professional 
identity suggest that the training, skills and standards are internally upheld and 
maintained, even when the skills themselves are provided as a service to a 
client. In his consideration of the military profession Talcott Parsons contends 
that: 
 Professional training requires the maintenance of reasonable standards 
according to the rules of the profession, exercised either by the concerted 
opinion of its peers or the organisation that patronises the profession. 
245
  
The professional body that was the Irish Army in 1990 was having its 
own professional standards and procedures questioned. Matters that had been 
taken as normal internal corporate rules were under scrutiny and being 
challenged by the new elected representatives who, unlike the client state, 
claimed knowledge of the internal workings. It was a challenge from within. 
In addressing the claims of the representative side, the professionals had to 
justify long standing practices not just to the representatives of their own 
enlisted personnel but also to representatives of the state. Prior to these 
encounters, the professional qualifications of the military authorities over their 
civilian counterparts might have been sufficient to allay any challenge of the 
rights and wrongs of any internal queries. However, there was now a 
questioning of what had been considered fundamental parameters in which the 
military had previously operated.  
The contents of the representative side paper also provide a rare insight 
into the mind of military subordinates and their perspective in relation to 
superiors. Although provided for the purpose of arguing against the wearing of 
uniforms during representative business, they shed light on the special 
relationship between subordinate and superior. In the section of their position 
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paper entitled, Effect of the uniformed revolving door role, the representative 
side argued: 
The military chain of command quite rightly dictates the manner in which 
we speak and respond to our superior officers…The representative forum 
must be divorced from all other military roles and relationships and clearly 
defined as something outside of the military chain of command. 
246
 
 In the subsequent minute of the meeting in which this paper was 
presented it was noted that the representative side stated that the division of 
roles were acknowledged by the Tánaiste and Minister for defence on 6 July 
1990.
247
 The debate on rank and uniform was to be a continuing source of 
disagreement for the duration of the talks and it escalated as a result of another 
issue relating to the posting of information bulletins in army barracks by the 
representative side. Despite the lack of agreement on issue of rank and 
uniform there were many other items that had to be addressed in order to set 
up the structures, practices and regulations that would constitute the means by 
which the associations and the Department of Defence would engage with 
each other. Defence officials suggested that non-contentious issues be dealt 
with in parallel with the main issue to be resolved so that they could be 
disposed of quickly to make ‗tangible progress‘.248 Other items that emerged 
for inclusion in subsequent talks included the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Scheme which was to be the dedicated industrial relations machinery that 
would deal with formal claims in relation to pay and conditions of service. It 
was felt that the discussion on this scheme would be best held off until all the 
regulatory matters under other headings had been resolved.  
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During this period it was still the case that the representative associations 
had not yet been officially set up. Regulations had not yet been amended and 
therefore it was still an offence for enlisted personnel to speak to the media. 
The Departmental side at the meeting of 24
 
July appeared to give permission 
for the representative side to make public comment on the findings of the 
report of the Gleeson Commission, stating that it was expected that ‗informed 
media comment‘ would be made. The rather testy response of the 
representative side was that they ‗reserved the right to respond to media 
enquiries without prejudice to the ongoing discussions‘.249 In a legal sense, the 
public statements being made by the secretary/pro could have again resulted in 
military charges being preferred. That this did not happen at this point 
displayed a new environment of co-operation if not understanding between the 
two sides. It also inferred an independent association was already operative. 
Having considered the papers submitted by both sides in relation to the 
rank and uniform issue, the parties met again on 27 July 1990 to discuss them. 
The Departmental side comprising as usual of, military and Department of 
Defence officials stated that given the fact that the system was not yet up and 
running, and that it was to be a completely new environment, they felt it was 
‗not valid in the absence of actual experience to predict the interface between 
commanding officers and elected representatives would be made difficult by 
the wearing of uniform and the use of rank‘. The views of the representative 
side were reiterated and they gave the example of discussions on ‗matters 
dealing with family issues, on which they represented their members, were not 
military in nature and could not be dealt with on that basis, i.e. as subordinates 
to superiors‘. The Departmental side, in their response, also acknowledged 
that a ‗process of education would be required on all sides in order to fulfil the 
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new role‘.250 At the next meeting the issue arose again and on this occasion the 
representative side summarised their reservations thus: 
1. Wearing of uniform inhibits proper responses. 
2. Wearing of uniform sets up certain behaviour patterns. 
3. Wearing of uniform enshrines the superior/subordinate role. 
4. Wearing of uniform is inappropriate where the relationship may 
involve heated debate. 
5. Removal of uniform and the dropping of rank would encapsulate the 
representative function and set it apart. 
6. Removal of uniform and dropping of rank in the representative role 
would maintain the command and control relationship in the military 
role  
7. Removal of uniform and the dropping of rank are necessary for the 
full discharge of the new representative role by the representative 
side. 
8. There are precedents in many other countries which can be drawn on 
to illustrate arguments made.
251
  
 
Following the presentation of the summarised version of their views the 
representative side, who had refused to discuss any other matters until the 
issue of rank and uniform was resolved, agreed to consult with their national 
executive to enquire as to whether they may be mandated to discuss other 
issues.  
Apart from the views expressed by the military authorities in relation to 
the rank and uniform issue at meetings, they eventually made a robust written 
                                                 
250
DOD P244 part 1, minutes of 6
th
 working meeting between Departmental and 
representative sides 27 July 1990. 
251
 DOD P244 part 1, minutes of 7
th
 working meeting between Departmental and 
representative sides 31 July 1990. 
 
149 
 
response to the representative side paper, taking paragraph by paragraph the 
points made and commenting on them to reach a conclusion that regarding the 
chapter entitled ‗Representation as a military issue‘, there was falsehood, 
fabrication, undue influence by personal notions, failure to distinguish a full 
time liability to military law from ones personal life and incorrect 
interpretation of the scope of representation under the Defence Acts. The 
response to the second part of the representative paper entitled, ‗Effect of the 
uniformed revolving door role‘, made the point that all ranks were part of the 
chain of command, that existing courtesy between ranks was being ignored, 
that the permanency of rank was misunderstood and that it was a contradiction 
to suggest that issues within the scope of representation were non-military and 
at the same time wish to raise matters with military superiors. On the chapter 
entitled ‗Psychological disadvantage‘ it was stated that it was absurd to 
assume that the mere wearing of uniform would reverse the quality of good 
relationships. It contended that this chapter was aggressive and confrontational 
and illustrated an antipathy towards authority rather than a quibble over the 
outward display of rank and uniforms. The general conclusion that was 
reached in this response to the representative side paper was stated as: 
Even with the making of allowance for such inaccurate expression and 
partisan views, the proposal in relation to rank and uniform is far from 
convincing and no apparent justification exists for such far reaching 
departure from the norms of military life. 
252
  
In his examination of the military establishment as a social system, 
Janowitz reflects on the wholeness of the job and the assimilation necessary 
for one to be absorbed into the military system. In other works he had 
suggested the military is among a few groups that place so much emphasis on 
it: 
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Assimilation involves the ongoing process of recruitment, selection, 
training and career development. Not only must the new recruit, officer, 
enlisted man learn a complex set of technical skills, he is also expected to 
master an elaborate code of professional behaviour and etiquette, since 
membership in the military means participation in an organisational 
community which regulates behaviour both on and off the ‗job‘. 253 
This view would be consistent with the expressed position of the military 
authorities in Ireland at the time. Not only are there certain patterns of 
behaviour expected in the military but it would appear that these were also 
expected ‗off the job‘, in this respect the PDFORRA position was at variance 
with what was considered normal by those inside the command structure of 
the army, but also by a noted sociologist too. The representative side and the 
official side nonetheless both held very strong views and continued to address 
this as an issue of extreme importance. 
At the seventh and eight meetings between the Departmental side and 
the representative sides, held on 31 July 1990 and 7 August 1990 respectively, 
the only items on the agenda apart from minutes and ‗Any Other Business‘ 
(AOB), was the question of rank and uniform in the representative role. In an 
effort to deal with the stalemate, it was suggested at the eight meeting by the 
representative side, that they could meet in the current forum with the General 
Staff to discuss the question of rank and uniform without the presence of the 
civilian side of the Department of Defence. They felt that the military 
representatives present in the talks did not have the required negotiating 
flexibility on the matter. The Departmental side suggested consideration be 
also given to the idea of meeting with the General Staff in McKee barracks, in 
uniform. Both parties agreed to consider the two suggestions. With this 
temporary deferring of the rank and uniform issue, it was agreed that the 
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matter of establishing a definitive list for inclusion in the ‗scope of 
representation‘ could be advanced. 254 
 At the next meeting the representative side requested permission for the 
use of notice boards in military installations to convey information to their 
members. The Departmental side agreed to consider this matter. The meeting 
turned to the items for inclusion in the scope of representation. Under the 
Defence Amendment Act the representative bodies were being established for 
the purpose of making representations on behalf of their members on matters 
that came within the ‗scope of representation‘. The detail of which was not 
specified in the legislation. The idea had been that the scope of matters that 
came within the remit of the associations to discuss would be laid down in 
regulations having regard to the main provisions of the Act. The representative 
side put forward the following twenty two headings that they wanted included:  
1. The scope of representation and its concept. Independence from 
the chain of command. The manner in which members overseas 
would be represented. 
2. Access to the media. 
3. Posting of materials on notice boards. 
4. The principles governing conduct of association affairs within 
military installations.  
5. Release/secondment of personnel. 
6. Claims regarding pay, allowances, and other emoluments in 
cash or in kind.  
7. The principles governing hours of duty. 
8. The principles governing the allocation and standards of 
accommodation officially provided. 
9. Pensions/superannuation. 
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10. The principles governing the granting of annual, special and 
sick leave, including uncertified sick leave. 
11. The principles governing recruitment and training. 
12. The principles governing promotions. 
13. The principles governing discipline. 
14. The principles governing transfers and postings. 
15. Finance and financial independence. 
16. Welfare of association members and dependents including 
medical benefit schemes, assistance funds, recreational facilities, 
education, civilian employment adjustment courses, dependents 
assistance, credit unions and contact with other welfare bodies 
including those of the military authorities.  
17. Conditions in the workplace including occupational safety.  
18. Conciliation and arbitration system. 
19. Suggestions of general application promoting the efficiency of 
the Defence Forces. 
20. The making of regulations and the implementation of reports 
that impact on members. 
21. Affiliation to external bodies. 
22. A provision to give consideration to as of yet unspecified 
matters which may arise in light of experience as a consequence of 
the evolution of representation or the non-acceptance of the concept 
of representation through word or deed by any of the participating 
partners. 
255
  
It emerged at the tenth meeting of the sides that out of the twenty two 
headings submitted by the representative side, the Departmental side had no 
difficulty with half of them, items 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 21, 
however there were reservations about the rest. The expression of these 
reservations and objections again throw light on the perceptions of both sides 
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on the operation of the relationship between the civil authority and the 
military. They asked for further elaboration on the headings dealing with hours 
of duty, and on principles governing discipline, promotions, recruitment and 
training. With regard to accommodation the Departmental side agreed in 
principle about standards but not allocation. They contended that the 
principles governing discipline were excluded by Section 2 of the Act.  The 
minutes of the meeting stated: 
In general the authorities were prepared to discuss a wide range of items 
through representation but would not countenance an association‘s resort 
to the media to publicise matters which were intimately concerned with 
army command, discipline etc. 
256
 
Defining the scope of representation was an extremely important 
exercise for all parties to the discussions. From the civil-authority point of 
view the government responsibility for the raising and commanding of an 
army could not be diminished in any way. They were also acutely aware of the 
power of the media in influencing public opinion which they had already seen 
utilised as pressure brought to bear on politicians. From the military authority 
point of view the exercise of command and discipline went to the heart of the 
operational efficiency of the army as a military force. Any interference in this 
area would be seen as dangerous in light of the role of the military in any state, 
being as they are the last line of defence in the protection of the country and its 
citizens. How or if these matters were to be discussed or excluded were very 
relevant.  From the perspective of the representatives, the application or the 
effect of some of these issues went beyond the mere right of the government 
or the army to do as they must do. They made clear that they agreed with the 
need for discipline and the exercise of command and that full unambiguous 
power was legitimate but where such decisions in these contexts impacted on 
their members, they felt the necessity to be able to represent their interests. In 
realistic terms, the representatives saw no role in the command decisions that 
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would for example, decide to deploy troops on an operation in Ireland or 
overseas, however they held it quite legitimate to negotiate and have input 
regarding the effect of such deployments or operations. So if the army decided 
to plan and undertake an operation that resulted in soldiers needing special 
medical attention, special allowances or arrangements for family contact, the 
representative body should be entitled, they felt, to negotiate on such matters.  
In a discussion about the implementation of the Gleeson report it was 
agreed by the Department that all matters that came within the scope of 
representation would be the subject of consultation before any 
implementation. In effect it was at this point that the elected representatives 
acquired the right to be consulted, as a matter of course, and have an input into 
matters that would have an impact on their members. In many respects 
elements of responsibility to soldiers that had previously been within the remit 
of the officer body were removed and passed on to the new group. In a purely 
industrial relations sense it was a significant advance in that the ‗right‘ of 
consultation about certain matters had now been agreed. There was however a 
little caveat that the Department still maintained the right to elicit views from 
within the military chain of command. there position was recorded in the 
minutes: 
The Departmental side stated that it was intention that the elected 
representatives would be consulted on matters which would fall within the 
scope of representation but that, in relation to the Gleeson Commission 
Report, and indeed any other matters affecting the management and 
control of the Defence Forces, there will continue to be the normal 
eliciting of views and examination of proposals etc., within the command 
structure.
257
 
 In September 1990 another important concession was wrought by the 
elected representatives from the official side. They had previously requested 
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access to notice boards in military installations. It was agreed that notices, 
addressing the following matters, could be posted up by representatives:  
Times and dates of committee meetings, details of fundraising events, 
results of fundraising draws.
258
  
Though these headings seemed quite restrictive, the first notice presented to 
the military was a four page information sheet that covered numerous issues 
beyond what was agreed at the meeting. In a circular out to the commands it 
was stated that the Chief of Staff had agreed to the posting of a PDFORRA 
information sheet on all barracks notice boards. Petty Officer Jim Halligan 
who had been passionately involved in seeking recognition for PDFORRA had 
vivid recollections of seeing the notices up for the first time: 
I remember seeing our PDFORRA information sheet on the notice board 
at the Naval Base as if it was yesterday. Our logo and our name not just 
posted up but referred to properly in the accompanying instruction. It was 
a great day for all the efforts made by all the people who had had to hide 
the name PDFORRA and their involvement in it for so long. Despite the 
content of the sheet which was important in itself, for me the posting of it 
on the official Naval Base notice board symbolised legitimacy of our 
organisation and a visible manifestation of it at long last. 
259
 
The circular stated ‗This information sheet is somewhat lengthy but 
permission for its display is being granted as it contains important details on 
the progress of negotiations. Any future information will be shorter‘.260  The 
undated information sheet comprised of four pages and although unsigned it 
was presented on PDFORRA headed paper.
261
  It had numerous paragraphs 
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dealing with matters of importance to the organisation. Committees around the 
country were to be tasked with studying the report of the Gleeson Commission 
so when the time came to negotiate its provisions, there would be a considered 
position from which to start. It referred to the ongoing negotiations to create 
new DFRs for the operation of the association on a statutory footing and 
described them as ‗painstakingly slow‘. It listed some of the topics then under 
discussion and progress where it had been made. There was confirmation that 
the association was to retain its name and that district committees had been 
allocated an hour per fortnight during working hours in which they could meet 
in barracks. In an interesting paragraph entitled ‗Euromil‘, it referred to 
political developments throughout Europe that had far reaching implications 
for the welfare of European soldiers. Reports from East Germany suggested 
that as many as 40,000 soldiers were to be discharged and they were not sure 
if any welfare payments or assistance would be paid to them. The final 
paragraph contained the news that the practice of soldiers who were being 
deployed overseas paying for their kit bags was to discontinue.  
The information sheet was an important document in that PDFORRA 
was being permitted to transmit information through the official channels of 
the army. That this was being done prior to the implementation of new 
regulations was significant and on the face of it showed goodwill. The matters 
that were outlined were of particular interest to enlisted personnel and 
indicated progress in the lengthy timeframe it was taking to draft the 
regulations. The mention of Euromil was also significant and two members of 
PDFORRA went on to attend a Euromil meeting in Leipzig, East Germany on 
3 and 4 October 1990 the day of East and West German re-unification. Despite 
these seemingly positive developments the issue of notice boards was set to 
become a main point of contention, not just between the army and the 
association, but also between the military and the civil authorities. Difficulties 
arose when military commanders insisted that the local notices were to be 
signed, but with the rank of the representatives to be included. A request for an 
urgent meeting was sent to the Minister for Defence and An Tánaiste Mr Brian 
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Lenihan by Richard Condron which he signed as a member of the national 
executive of PDFORRA. 
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When a delegation from PDFORRA met with the Minister less than a 
week later they brought up the issue of notice boards and the problems they 
were experiencing because of the rank and uniform issue. In a memorandum 
that was circulated on 10 October the Minister‘s private secretary advised the 
following: 
Following his discussion of the matter with representatives of NCO‘s and 
privates and having considered the views expressed by the Chief of Staff, 
An Tánaiste has concluded that pending resolution of the question of the 
use of rank and the wearing of uniforms by personnel engaged in 
representative business he will not object to the posting of newsletters 
containing references to elected representatives without use of their ranks 
on official notice boards. This interim arrangement is without prejudice to 
the decision to be taken in due course on the ranks and uniform question. 
263
        
The Minister had an understanding of the views of the Chief of Staff at this 
point, the memorandum acknowledges this. In what could be regarded as an 
internal military issue, the Minister had sided with the representative 
association. Given that the interpretation of the professional corporate wisdom 
usually rests with the officer corps, by any standards, this was a significant 
decision. On the lowest level it meant that decisions arrived at by commanding 
officers in not allowing the notices be displayed would be reversed. Whatever 
impact this would have on the exercise of command and discipline would not 
become immediately apparent. The impact however on the authority or 
influence of the new association was significant. Because this issue had been 
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one deemed to be of crucial importance by the military authorities, it was they 
who reacted most strongly to the Minister‘s decision. Unknown to the 
representative association the Chief of Staff and the General Staff had 
indicated to the Minister that the very future of the Defence Forces was at 
stake. They reiterated their arguments regarding the essential link between the 
use of ranks and the wearing of uniform being inextricably linked to the 
exercise of command and discipline. They had advanced many arguments, 
ranging from public order to political and subversive infiltration possibilities, 
in the earlier requests for the associations to conduct meetings outside of 
barracks. Now they turned to the internal detrimental impact that notices, not 
carrying the rank of their authors, would have. Deterioration in morale, 
discipline, and the security of the state were all advanced as consequences if 
the Minister instructed the military authorities to allow the notices, despite 
their trenchant opposition to them. It was suggested in one communication 
with the Minister that such an initiative was illegal.
264
   
Members of the representative body PDFORRA were impressed from 
their point of view they felt that Brian Lenihan was of sufficient stature to 
‗take on‘ the generals:  
Mr Michael Noonan TD was seen by most people in the forces as being 
incompetent in the discharge of his responsibilities. I believe without 
exception every member serving in the Defence Forces at the time 
welcomed the idea of Brian Lenihan becoming Minister for Defence. 
Some even thought it raised the profile of the Department of Defence 
which was seen up to then as being perceived as a back water position. 
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For the army however, the decision by the Minister to allow the dropping of 
the ranks, even on a temporary basis, was catastrophic. The fundamental 
operation of command and discipline was linked to rank and uniform. External 
                                                 
264
 DOD P244 part 2, Letter dated 17 October 1990 to An Tánaiste from Chief of Staff. 
265
 James Martin interview, February 2007, Dublin.    
159 
 
tools such as rank markings define the authority and status of the superior.  
Janowitz argues: 
The military exhibits extreme status sensitivity....It is not surprising that 
the military establishment has evolved an elaborate basis for according its 
limited supply of status and prestige to its own members. Most pervasive 
is the criterion which is applied universally through the services, the 
distinction between the officers and the enlisted men. 
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 Within the hierarchal confines of the army nobody could have ignored 
the wishes and orders of the General Staff. Authority was singular in its 
direction from top to bottom; in this new situation enlisted personnel had not 
only bypassed the command structure but had been backed by the only 
external authority that could overrule the Chief of Staff. Had this been on a 
minor issue perhaps the military authorities could have accepted it more 
easily. Because the issue was deemed to be fundamental to the exercise of 
control of the army itself, letters were sent first pleading and then in the 
strongest possible language. It is ironic that in 2010 nobody interviewed in the 
Department of Defence can remember the last time that rank and uniform was 
an issue. The best guess was from the Secretary General Michael Howard who 
thought it had been fifteen or sixteen years since he had heard it mentioned:    
I remember that being an extremely controversial issue. The fact is that the 
culture in the Defence Forces seemed to have been much more flexible 
and adaptable than what people had expected it could be. 
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What had arisen was a situation where the views of the ultimate 
authority of the Defence Forces in command of the Irish Army, Navy and Air 
Corps, in relation to rank and uniform, were now at variance with those of the 
Minister for Defence, a respected and powerful member of government. In 
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addition the Minister was issuing instructions to the army which they clearly 
felt was not in the best interests of the army or the state. It was also the case 
that the military authorities would have felt that this area was clearly one in 
which they had professional experience and that their views were paramount 
in this regard. They were, after all, the military experts.  The divergence in 
views about the matter was indicative of the different perspectives of the 
parties involved. The PDFORRA representative side perceived their work as 
falling into the category of industrial relations, they held a simplistic view that 
as soldiers they were military personnel but areas and activities that were not 
operational were open for negotiation and debate. The military authorities on 
the other hand saw all activities of all military personnel at all times being 
‗military‘ and subject to the regulations, tradition and practice of the Defence 
Forces. The government, it would appear, saw both sides at once:  
There had always been and there still is a great respect in government for 
the army. It is widely recognised that they play an essential role. At that 
time the government was really geared towards providing solutions and 
advancing matters.
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Despite the respect the government had for the army and its hierarchy, 
the rank and uniform issue and in particular, the notice boards that were to 
contain their names or ranks, resulted in the government acting against the 
wishes of the military authority of the day. A letter from the office of the Chief 
of Staff to the Tánaiste dated 17 October outlined the Chief‘s grave 
reservations regarding the posting of newsletters without the use of rank by 
members of the PDF. It went so far as to suggest that:  
The surrender to PDFORRA on every major issue to date has 
progressively undermined the status, function and delegated 
responsibilities of the General Staff and of the prescribed functions of 
GOCs and Unit Commanders. The future well being of the Defence Forces 
is at stake. The question of the use of ranks and uniform is a basic issue on 
                                                 
268
 Dr Brian Hillery interview, April 2010, Dublin.   
161 
 
which the military feel obliged to take a firm position. The notice board 
decision is seen as a serious erosion of the authority of military 
commanders at all levels. It is my view as Chief of Staff, fully supported 
by the General Staff that any matter which adversely impinges directly or 
indirectly on the prescribed and exclusive military responsibility and 
prerogative of the exercise of command and discipline of troops is not only 
inimical to the exercise of that command but is also in essence, illegal.  
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This letter from the senior military figure of the state to the second most 
senior figure of government in the country clearly outlines the extent to which 
the military authorities viewed the various agreed provisions being made to 
the associations by the Department of Defence and the Minister. In addition to 
them being deemed detrimental to the command system, they were also 
deemed by the military to be illegal. The question arises here as to whether the 
Chief and his staff felt that the security of the state was at risk, and if so what 
they were prepared to do about it. It is difficult to find an example of such a 
strained relationship between the offices of the Chief of Staff and the office of 
the Minister of Defence since the antagonism between General Mulcahy and 
the government of 1924. The General Staff at that time acted in what he 
believed was the best interest of the state and the army and were politically 
isolated and forced into retirement for their stand. Mulcahy resigned as a 
result, however there was little comparison between the two periods and what 
prompted the incidents. In one instance the posting of notices and in the other, 
the interception of armed men planning a mutiny. There were no resignations 
by anybody in 1990 but nevertheless civil-military relations were in going 
through a difficult time.  
The formalities and otherwise that had existed up to then, the systems 
of contact, the assumption of professional competence in each of the military 
and civil side in their dealings with each other were now being called into 
question. It is at this interface between the civil authority of the country and 
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the military that civil-military relations are determined and operated. Like any 
two groups that operate in a system of clientship or management together there 
are assumptions made about each one‘s competency and legitimacy. When 
these are clear and accepted both can get on with the job of fulfilling their 
respective roles. If two groups have a system of interaction, if they have a 
clear sense of the others role and a knowledge of the others right to be there, 
work can be done.  
Applied to the system in Ireland, it had long been established that the 
military were subject to the control of the civil authority. The Department of 
Defence was the government agency to whom the military body reported. The 
government and the Department were and are the senior partners in the 
relationship between the two. Where both interface there was an assumption of 
professional competence. The Department was responsible to the Minister and 
the government for the running of the defence budget, the creation of 
regulations, the organisation of staff and procurement of equipment. The 
military on the other hand would have been adjudged to have competence in 
the area of security risks and requirements, manning levels applicable, military 
equipment needs and operations. They would have been deemed to have 
exclusive competence in such areas. In the normal course of events the civil 
servants of the Department of Defence would not have served in the military 
themselves. There was no such requirement. The matters of allocation of 
government budgets, administration of pay and pensions do not in themselves 
require military knowledge, and therefore it would be unlikely that they could 
question the competence of military officers when being told what was 
required or acceptable in military operational matters.  
The internal area of professional normalities portrayed by the military 
to the civil Department had not ordinarily been called into question. Now with 
a representative grouping on the scene, some of the accepted practices and 
etiquette were being questioned. These working meetings now meant there 
was a third party in the room. Being a part of the discussions, the civilian side 
were now present to hear the challenges on what had been considered hitherto 
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as normal and acceptable. They would later be led into a situation where they 
had to either defend a position that they may not yet be familiar with or 
competent in, relying on the military officers competence to maintain a 
position. Prior to these meetings enlisted personnel had not interfaced 
officially with the Department. All matters dealing with pay and allowances 
were processed by the military authorities who did not deploy any enlisted 
personnel to deal with them. It was a new departure to have enlisted personnel 
deal directly with civilian public servants and to hear on some occasions a 
completely different perspective on matters relating to the army. The fact that 
they were also military personnel and that they had an entitlement to be there 
challenged the exclusivity of competence previously enjoyed by the officer 
corps alone. There were new ideas on what constituted priority. There were 
also new criticisms of some of the internal actions of the management in the 
PDF. Such matters would not have been previously conveyed by officers who 
were themselves responsible for the practices that were being objected to.  
Where this would really portray itself was in the discussions and 
argument that were not exclusively operational or military in nature. If the 
enlisted personnel were forwarding an argument that was non-military, in the 
sense that it dealt with an issue like pay or allowances or the impact of welfare 
schemes on their families, there was a view that they were in a better position 
to describe and explain the impact on their families than were the officer 
corps. This implied the enlisted personnel were more competent to deal with 
requests and demands arising from them. This did not detract from the very 
real duty of care felt by most military commanders to their subordinates. Even 
in purely military terms, where issues like rank and uniform arose, the 
Department and the Minister were now being exposed to an alternative 
perspective and whether they agreed with the sentiment or not, the right of the 
enlisted personnel to be there, conferred a right to be heard and considered. In 
the context then of the relationship between the military and the civil authority 
this meant major change. As a consequence, there evolved a situation where 
the supremacy of the military authorities in purely military matters had been 
diminished. This was because the Minister now became the final arbiter in 
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cases where the officers of the official side and the enlisted personnel could 
not agree. Although the notice board issue seems in retrospect to be a minor or 
even petty argument, the reality is that issues like competence, 
professionalism, supremacy of decision making and the nature and shape of 
civil-military relations were about to change.   
 It was against this background that the Chief of Staff and the General 
Staff felt obliged to adopt a firm position. In a broader question, if one 
genuinely felt that the interests of the state were at risk, was there a moral 
obligation to do as much as one could to prevent events or developments that 
would have worsened the situation? In the days prior to the calls for the right 
of association the General Staff had been frustrated by their inability to 
convince the Department of the need to improve pay. In some respects this 
was easier to swallow, after all, the Department, on behalf of the government 
would claim exclusive competency in the area of public finances and pay. The 
Chief‘s arguments at the time may have included purely military 
considerations such as morale but superior competence in the area of public 
finance would place the Department in the dominant positioning for that 
debate. Where the issue of the notice boards hurt most was that the 
Department were arbitrating in an area that the Chief believed was exclusively 
military, and so his position should have been the dominant one. But that was 
not how it was unfolding.  If the Chief and his Staff felt a wind of change 
insofar as up to this point in military terms, their wish was a command, they 
were correct. The absolutism of previous relations between subordinates and 
superiors was about to change. Janowitz suggests that changes in the style and 
type of military command can be altered in light of change, particularly 
technological change. Some of what he holds may have relevance in the new 
environment of there being representative bodies in the Defence Forces. He 
suggests that: 
Military authority must shift from reliance on practices based on 
domination to a wider utilisation of  manipulation. Traditional or 
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ascriptive authority relies heavily on domination, while manipulation is 
more appropriate for authority based on achievement.
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His description of dominant authority certainly fits into the model 
usually found in the army. In previous times the case of notice boards or any 
other issue on which a superior declared a position would be deemed to be an 
instruction, an order to follow. Now for the first time such instructions or 
stated desires were to be challenged by virtue of the presence of a new forum 
in which matters were to be debated and negotiated. In this sense the arrival of 
the representative associations may have altered the type of authority that had 
been utilised up to then. Unfortunately as can been seen in the military 
position, such changes were seen more as a diminution of authority rather than 
a change in type of authority. The difficulty with this view was that it was not 
in line with government or Departmental thinking. In the civilian side of the 
Department, the whole question of engaging with the associations appeared to 
be approached from an industrial relations perspective. In the initial 
approaches made by government to the representative associations, the 
emissary was Dr Brian Hillery, a Professor at University College Dublin, 
lecturing in the field of industrial relations. This gives some indication of how 
the government categorised the army.  The Chief was very clear in his letter 
that there was no place for comparison to An Gardaí or industrial relations 
type relationships in the military:  
There is a fundamental difference between the role, function, organisation 
and modus operandi of the Defence Forces and the Gardaí. Comparing the 
two forces in terms of the scope of representation or other aspects of 
association is invalid. The general application of trade union and industrial 
relations principles and practices to military representative associations is, 
in the military view, equally invalid. 
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These different perspectives caused difficulties. In a simplistic sense the 
‗official side‘ that would in the future negotiate with the associations was to 
comprise of members of the military branch and the civilian branch. If both 
these groups who were on the same side had different views about the 
fundamental nature of what they were supposed to be doing there it couldn‘t 
but lead to difficulties. One of the tenets of the successful negotiations is the 
requirement to have a unified party at the table. In the groundbreaking 
environment of creating a new system without any previous precedent and in 
regard to a field that was state sensitive, every inflection, tone and 
interpretation could be fraught with misunderstanding. To begin with, some of 
the relationships lacked the sort of trust that could only develop in the fullness 
of time. There were also suspicions about motive and intent. The very real 
fears that were prevalent about state security and the sense of deep frustration 
felt by what PDFORRA claimed was years of neglect all added to a variety of 
challenges that had to be surmounted before businesslike work could be 
effectively conducted at the negotiating table. The series of first discussions 
and the potency of arguments regarding issues like the notice boards reflected 
this mix. There was a real belief, outlined by the Chief of Staff that the very 
basis upon which military command operated was to be undermined. The fact 
that this did not transpire subsequently would have provided little comfort to a 
force in the 1980s that was contending with internal security threats from the 
subversive organisations north and south of the border with Northern Ireland. 
It would ordinarily be the case that the military maintained exclusive 
competence in assessing the military threat despite the fact that deployments 
were usually in response to requests for aid to the civil power. The military 
would have felt in the particular security environment of the time that there 
was a real security threat. If the army were to aid the civil power with their 
military expertise, with what Huntington describes as their application of 
violence it is understandable there would be fears regarding the undermining 
of the exercise of command and discipline in the force. It is very evident from 
the aforementioned letter that there was frustration among the military 
authorities who sincerely believed they were being undermined not just in the 
exercise of their roles but also in their wider responsibilities to the security of 
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the state. Having agreed to advance the items under discussion for future 
meetings, the issue of rank and uniform was set aside in order for other 
matters to be addressed.   
The first formal discussions had been set up to agree the new 
regulations that would effectively become the basis on which the associations 
would operate. These were to be denoted as Defence Force Regulation S6 or 
DFR S6. They would also provide the necessary restrictions required to 
maintain the security of the state, while at the same time allowing for the 
meaningful pursuit of claims by representatives. Given that the military 
authorities were opposed to the introduction of representative bodies in the 
first place perhaps it was inevitable that difficulties would emerge but as can 
be seen by the foregoing, many fundamental principles had to be discussed.  
Once the issue of rank and uniform had been temporarily set aside 
there was a resumption of looking at the operating parameters and agreeing 
regulations and arrangements. However during these discussions a number of 
issues emerged that the representative side had a keen interest in. Although the 
associations were not fully up and operating within the new regulations, these 
issues would be typical of the ones that would be dealt with under any new 
scheme. They included issues like the implementation of the Gleeson 
Commission report and the introduction a new Health and Safety at Work Act. 
The discussions forum on regulations provided an opportunity for the 
association to make representations on behalf of their members. And although 
the regulations were not yet signed and the new associations not yet legally 
established, the Department of Defence accepted the representative side 
tabling proposals on these matters. This did not mean that they conceded any 
points or automatically agreed with what was being said but the fact that they 
were prepared to consider them marked the beginning of a new relationship 
between members of the military and the operative organs of the state. Though 
it may not have been perceived in those terms at the time, the fact was that 
matters now arising that were of concern to ordinary soldiers could be raised 
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and dealt with by their representatives at the highest level of the civil 
authority.  
In a prime example, the Gleeson Commission Report had made certain 
recommendations on the payment of Security Duty Allowance (SDA).  Prior 
to the report SDA was paid for a listed number of duties performed by military 
personnel in a rostered arrangement. The type of activity and the duration of 
duties that attracted SDA varied greatly across the Defence Forces, however 
proposals had been made by the NCOs team that additional allowances for 
duties should be time based. They had pointed out anomalies whereby some 
duties only required the presence of an individual for a couple of hours and in 
such cases they received the same rate of SDA as a soldier who performed a 
twenty four hour guard duty. They proposed that payment be made based on 
time rather than military classification. The Gleeson report recommended this 
new system however there were a very small number of personnel who were 
then in receipt of the allowance that would now suffer a loss under the new 
arrangement. The representatives involved in the discussions raised this issue 
and pointed out that they should be consulted on how this recommendation 
was to be implemented; the immediate response of the Department was that 
this was a government directive and they were set to implement it. The 
representative side felt obliged to appeal to the Minister for Defence stating 
that people were about to lose money as a result of the implementation by the 
Department of the Gleeson report, of which the original intention was to 
improve pay not diminish it. When eventually the new rates were published 
the memorandum contained an important note:  
Following the introduction of the new system of SDA any serving non-
commissioned personnel who wish to continue to receive payment of SDA 
under the old system will be permitted to opt accordingly as a once off 
arrangement. The old rates will be frozen at their current level on a ‗mark 
time‘ basis by reference to the rates under the new scheme.272   
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This proved to be one of the first practical representations made by the 
association on behalf of its membership.  Although they would have seen this 
as a natural element of representing their members, the military authorities had 
very different views on the nature of what representation meant. Their 
interpretation of what the function of the association should be was connected 
to the statutory description of the association. The Adjutant General outlined 
the views of the military and provided a memo from the office of the Deputy 
Judge Advocate General (DJAG):  
....the reservations of the General Staff have, if anything deepened and 
further considerations relating to the authorisation of ‗other activities‘ of 
representative associations are contained in a memorandum prepared by 
the DJAG. The General Staff request that the attorney general be invited to 
review these considerations and to offer a formal opinion on the general 
advisability of including within a regulation, provisions dealing with 
‗other activities of an association‘ as proposed in the current draft of DFR 
S6. 
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In the memorandum attached to the letter the DJAG appears to suggest that the 
activities of the association be confined to the very narrow function of just 
making representations on behalf of its members:  
The statutory purpose of the association is that of representing members 
and not for the actual provision of services and benefits to the Defence 
Forces or a number of members thereof who may also be members of 
associations. The Minister‘s regulating power is limited to specifying the 
matters which are to be subject to representation and other matters which 
are ‗ancillary, subsidiary and connected‘ with the establishment of 
representative associations. …it appears therefore that it is not within the 
regulation making power of the Minister to expressly authorise activities 
                                                 
273
 Letter from Adjutant General  N. Bergin to Assistant Secretary Department of Defence 
Seán Brosnan, dated 19 December 1990 in DOD File P244 part 2, DFHQ Dublin. 
170 
 
on the part of the association which do not form part of the statutory 
purpose of such associations. 
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The contents appear to attempt to row back on the general intention of the 
activities of the association as understood by most people involved and despite 
the fact that by December of 1990 the two parties had been in discussion for 
over four and a half months in the course of which they had participated in 
twenty two formal meetings and numerous informal. This position of the 
General Staff indicated an interpretation that the representative body should be 
confined to articulating the views of their members in certain matters such as 
pay and remuneration. A legalistic argument was made that suggested that the 
Defence Act 1954 (the principal Act) already provided for the provision in 
DFR Q11 of schemes, the object of which were to ‗promote the moral, social 
and material welfare of NCOs and privates‘ …which in turn is inseparable 
from legal duties and obligations relating to the maintenance, command 
constitution and organisation of the Defence Forces. In tying these two 
functions together it could be argued that associations engaging in such 
schemes were engaging in activities which the 1990 Act prohibited. The point 
was made that: 
…it is hardly consistent on the one hand for the Minister to engage in six 
months of consultations regarding the precise functions and procedures of 
an association and then on the other hand to give ‗carte blanche‘ to the 
same association in respect of other activities which would not be the 
subject of supervision and safeguards otherwise required by the Minister 
for the good of the Defence Forces and the common good. 
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The response of the Department reflected the more general view that 
had prevailed around the table and in the public domain:  
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…If the difficulties now outlined as being in the way of participation by 
the associations in welfare activities are sustainable, those difficulties will, 
I consider, have to be overcome and the associations must be accorded a 
meaningful role; involvement in this area was seen as the acceptable face 
of association activities from an early stage – long before we came to 
terms with the substantial role which they are now being given. 
(Incidentally the draft regulation as presented to the elected representatives 
was, as I understand it, an agreed official draft). 
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This was another very firm example of a significant alteration in the 
conduct of civil-military relations. The military authority‘s reservations and 
their solid belief in the professional and legal folly of the emerging 
circumstances were not taken into account. The third party, in the form of the 
representative association, had in some respects diminished the position of the 
military in being the absolute authority on all military related matters. This 
most certainly represented a diminution of influence and a strengthening of the 
supremacy of the civil power in the relationship between the state and its 
army. Another debate that became a matter of contention had to do with the 
provision of permission to have association meetings outside of military 
establishments. In the course of members of the forces meeting to discuss the 
whole idea of representation in the summer of 1989 large meetings of many 
soldiers had taken place in several locations around the country. Once in a 
sports hall in Cork a journalist had made her way into the gathering to listen to 
what was being said but she was asked to leave. Despite the fact that the 
associations were now on the brink of coming into statutory existence, the 
military still had significant reservations regarding the gathering of soldiers 
outside of barracks. While there was no objection to meetings of elected 
representatives outside of barracks the Chief of Staff stated that the General 
Staff were totally opposed to meetings of the general membership. He outlined 
many possible negative consequences if they were permitted including, 
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agitation in concert with trade union groups or subversives, marches on the 
Dáil, infiltration by the media and the erosion of good order and discipline. 
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Again the civil authority did not concede to the recommendations of the 
military. In a note from the Minister to the Secretary of the Department and 
copied to the Chief of Staff it was made clear that the Minister had considered 
the matter but was not prepared to entirely restrict meetings in the fashion 
requested by the army. In a note to the Secretary of the Department, the 
Minister for Defence outlined his decision: 
Following consideration of the issues involved I have come to the 
conclusion that some arrangement should be worked out to permit 
meetings outside barracks by members of the association – over and above 
meetings of elected representatives as already agreed. I am aware of the 
potential problems which are visualised, but consider that it should be 
possible to provide for appropriate controls and safeguards.
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Proposals were presented to the representative side. An arrangement was 
agreed that enabled numerous meetings to take place but some of which were 
only with the consent of the Minister. The annual general meeting of the 
association takes place now every year and delegates numbering in excess of 
250 gather in civilian attire. These meetings since their inception, have been 
well organised and free from any of the scenarios presented by the Chief in 
1990. Despite the fact that the Chief‘s concerns seemed to have been about the 
possible consequences of outside meetings, the case made by the Deputy 
Adjutant General had been grounded more in the legal concept of command 
and control. He made the point that regardless of the sort of activities that the 
representative associations may eventually be engaged in, their statutory 
existence could not be considered in isolation: 
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When advancing reasons for restricting members of the representative 
associations from meeting as such outside military installations it must be 
borne in mind that while the Defence Act 1990 is the only act to provide 
for representation it cannot be separated from the other Defence Acts in 
terms of its interpretation… Any activity of the association must be 
viewed in light of the role of the Defence Forces in the security of the state 
and the necessity in the furtherance of that role for the maintenance and 
good order, discipline and morale in the Defence Forces.  
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The views expressed were similar to those that had arisen regarding the 
wearing of uniform, neither the legalistic or the purely militaristic arguments 
fully won the day and when the discussion forum eventually agreed on a 
schedule to enable certain types of meetings of the association to take place 
there were elements of it that contravened the advices of the military. But the 
association did not have it all its own way either. There was to be certain 
restriction for example on the numbers of general meetings of the membership 
in barracks.  
Before the last meeting of the negotiating groups had been held, the 
representative side team met with the Minister for Defence and the Chief of 
Staff. At Dáil Eireann on 24 April 1991, the Minister for Defence, the 
Secretary General of the Department and the Chief of Staff met with WO 
Michael Martin, CS Richard Dillon, CS Richard Condron and Sgt Harry 
Higgins. They were welcomed by the Minister who ‗expressed optimism for 
the future‘, the Chief of Staff used the opportunity to state that he was ‗very 
happy with the responsible attitude being adopted by PDFORRA and wished 
to thank them for the manner in which they were conducting their business‘.280 
Numerous issues were discussed, the first of which was a requested meeting 
between the Minister and the National Executive. It was agreed that it should 
take place when the regulation was being signed. A serious issue, regarding 
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the Defence Force Widows and Orphans Pension Scheme, was tabled by the 
representative side regarding their member‘s ability to opt into or out of the 
scheme which had become mandatory from 1985. The Minister thought that 
there may be a knock on effect to other parts of the public service if any 
amendments were made. There was a pressing concern of the representative 
side regarding the provision of deductions at source for soldiers who wished to 
pay their association dues directly from their pay. The Minister agreed to 
ensure the processing of this scheme within three or four weeks of the forms 
being submitted. This was a very working style meeting between the Minister 
and the representatives and it established a good rapport for future 
relationships. Meanwhile the business of finalising the broader negotiations 
continued. By late April of 1991 a formula had been almost agreed and was 
appended to the DFR S6. Meetings between committees of the associations 
were to be facilitated with suitable accommodation within barracks subject to 
the exigencies of the service. Meetings outside of barracks were also permitted 
but not in uniform. The general meeting of the membership in barracks though 
quite restrictive was also agreed. Most types of meetings were specified but 
there was a general clause that enabled the association, with the Minister‘s 
permission, to organise meetings not specified in the list below: 
a) An Annual delegate Conference  
b) A meeting of the national executive 
c) A meeting of command level committee 
d) A meeting of barracks level committee 
e) Meetings at barracks level involving not more than 50% of the 
personnel in the barracks or post, may be held with the permission of the 
officer commanding the barracks or post concerned provided that not 
more than 50% of any one unit are not in attendance. 
f)           Meetings other than those referred to at (a),(b), (c), (d) and (e) 
above shall not be held without the permission of the Minister having 
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first been obtained by the association – the arrangements in this regard to 
be agreed between the Minister and the Association. 
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From this set of discussions, structured arrangements were being put in 
place to enable the serving military personnel of the State to assemble and 
conduct the business of their associations. This development displayed a 
measure of trust extended by the civilian government to a section of the 
military despite the hierarchy having reservations. The finalising of the new 
regulation that would provide for the first representative bodies in the Irish 
armed forces was now virtually complete. The last matters to be negotiated 
and agreed for inclusion in the new statutory provisions were the agreed 
arrangements for funding, the deductions at source facility, the release on 
secondment of members of the national executive and a rewording of a 
provision to allow representative matters be raised by the association in 
respect of issues that might arise while personnel were serving overseas:   
Matters arising on overseas service which come within the areas specified 
in the second schedule to DFR S6 shall be dealt with a National Level. 
Assistance may also be given in the dissemination of information in 
regard to representative matters to troops serving overseas.
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The last meeting to conclude the first formal discussions took place on 2 
May 1991 almost a year after they had first begun. Nobody could have 
foreseen the complexity of discussions that were held, for what some 
perceived as a simple exercise, to authenticate an existing organisation and 
place it on a statutory footing. One huge effect of these discussions had been 
to raise many fundamental issues that went to the heart of military philosophy 
on service and duty. They questioned the extent to which rank and military 
service extended or intruded into the family and social life of soldiers. They 
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challenged the accepted concepts regarding the exercise of command and 
discipline. They revealed the extent to which the internal security of Ireland 
featured in the thinking of those who initially opposed the idea of 
representative associations for the armed forces. Seemingly intractable 
problems had been resolved between bitter opponents.  But like most 
negotiations there was a set of conclusions with no parties getting everything 
they wanted and all getting enough to proceed and endeavour to initiate a new 
way of conducting business for the betterment of everybody. At the thirty 
sixth meeting of the group held in DFHQ in Dublin on Thursday 2 May 1991, 
the representative side requested their closing statement be reflected in the 
minute:  
As discussion and negotiation on Defence Force Regulations S6 were now 
completed they wished to record their congratulations to all concerned on 
the Departmental side for the time and effort expended on the making of 
the regulations. 
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The Departmental side also expressed thanks to the representative side 
for their help and co-operation during the discussions. It was noted that the 
next task would be the drawing up of the Conciliation and Arbitration Scheme 
or the C&A scheme as it would become known.  
Conciliation and arbitration  
After agreement had been reached on the formulation of the regulations that 
would be take effect when the Defence Amendment Act 1990 was enacted, the 
first priority was to introduce a Conciliation and Arbitration Scheme similar to 
many that operated in the public service and for An Garda Síochána. ‗New 
arrangements‘ were also negotiated and agreed to provide practical direction 
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in the day to day operation of the schemes at both at the military levels and at 
national levels.  
Under the new agreed arrangements for PDFORRA, elected 
representatives from among the enlisted ranks, chosen by secret ballot would 
form committees at three levels of command, barracks level, brigade or 
command level and national or DFHQ level. These arrangements reflect the 
military chain of command and seek to highlight and resolve issues that come 
within the scope of representation at the lowest possible level. In negotiations 
that take place at these levels there is the option of referring unsatisfactory 
outcomes upwards to a higher authority. So far these arrangements are not too 
dissimilar to the purely military system in place previously. There was, and 
still is, an option whereby a soldier may bring any matter to the attention of 
any superior at any level of the Defence Forces provided that the addressee 
was preceded by all those in the various levels of command beneath. What is 
different in the agreed arrangements is that individuals do not make a case. 
PDFORRA pursues the principle of a case in a collective way.  This 
methodology provides recourse to the higher civil authority.  This is one of the 
ways in which the representative bodies give weight to the hierarchy of civil 
over military authority. Any issue begun at any level in the Defence Forces 
can now find itself the subject of consideration by the civil authority which 
may exercise its right to overrule a decision arrived at by the military 
authority. In addition there is a formal C&A scheme which in Ireland operates 
for the wider public service. This scheme is the negotiating forum where 
elected representative of the soldiers deal directly with the representatives of 
the various State departments but most importantly with the Department of 
Finance. The scheme has two features that would have been undesirable to the 
military authorities in the early 1990s. Firstly it takes place and has a higher 
status above that of the senior military authority level at Defence Force 
headquarters, secondly it is very much operated in the spirit of best ‗industrial 
relations‘ practice and procedure. Despite reservations that may have been 
there at the time of the scheme‘s inception, there is now no doubt, that the 
military authorities accept the manner of its operation.  
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Residual matters arising  
The emergence of the statutory representative association PDFORRA for the 
enlisted personnel came about as a result of a confluence of events, 
perspectives, actions and reactions of numerous interested parties that have 
been outlined in previous chapters. As was stated by Col. Brian O‘Keefe, prior 
to the introduction Defence Amendment Act 1990, officers had never 
particularly seen representation as a means of resolving the issues of pay and 
conditions in the Defence Forces.  RACO was a feature of the new legislation 
that wasn‘t sought but was brought formally into existence under the 
legislation. It is not to say that officers did not have grievances like the 
enlisted personnel but their perceived resolution of these issues were very 
different to those who felt representation was the solution. Apart from the 
paternal concern of officers for the welfare of their soldiers and the frustration 
they felt at their incapacity to do anything about it, they did have their own 
problems with pay and conditions of service. During the 1980s it was felt by 
many officers that their pay and allowances had fallen behind others sections 
of the public service.  When the initial announcement of ten and twelve and a 
half percent increases was made in December 1988 it was greeted with 
enthusiasm by officers. They believed that the special relationship of loyalty 
and service to the government had stood to them and been taken into 
consideration in the granting of this unique award. When it emerged that the 
increase was not specific to the army but was to be part of a general increase 
across the public service and paid to everybody, officers everywhere were not 
only very disappointed but they felt they had been let down. Colonel Brian 
O‘Keefe recalls: 
Officers felt absolute betrayal by the government, we were devastated. We 
had a tradition of complete and absolute loyalty, but loyalty is a two way 
street. We expected perhaps naively that they would look after us.
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The betrayal that officers felt was articulated in meetings held at 
command level during which the same GOCs that had advised of an 
impending ‗special pay award‘ now had to brief their officers that this was not 
the case. ‗The exchanges were forthright and robust. People were annoyed and 
angry. They made known their views to the GOC‘.285  
Coincidently while NASA were organising in Ireland a very similar 
situation arose in Spain in 1989 with spouses of soldiers there establishing a 
campaign to seek better conditions for their husbands in the military. The 
motivation of the Spanish women arose for different reasons, nevertheless the 
mode of their campaign and the eventual calls for the right of association bore 
direct similarities to what had happened in Ireland. As was the case in Ireland, 
Euromil were contacted and the Spanish women received assistance and 
advice that culminated in them persuading their husbands that the right of 
association had to be pursued. Representatives of PDFORRA, who had 
become  delegates to Euromil met the Spanish wives and soldiers at Euromil 
meetings across Europe and also visited Spain. They shared their recent 
experiences from Ireland with them and offered advice on how best to 
approach their campaign. Knowledge of the approach that had been taken by 
Irish women and soldiers influenced the approach that the Spanish took to 
their perceived problems. The original initiatives by Spanish personnel 
prompted by an internal grievance, led to the broadening of their efforts to 
address that grievance beyond the Spanish army and Spain. It was the negative 
response that brought the argument further afield and onto the international 
stage. The same could be said about Ireland and as former Company Sergeant 
Richard Condron, Commander Eoin McNamara and Lt General Gerry 
McMahon have all suggested, that had things been done better, had there been 
a more meaningful response to issues that were a source of grievance, maybe 
representation would not have evolved at all. 
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Conclusion  
The broader study of civil-military relations has concerned itself 
primarily with the special relationship that exists between the armed forces of 
a state and its civilian leadership. It is acknowledged by most that the 
relationship is a skewed one in the sense that every country assumes the need 
for the finality of the application of violence in its own defence or interests. 
The ultimate capacity of the army to deliver that force makes it theoretically 
capable of turning that violence on the government and becoming a threat to it 
and to the state it serves. In a sense it is probably understandable that an army 
or any identifiable element of it who challenges the government is in some 
way also a threat. Huntington, Finer and others speculate on the propensity, 
the motivation, the capacity and likelihood of military intervention in one 
armed force or another or in one type of a society or another.  
That the Irish government were subjected to a type of military 
intervention as currently defined is certain. It was preceded by normal civilian 
democratic intervention in the form of protests and lobbying of NASA. Their 
members were civilians their activities were legitimate and although novel, 
because they were representing complaints about an organisation usually 
closed to wider society, the activities in themselves and the strategies they 
employed were nothing new. To what extent NASA was a force in itself 
highlighting the inequities that impacted on army family life, or whether it was 
the catalyst that prompted the pursuit of the right of association or both, is an 
interesting aside. In any event they were a critical motivation for the soldiers 
themselves in mobilising them to take some form of action. But until soldiers 
did something themselves, military intervention could be said not to have 
taken place. Despite the existence and high profile of the activities of NASA, 
it was the first meeting of concerned soldiers to speak about what could be 
done that marked the beginning of military intervention in Ireland in 1988.  
Upstanding, reputable and loyal soldiers like Dick Dillon and Michael 
Murphy who first spoke about the need for a representative association were 
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never going to be a threat to the security of the State and neither of them 
would have abided or tolerated anybody or any actions that were. 
Nevertheless, the association that they helped to found was, for a long time, 
perceived as a threat, evidenced by the written views of the General Staff, 
revealed in this research.  
Huntington defined the constituent parts of national security and the role 
of civil-military relations as being the principal components of military 
security policy. It has been shown now that Ireland's civil-military relations 
underwent massive change as a result of the introduction of representative 
associations. Although excluded from the basic operational decision making 
regarding where and when the military should be deployed, claims in relation 
to pay and allowances do impact on what Huntington termed ‗the fundamental 
question of the proportion of state resources devoted to military needs‘.  In 
addition, the emergence of the associations raised concerns regarding internal 
security policy and in at least one instance the civil authority insisted on 
permission being given to the holding of meetings that the military authorities 
would have deemed a threat. His assertion that the status of an officer equates 
to a civilian profession such as surgeon is somewhat weakened by the 
exposition of the successful initiative taken by enlisted personnel in Ireland to 
address a matter that had clearly impacted on morale in the forces. Officers 
had tried and failed to address these issues and were led by enlisted personnel 
in this regard.     
The army hierarchy in Ireland found itself in a situation where many of 
its decisions would eventually become subject to the need for agreement or 
consultation largely as a result of their refusal to engage in any kind of a 
consultative level with their own soldiers even when there was a unique 
opportunity to do so when asked to establish representative structures. This 
does not detract from the fact that they endeavoured in vain to improve the pay 
and conditions of their subordinates at a time when it was perceived by 
Defence Force personnel and their families that their pay and conditions were 
deteriorating.   
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Civil-military relations in Ireland were in a state of erosion in the late 
1980s as evidenced by a number of factors outlined in this work; among them 
the frustration reportedly felt by the incumbent Chief of Staff who felt that no 
one was listening to him regarding problems in the Defence Forces; the view 
held by senior personnel in the Department of Defence that the Chief of Staff 
was encouraging soldiers to be incensed by their situation leading to political 
criticism and difficulties for the government; the dissatisfaction of the General 
Staff with the Minister for Defence and the suggestion by them that he was 
engaging in possible illegal initiatives regarding the introduction of elements 
of the representative structures and activities.  
To what extent any members of the Irish officer corps influenced any 
part of the intervention has yet to be revealed. No evidence has yet come to 
light. As has been shown, many officers agreed with the grievances articulated 
by NASA and were themselves frustrated by the perceived intransigence of 
the government to improve pay and conditions but the corporate officer body 
at no time intervened as a group to exert collective opinion or will upon the 
government. By Huntington‘s criteria their professionalism would have made 
it unlikely anyway. They participated gladly in the Gleeson Commission 
submission teams and represented, as best they could, the views of the corps in 
relation to pay and conditions and although the commission could be said to 
have been brought about by intervention, participation in it was strictly in 
compliance with military and government wishes. It seems from this that the 
enlisted personnel of Ireland were involved in a form of intervention that 
excluded the officer corps but contrary to Huntington‘s expectations they in 
fact led the officers in what became a very positive development for the 
overall welfare of the Irish Defence Forces. The developments that brought 
about change in civil-military relations in Ireland were led by enlisted 
personnel who have not generally been considered as having a role in this field 
of study.  
The regulation of the representative associations under the Irish Defence 
Amendment Act 1990 provides a formal means in which members of the 
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‗military‘ may interact with the government of the State at numerous levels. It 
is a means outside of the normal military ‗chain of command‘ that establishes 
a relationship on matters other than the application of state violence. Up to 
now the study of civil-military relations has regularly considered the crucial 
relationship between the civil authority and the military body in terms of the 
latter‘s capacity or propensity for armed intervention or the threat of it. In the 
traditional coup d‘état soldiers take up arms against a government whom they 
believe are acting against their interests or the interests of the state. In Ireland 
the military‘s professional ability to access and use arms never emerged as a 
consideration in the pursuit of the right to associate. As has been outlined it 
was always about what they considered to be a constitutional right. The fact 
that a constitutional case was initiated indicates that the ultimate weapon was 
the judicial process, not the use of weapons.   
It has also been shown that the political persuasion, democratic lobbying 
and electoral endeavours by NASA achieved much and prompted a swift 
response by a new government but in the case of representation only to the 
level of internal structures. These fell short of the demands of the soldiers who 
sought full independent representative associations. The imminent cancellation 
of what the government saw as ‗unregulated elections‘ of a large body of 
military personnel and the withdrawal of a constitutional High Court case 
against the State were the concessions won by the government on the night of 
the Ashling Hotel agreement. In return the soldiers got what they had been 
seeking all along.  
 The workings of the representative associations by their very nature 
defuse the propensity to intervene with force of arms. By way of traditional 
negotiation, matters, which could develop into justification for intervention in 
some countries, are aired and dealt with in a non-violent or threatening way. 
Even in situations where the officer body or enlisted ranks deem the actions of 
the government not to be in the interests of the State, there is a means to 
articulate those views and at least have them heard and perhaps acted upon.  
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The operation of formal representative bodies in Ireland underpin a 
relationship between the civil and the military which deliberately sets aside 
any propensity of violent intervention and one which confers a ‗civilian‘ or 
‗democratic‘ identity on the soldier. The ‗military‘ hitherto seen as a corporate 
entity has been recognised as having two dimensions, that of the soldier and 
that of the citizen.  The existence of these associations gives daily weight to 
the fact that the relationship between the civil and military authorities is also 
hierarchal with the civil authority being the final arbiter. In this sense, 
countries that fear what the organisation of soldiers could lead to should take 
note.  
The struggle to bring this state of affairs about included ‗intervention‘ by 
Irish military personnel.  Their very existence and operation separate and 
acknowledge a new perspective on civil-military relations. The military side of 
the equation can now be separated and seen to comprise of the usual military 
corporate identity plus the new social or industrial relations identity that was 
thought by many to be incompatible with the exercise of command and 
discipline. The representative body for officers, RACO and many individual 
officers including the Chief of Staff interviewed in Ireland in the course of this 
work indicate that the associations have improved the exercise of command 
and the general conditions in the service. The style of ‗democratic‘ 
intervention in Ireland such as the lobbying of politicians, the electioneering of 
the NASA group and the taking of the court case all demonstrate a type of 
‗intervention‘ that is primarily peaceful and within the bounds of the law. 
Even the instance when the association public relations officer breached 
military regulations by speaking to the media there was a constitutional doubt 
about whether such action breached the actual law of the land and the Irish 
High Court was willing to hear it.   
The needs of any modern army to manage complex organisational 
requirements such as procurement, technology, human resource management 
and the required application of violence has now been added to by the advent 
of associations whose presence alter the relationship between the corporate 
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affairs of the army and those of the civil authority. Decisions which had, in the 
past, been made solely by the army regarding the management of their 
personnel and their conditions of service, can now be subject to alteration or 
rejection by a government. One of the areas that seems to be somewhat 
neglected in the consideration of civil-military relations is the fact that soldiers 
do have an outside life beyond the realm of the army. The fact that in many 
countries they are now fully integrated with mainstream society with full 
access to the political machinery of a country has not been taken into 
consideration.  
There was clearly military intervention in politics in Ireland in the 1980s. 
It was not perpetrated by the military hierarchy however and this in itself is 
significant. The briefing by off duty personnel of opposition party spokesmen 
in Dáil Eireann itself testifies to that, however from the arguments that were 
seen to be advanced by representatives later that they would see such off duty 
intervention as part of their ‗non-military‘ existence. Perhaps it was 
‗civilianised‘ intervention rather than military. New perspectives on what 
constitutes military intervention are needed. The soldier cannot continue to be 
seen as a single faceted entity, a political eunuch. In the same way that the 
representative associations in the Irish armed forces have managed to separate 
the security issues from the non security issues, so too can military 
intervention in the traditional sense be separated from legitimate political 
activity. If a soldier exercises his or her right to vote they are already engaged 
in politics. Consideration should be extended to other non threatening forms of 
political engagement such as happened in Ireland. Certainly if the perspective 
of the General Staff in the 1980s were to be considered then there is no such 
thing as a civilian dimension to a soldier‘s life and therefore no legitimate 
entitlement to engage at any level of the political process other than by 
exercising their franchise to vote. Political intervention of enlisted personnel 
as seen in Ireland did not threaten civil-military relations. In some ways it 
became a safe staging area for traditional rivalries between the military 
hierarchy and the civil authority but both sides gained and lost some of the 
issues that emerged and their respective power or hold over the majority of 
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those serving was lessened. It changed the context of those relations but could 
not be said to have damaged them.  
Military intervention can often be precipitated by a perception of poor 
pay and conditions or circumstances in which soldiers feel aggrieved at the 
civil authority. In such circumstance representative associations certainly 
provide a mechanism for channelling those grievances into negotiation and 
while other reasons for intervention may not be prevented by their existence 
there is a least some circumstance where they can lessen the propensity for 
intervention and diffuse an emerging deterioration of security.  
As has been outlined there have been incidences of military intervention 
in Ireland at the time of the so called Curragh and 1924 mutinies. Neither of 
these events ranks with the emergence of representative associations with 
regard to the long term impact on the structural operation of civil-military 
relations in Ireland. In the case of the former there was an impediment created 
by the actions or inactions of the soldiers on a single albeit important military 
operation. In the second instance in 1924 there was an important long term 
effect that settled the hierarchy of the civil-military relationship but not as a 
result of the mutineers themselves, rather it was the voluntary extrication of 
Mulcahy rather than the intervention of disgruntled military personnel that 
settled the matter and preserved the integrity of the rest of the force. The 
emergence of the representative associations resulted in a fundamental change 
in the conduct of civil-military relations in Ireland. Among other results, new 
legislation was enacted, new formal institutions of negotiation were put in 
place, a new statutory presence was created in many arena of defence policy, 
the exercise of constitutional rights for military personnel were enabled and a 
powerful mechanism for the diffusion of conflict came into being.   
These events also gave substance to the European resolutions and beliefs 
that the soldier is a citizen in uniform and that in peacetime they should be 
afforded the same democratic rights that they are expected to defend in times 
of conflict. The European Organisation of Military Associations helped clarify 
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the aims of the Irish personnel involved in the 1980s and they too have gained 
from their exposure to the Irish case. The Irish influenced other struggles such 
as those described in Spain, emphasising that the pursuit of democratic rights 
in a peaceful way for a representative association, was the key to resolving 
their particular problems.   
What finally changed the governments mind and prompted then to come 
eventually to meet and speak to the ad hoc PDFORRA in March 1990 has not 
been conclusively established. The electoral activity of NASA certainly had a 
major influence in the introduction by the new government in mid 1989 of the 
Gleeson commission and an announcement regarding representative 
structures, but despite this, for eight months after the announcements there 
was no move either to speak with, or engage with the body calling itself 
PDFORRA, and in any event the Chief was instructed to propose his own. In 
terms of timing of the Ashling Hotel meeting, contact was made in the very 
narrow timeframe between the onset of the constitutional case that was then in 
the High Court, and the government timeline for the introduction of the new 
legislation. It is significant that in granting most of what the representatives 
had asked for, the only request from the government that night was that the 
association elections be abandoned and the court case be ‗discontinued‘.  
Ordinary soldiers during this period in Ireland sought to influence 
government policy. They succeeded but not under the threat of arms. They 
relied instead on democratic political persuasion. The combination the 
women‘s group and the very real mandate they achieved, the use of the open 
political system and the independent judicial system may be only be adjudged 
as military intervention because soldiers did it. This does not take account of 
the civilian dimension of the soldier. If that were recognised, the activities 
themselves could hardly be construed as either a threatening or damaging to 
society. The activities of members of the armed forces in Ireland during the 
struggle for and the emergence of representative bodies enhanced democracy 
rather than threatened it.     
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The foregoing examination and understanding of these events in Ireland 
provide us with new knowledge regarding a dimension of civil-military 
relations that had been hitherto unknown. It includes the significance of 
enlisted ranks in the balance of these relations and the role that can be played 
by representative associations in improving them thereby possibly deflecting 
less democratic actions by frustrated members of armed forces. The events as 
explained and explored can provide Finer‘s categorisation of the levels of 
intervention with a real example of influence and show at the same time, 
contrary to his view that the line between influence and blackmail may be 
further apart than he suggested. Finer‘s eternal questions on how soldiers are 
politicised have been answered in part by the analysis of the Irish events. At 
the same time, Gannon‘s perspective on the events in the context of the 
question of the readiness of the military leadership in Ireland to the emerging 
situation at the time seems now a very narrow element of the whole story.  
In considering the actions of soldiers in the British and Irish ‗mutinies‘ 
in 1914 and 1924 in the context of what PDFORRA did, it can be clearly seen 
that the methodology of the army wives and the founding members of 
PDFORRA were not only less threatening to the State, but achieved far more 
in terms of the interests of the soldiers themselves. Unlike the previous 
incidents where the intention of the State and the safety of its government 
were inhibited, Irish soldiers of the late 1980s, despite the conservative 
reservations of the officer body, proved themselves worthy of trust and co-
operation.   
Huntington‘s pre-occupation with the professionalism of the officer 
corps and his dismissal of enlisted ranks in the consideration of civil-military 
relations can be now seen as a serious omission in his work, characterised by 
the events and explanations of what happened in Ireland. NCOs whose 
professionalism he did not consider not just led events in Ireland but ensured 
also by their attitudes and ethos that the State would never be under threat 
either from force of arms or withdrawal of services. This marks a level of 
professionalism and loyalty to the State that is only superseded by the actuality 
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of NCOs providing leadership and innovation in proffering a solution to the 
problems of pay and allowances that the military authorities had been 
grappling with for many years without success. Indeed, the acquisition of the 
‗right of association‘ for officers in Ireland only came about as a result of 
NCOs and their wives taking on the institutions of the State in the most 
democratic way possible. The subordinates led the superiors and in this field at 
least, rank markings, contrived ‗tradition‘ and assumed professionalism by 
virtue of rank did not count for much. It was the courage, action, the risks, the 
organisational ability and the persuasiveness of enlisted personnel that resulted 
in great strides being made in Ireland for all military personnel in a way that 
was protective of democracy and the public safety it expects.  This new 
knowledge in the area of civil-military relations in Ireland may provide a 
framework from which to examine whether the consequent structures would 
be acceptable or would work for other armies in other countries.  
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Appendix 1  
Letter of proposal to form PDFORRA.
 
Source: PDFORRA Archive, Head Office Benburb St Dublin 
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Appendix 2 
Letter from Chief of Staff to all ranks. 
 
Source: PDFORRA Archive,  Head Office, Benburb St. Dublin  
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Appendix 3 
Advertisement for notification of elections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PDFORRA Archive,  Head Office, Benburb St. Dublin  
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Appendix 4 
 
PDFORRA‘s first press release. 
 
     
 
 
 
Source: PDFORRA Archive,  Head Office, Benburb St. Dublin  
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Appendix 5 
Letter from MEP Jensen regarding PDFORRA. 
 
Source: PDFORRA Archive,  Head Office, Benburb St. Dublin  
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Appendix 6 
List of demands Ashling Hotel agreement. 
 
Source: PDFORRA Archive,  Head Office, Benburb St. Dublin  
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Appendix 7 
Signed document of Ashling Hotel agreement. 
 
 
 
Source: PDFORRA Archive,  Head Office, Benburb St. Dublin  
197 
 
Appendix 8 
Cover letter for Chief of Staff structures.  
 
Source: PDFORRA Archive,  Head Office, Benburb St. Dublin  
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Appendix 9 
Comparative bar graph for soldiers and Gardaí gratuities.    
 
 
 
 
Source: Defence Forces Submission to Gleeson Commission. Dept. 
Defence Headquarters Newbridge Co. Kildare. Copy in possession of author.   
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Appendix 10 
Chronology of events 
February to July 1988  Formation of NASA 
October 1988   Eastern Command soldiers discuss representation 
December 1988  Inter-Departmental Committee report  
January to June 1989  Compilation of PDFORRA constitution in Eastern Command 
May 1989   First NASA press conference 
4 July 1989   First letters from soldiers seeking establishment of association 
28 July 1989  Government announce Commission and new consultation structures 
28 July 1989  Circulation of letter from Chief of Staff to all military personnel 
26 August 1989 Formation of national executive of ad hoc PDFORRA 
11 November 1989 Establishment of PDFORRA claiming constitutional legitimacy  
8 February 1990  First public interview by PDFORRA PRO from Denmark  
14 February 1990 Interim injunction granted in High Court to PDFORRA PRO 
14 March 1990 Interlocutory  injunction denied in High Court  
22 March 1990 Ashling Hotel negotiations and agreement 
May 1990  Passing of Defence Amendment Act 1990 
10 July 1990  First formal discussions to create agreed new regulations 
31 July 1990  Publication of Report of Gleeson Commission 
16 May 1991  Enactment of regulation DFR S6 creating statutory body PDFORRA 
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Appendix 11 
Summary of events 
In 1988 calls were made for the first time to provide a representative 
association for members of the armed forces in Ireland. The demands came 
from a group of women calling themselves the ‗National Army Spouses 
Association‘ (NASA) which was founded in July of that year and later framed 
a constitution that sought, among other things, to establish a representative 
body for serving members of the Permanent Defence Force (PDF).
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 The 
formation of the group, made up as the name suggests of spouses of soldiers, 
had come about as a result of frustration among enlisted personnel and their 
families regarding their perceived poor pay and conditions of service. The 
decision to ‗go public‘ with their problems was grounded in the fact that 
soldiers themselves had no means of publicly articulating their views and 
airing their problems. They were prohibited by military regulations from 
having any independent contact with the media.
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 As the women‘s public 
campaign intensified there were daily images and articles in newspapers and 
on television screens where their spokespersons highlighted a myriad of 
problems in the force. These included poor pay and bad living conditions, low 
morale, little promotional prospects, unfair treatment and a lack of family 
support services.  
At this stage a number of professional full time soldiers serving in the 
Eastern Command decided that they had to do something themselves. 
Although severely constrained by military law they nevertheless met in secret 
to discuss a way in which they could improve matters and came to the 
conclusion that a representative body would provide the best platform from 
                                                 
286
 Paragraph 2, The National Army Spouses Association constitution and rules adopted 24 
June 1989. 
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 Paragraph 27, Defence Force Regulation A7. 
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which to address their problems. They looked at police and prison officer 
representative associations and examined their constitutions and rules. The 
individuals also sought legal advice on the legality or otherwise of forming a 
representative body.  The soldiers compiled a draft constitution and rules 
document for a potential association and drafted a letter through the chain of 
command in proper military fashion to the Minister for Defence advising him 
of their intention to establish an association and seeking his permission. The 
organisation that they had intimated they intended to set up had been called 
the ‗Permanent Defence Forces Other Ranks Representative Association‘ 
(PDFORRA). The legal advice had indicated that despite military prohibitions 
on membership of secret organisations and political parties, under the Irish 
constitution all citizens had the right of association.
288
 Although this right 
could be regulated in the interest of public safety and security, there appeared 
to be no constitutional prohibition cited. To avoid accusations of a collective 
action or mutiny each letter from each soldier had been individually sent 
together with a copy of the draft rules. Although acknowledgments to the 
letters were received, there was no substantive written response from either the 
Minister for Defence or the military authorities.   
Media interest in the women‘s group and the plight of serving soldiers 
increased and the issues became a matter of political debate in Dáil Eireann. In 
the general election of 1989 a number of the women from NASA contested 
seats in three areas of the country where there were large concentrations of 
soldiers and their families. Although none were successful there was one 
sitting TD who lost his seat contributing to the situation in which a previous 
sitting government had lost its majority. When the new minority government 
was established a new Minister for Defence was appointed and a major 
initiative was announced that was claimed would solve the problems in the 
Defence Forces. Minister Brian Lenihan stated that for the first time an 
independent commission would be set up to examine all elements of pay and 
                                                 
288
 John Wolfe, former Squadron Quartermaster Sergeant, founding member PDFORRA, 
personal interview March 2010, Carlow.  
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conditions of service in the armed forces and make recommendations on 
which the government would act. He also said that he was instructing the 
Chief of Staff to investigate and make recommendations on the establishment 
of representative structures for members of the forces. These announcements 
were initially welcomed by the public and the women‘s group NASA. 
Significantly, the methodology for making recommendations regarding 
pay and conditions to the commission included the creation of three 
‗submission teams‘ drawn from privates, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) 
and officers. Both the non-commissioned and privates team made submissions 
to the commission seeking a representative association for enlisted personnel. 
Most of the members of these teams were also members of the group seeking 
recognition for PDFORRA. During the time these teams were conducting 
research for their submissions, they made contact with a European umbrella 
group known as the European Organisation of Military Associations 
(EUROMIL) and discovered the existence of numerous military associations 
in other countries. From the contact made with Euromil the teams became 
aware of European parliamentary and Council resolutions that sought to have 
member states afford their soldiers the right of association in peacetime. It was 
during these exchanges that arrangements were made by Euromil to invite 
members of PDFORRA to their next presidium meeting that was to be held in 
Ringköbing Denmark in February 1990.  
In response to the instructions of the Minister for the Defence the Chief 
of Staff went about creating proposals for representative structures for 
members of the Permanent Defence Force. Complaints were made by the non-
commissioned officer team that no consultation was taking place with any 
enlisted personnel despite the fact that the structures were intended for their 
use. It appeared that what the Chief envisaged was that there would be three 
groups drawn from the three rank strata of private, non-commissioned officer 
and commissioned officers. This structure and the organisation proposed by 
the enlisted personnel were very different. On one hand there was the Chief‘s 
internal structure where matters would be dealt with within the existing chain 
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of command and offices where necessary would be available in barracks. 
There was no provision for access to the media. The group known as 
PDFORRA and the privates and non-commissioned officers‘ teams on the 
other hand both sought an independent external organisation with full access 
to the media and independent means of finance.  
In November an announcement was made by press release by the 
soldiers who said they had established their own representative body under the 
Irish constitution. The press statement which was headed PDFORRA was 
unsigned being as it was in breach of military regulations.  
The Minister for Defence had already set about drafting legislation for 
the Dáil, a new Defence Amendment Act that would enable the new structures 
being recommended by the Chief to be accommodated in the Forces. He also 
announced that arrangements were being made to conduct elections in the 
Defence Forces in order to elect personnel for the Chief‘s structures. There 
was now a fear among the soldiers who had sought recognition of their own 
representative body that this legislation would introduce the Chief‘s structure 
which was held among them to be an ineffective internal model. Arguments 
for and against each structure went back and forth in Dáil Eireann where 
opposition parties had been briefed extensively by off duty soldiers. 
While in Denmark at the EUROMIL conference and fearing the 
imminent passing of legislation that would end their hopes of an independent 
association, the secretary/public relations officer of the fledgling PDFORRA 
gave a radio interview to an Irish national radio station which was in direct 
breach of military regulations. He argued that the constitution of Ireland 
protected his right of association and that military regulations inhibiting it 
were not constitutionally compliant. Intense media interest resulted in a press 
conference being held in Dublin airport where members of the media had been 
awaiting the arrival of the secretary and chairman of PDFORRA on 10 
February 1990. This was the first time that a serving member of the Irish 
Defence Forces had openly defied military regulations to speak out and 
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exercise the perceived ‗right of association‘ on national television and radio. It 
constituted a second very public defiance of regulations and there were to be 
consequences. On return to his unit the secretary was advised that he was to be 
charged under military law. In order to establish his ‗right of association‘, a 
judicial review was then sought by him in the high court in an attempt to 
prevent being charged. As a result a high court constitutional case was 
precipitated on whether the military regulations were inconsistent with the 
constitution by prohibiting a person of the Forces acting as a spokesperson for 
a legitimate group. There was a great deal of public reaction to the charges 
being preferred against the secretary. Newspapers called for justice and the 
right to free speech. Letters were sent to Irish European Parliamentarians 
questioning the intentions of the Irish government in relation to the treatment 
of the secretary. Other trade organisations, town councils and a broad selection 
of citizens objected to the army and government silencing a person who was 
claiming to be trying to exercise a constitutional right. The Minister continued 
to announce that elections would be held soon for the chief‘s structures. 
PDFORRA then placed a notice of elections for their own organisation in the 
national newspapers and claimed that no serving members would participate in 
the elections that the Minister was organising for the internal structures.
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This stand-off continued for a short period but before the conclusion of the 
court case the government decided to meet with PDFORRA representatives 
for the first time. Two TDs were dispatched from Dáil Eireann and after 
lengthy negotiations that continued into the night it was agreed that if the court 
case was discontinued the Chief of Staff‘s structure would be abandoned and 
the new legislation would be enacted which would then become the 
framework legislation to place PDFORRA on a legal statutory footing. A 
hastily compiled document setting out the major conditions of this agreement 
was drafted and signed by the PDFORRA representatives and the TDs. The 
events were treated as a big news story and it was hailed as a significant 
agreement. The legislation in the form of the Defence Amendment Act 1990 
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was passed. Discussions immediately began regarding arrangements for 
elections and following a year of negotiations, new regulations and 
arrangements were agreed that brought PDFORRA into existence as a 
statutory body. The new organisation was also provided with access and 
participation in a conciliation and arbitration scheme which was and is an 
integral part of Ireland's Industrial Relations machinery.   
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Appendix 12 
Extracts from representative side papers on the issues regarding rank and uniform. 
Source: Department of Defence, Dublin File DOD P244 part 1, appended to minutes 
of meeting between Departmental side and representative side 20 July 1990. 
Representation as a military issue 
The concept of total service is as misplaced in peacetime as it is necessary in 
times of conflict and emergency.…the reality today is that a soldier enjoys 
another alternative type of existence outside of, and independent to,  the 
military chain of command and the duties and life of that discipline. This 
alternative parallel type existence is what governs the quality of life itself: The 
practicing of individuality, the value of job satisfaction, the reassurance of 
emotional human relationships, the freedom of independent decision making , 
the joy of family life, the sorrow of bereavement, the security of employment 
and the need for personal development.  
These and many other aspects of our existence make up and govern the 
way we are. To suggest that these are military issues defies logic…It is 
recognised that that there are certain restrictions placed on the parallel 
existence…it is accepted by all soldiers that they may be required at any time 
to be plucked from their ‗other‘ existence to fulfil their function as a soldier 
and take up position in the disciplinary existence that is an essential part of the 
successful execution of the military mission. This transition can be effected 
with ease and speed as a result of sound training and the influence of the 
military ethos, the wearing of uniforms and the relationships between ranks 
greatly assists in this transition. The military chain of command by its very 
nature cannot possibly hope to deal with many of the issues that affect the 
soldiers ‗other‘ existence 
Discouraging of any social contact or relationships between them, the 
setting aside of any humanitarian qualities and the reliance on the influence of 
rank alone and not the professional ability or leadership suitability in order to 
exact the desired response from the subordinate. In the exercise of military 
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objectives this system of discipline works and is accepted in total as the proper 
manner in which any military force must operate in order to become effective, 
however to suggest the holding  of superior rank incorporates understanding of 
and ability in the issues that affect the soldiers‘ other life is an unfounded and 
excessive expectation of the individual concerned. 
Effect of the uniformed revolving door role 
The military chain of command quite rightly dictates the manner in which we 
speak and respond to our superior officers. The wearing of uniform is an 
integral part of that type of special relationship. In uniform the subordinate is 
indoctrinated into behaving in a certain fashion in the presence of his superiors 
which would be vastly different from any other behaviour that would be 
expected of him in any other walk of life. To expect the soldier not to be at a 
severe disadvantage in debating issues with a superior is to portray a deep 
misunderstanding of what military training achieves and what it means to the 
enlisted person. To insist that the enlisted person should discuss non-military 
issues in uniform is tantamount to downright intimidation. If these issues are 
raised in a fashion unbecoming of the military relationships but in the uniform 
of the military this will most certainly adversely affect the discipline of the 
relationships. This is inevitable because of the nature of the issues which will 
undoubtedly lead to heated debate. In uniform this sort of behaviour would be 
unthinkable. It is the undeniable instinct of a subordinate in uniform to refrain 
from questioning the decisions of a superior and indeed to do so would depart 
from the carefully cultivated relationships that exists between them.…The 
representative forum must be divorced from all other military roles and 
relationships and clearly defined as something outside of the military chain of 
command 
 
 
 
208 
 
Appendix 13 
 
Interview with former Sergeant Major 
Richard (Dick) Dillon, founding Chairman 
PDFORRA 12 March 2008  
Michael: Dick can you tell me, or can you recall your very first contact 
with anybody about  PDFORRA or the first time that it was raised in your 
head, did somebody come to you or did you talk to them or what is your 
earliest memory? 
Dick: I think it was when there was fundraising going on for the 
women of NASA and I was in the 79 pub in Ballyfermot and I was talking to a 
guy named Mick Murphy who you know got involved as well.  It was that 
night I was talking to Mick and I said look we are going to have do something 
ourselves besides the women because the women will only be able to say so 
much about the Defence Forces and we are the ones who have the information.  
That was the first time that the idea of representation came about in our heads. 
That was the very first time. 
Michael: So that was where it emerged that the women would only be 
able to go so far and that you would have to do something yourselves?   
Dick: Yeah, we would have to do it ourselves. 
Michael: What did you do after that, what did you decide to do? 
 
Dick: We asked a number of other fellows that we knew and most of 
them, all of them, would be very committed in the Defence Forces, all around 
the rank of sergeant or thereabouts and upwards. 
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Michael: What rank were you at that time? 
Dick: I was a sergeant at that time. 
Michael: And Mick Murphy? 
Dick: Mick Murphy was a sergeant as well at the time.  Most of the 
lads we contacted were sergeant rank or higher and eventually we got a group 
of about sixteen together and we started meeting in a pub in the Twelfth Lock 
in Lucan. 
Michael: Can you remember the reactions to the idea when it was put 
to people, this very new idea in the Defence Forces? 
Dick: I think the idea was accepted in the sense that myself and Mick 
had looked at the Garda Representative Association, how it worked and we 
had looked at the history of what they had been through.  We explained that to 
everybody that we would more or less get the same type of treatment.  We 
spoke about all the problems everybody was having and to be honest with you 
nobody really disagreed about all of the problems we were having. 
Michael: So do you think the problems that were there at the time 
helped people to accept it and understand it? 
Dick: Yeah, I think they knew at the time. After we had a good chat 
and we had meetings over a few weeks before people got committed.  We 
ended up with eleven coming regularly and it was from that group then.  We 
had people that came in and out, got a bit involved with it but they probably 
spoke to their families and their families didn‘t want them involved in it at the 
time.  I‘d say at that time it wouldn‘t be seen as a great idea in the military, to 
be looking to have some sort of, as everybody would see it, a trade union.  It 
was never going to have the powers, I think we knew from the very beginning 
that it was never going to have the powers that a trade union had.  We were 
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never going to get that.  I think that was society in general, we wouldn‘t have 
accepted it. 
Michael: Is that why it was never looked for? 
Dick: I think the majority feeling within the group was and anybody 
that we spoke to that had trade union experience said the same, they felt they 
were not going to accept us as a trade union – you are not going to go down 
that road so that‘s how the idea of what the prison service had at the time and 
which is now changed and what the Guards had at the time came about. That‘s 
how that started. 
Michael: Do you remember was there anybody that you met and talked 
to who absolutely rejected the idea or thought it was a bad idea? 
Dick: Some of our own peer group who we met pulled away and said 
no, they wouldn‘t get involved in anything like that.  They didn‘t want it, they 
didn‘t think it was a good idea.  They felt like a lot of the commissioned 
officers felt, they didn‘t want it and felt that you couldn‘t have soldiers in a 
union.  We ended up with a small group anyway and said we would go for 
representation and it was from that group then that they met for over a year 
because it was an ex soldier that ran the pub. 
Michael: That was at the Eleventh Lock was it? 
Dick: The Twelfth Lock  in Lucan, and the guy who was managing the 
pub I knew as he was an ex soldier.  That was where we met and it was a quiet 
place on the canal, it was out of the way. 
Michael: What were the discussions like there?  You were all there 
because you agreed something need to be done?  Before you tell me can you 
just paint me a picture of your recollections of how things were in terms of  
pay and conditions of soldiers at the time which you say is the thing that 
prompted this? 
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Dick: What happened was is that things got very bad, aid to the civil 
power had become a huge drain on anybody who was in the operational units, 
Portlaoise, Mountjoy Prison, cash escorts, explosive escorts, the Border then, 
you just stepped up you were going up to the Border and on duties down here.  
I suppose people were looking at what prison officers were earning at the time 
and what Gardaí were earning at the time.  People were getting very browned 
off with the huge commitment they were making and they were getting 
nothing back, no real social gain for you or your family from the job you were 
doing.  Conditions in the barracks you were working in, particularly along the 
border, weren‘t very good either and conditions in Portlaise Prison or 
Mountjoy Prison weren‘t very good at all.  If you were working in Green 
Street, while everybody else was in sheltered cover, military people were in 
the street all day from the time they started their shift in the morning until five, 
six or seven o‘clock in the evening with sandwiches and maybe a cup of tea.  I 
think it just got too much and because things economically weren‘t great, a lot 
of people who were in the military, particularly guys who were say mid-
twenties or into their early thirties who had  young families, were doing part-
time work and while you were doing the part-time work you were alright in 
that you could get along reasonably okay.  When all that went with the extra 
hours in aid to the civil power they just got really tired of it and when the 
women started talking I think it just gained momentum. 
Michael: Do you know who in the women started raising this idea of 
awareness? 
Dick: I think it really started one day with someone ringing up on the 
radio complaining of soldiers firing or killing dogs in Lebanon and then 
people started ringing up on the same radio show and said that they would be 
better to look after the soldiers they had rather than worrying about what they 
might do to wild animals.  It just took off then from a group of women in the 
border area, it gained momentum from there and they started talking to other 
women.  People were briefing them, myself and others were briefing them 
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because they wouldn‘t know the full picture.  They started meeting politicians 
and different groups.  That‘s where it took off from. 
Michael: Did soldiers have any reservations about meeting politicians 
at the time? 
Dick: I would say some did but the group that we were working with at 
that stage sort of accepted it.  That was the way we had to go. They were the 
only ones who were going to make the change. 
Michael: What sort of a reception did you get from the politicians? 
Dick: Most of them that we met (some of them wouldn‘t come to 
meetings) but those that did, we were able to convince that we were genuine 
people just trying to do a job and it was either try and change how we were 
looked after and the means to how we were going to be looked after, and our 
social conditions or leave.  They were very unhappy at the time and I think it 
was a period where a lot of people were going through in the Defence Forces.  
I don‘t have the figures but I reckon the figures were huge of people coming 
and going. 
Michael: You met for over a year, can you remember the first time that 
you decided to take it beyond and out of that group and get this  message 
further afield? 
Dick: I‘m not sure, it was July ‘89 they decided they had put together 
a constitution and a rule book. 
Michael: Would you have any idea of the number of man hours you 
and people like you put into this at the time? 
Dick: I wouldn‘t have a clue but we spent nearly a year and a half 
before that original letter went in and we used to meet once or twice a week 
and in between then people would get bits of work to do on various parts. 
213 
 
Michael: In relation to the constitution, in addition to answering the 
phone calls, meeting with people did you have to go have and write some of 
that?  
Dick: At first it was all of us and then it broke down into smaller 
groups and then they would put the bits together and then each week we would 
look at it, talk about it and agree on that piece.  Eventually then we came up 
with the book.  The hours you wouldn‘t even guess because you‘d forgot the 
amount of phone calls and meetings with people in the evenings.  After the 
original letter and rule book went in there was three or four nights a week 
where we were meeting different groups of people trying to convince them 
that that was the way to go.  That went on for a long time until eventually 
there was a meeting of people from all over the country.  The ad hoc thing 
started after that. 
Michael: For that type of commitment you would have had to have the 
support of your wife and family? 
Dick: All of them were lucky like that, all very very lucky and then 
again it was a hard time for them as well because of the way some of the 
media started writing and the way some of the officers were reacting.  Word 
was starting to spread out that they were going to crush us whatever that 
would mean.  It was a worrying time for them because of them knew what we 
felt about the army or the Defence Forces in general.  It was a hard time for 
them, I‘d say it was a very worrying time for most of them because they knew 
what it meant for any of us to be put out of the Defence Forces or to be 
charged or put into detention.  None of the guys who got involved would be of 
that frame, they would be all about the Defence Forces and being part of it.  
The problem just got too much, the workload, the whole social side just got 
too much. 
Michael: So all the things, you had a very sustained sort of activity for 
a year and a half or more and then you had this very large group that came 
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from around the country.  Was it always only pay or was there other issues 
that were annoying people? 
Dick: Working conditions, I‘d say pay at the time because of the social 
conditions at the time in the country, the economic climate in the country.  Pay 
was probably the biggest issue but I‘d say the way people were treated in their 
everyday work life, the conditions in which they worked and lived, because of 
this aid to the civil power and all that.  I‘d say it all just accumulated. 
Michael: People have said that you were the constant consistent feature 
there from the very earliest time, were you? 
Dick: To be honest with you I‘d say nowadays yeah but I would have 
to say when we started off all of this and other people started coming on board 
and it got bigger, we were never really thinking about you having a job or 
doing a particular thing, having a career or anything like that.  It was simply 
representation, it was nothing else and I suppose none of us would have had 
the experience to think that it was going to become what it is today.  You 
don‘t actually visualise what the organisation is today as opposed to what you 
were trying to do at the time.  It is the natural course of events and the politics 
of it, no matter what way you look at it, once an organisation is up and running 
and is doing what it is going to be doing , becoming as big as it did, there is 
going to politics in it.  You‘re never going to escape it and I realise that now.  I 
have to say at that time I didn‘t and people might say that it was because you 
were naïve or stupid but it is none of those things.  You were in the army since 
you were young and that‘s the job you were committed to and all people 
wanted to see out of that group was representation. 
Michael: Would you be saying or would I interpret correctly that your 
sole focus at that time was the principle and the idea of people having a 
representative body.  Was the biggest thing was getting that on the road? 
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Dick: We weren‘t thinking about eight or ten years down the road, 
about funding, money or offices.  All those things came as a natural 
development. It just took it step by step. 
Michael: Were there times when you felt annoyed? 
Dick: I think the only time I felt annoyed about the whole thing was 
when we went into the structures at the time and came out of the elections and 
had the different commands now in it.  It was probably the only time I ever 
really got annoyed because I sort of felt that what happened was different 
commands started adopting the old military line, that you had to compete with 
them fellas, that they were from Dublin. I think that was the only time I got 
annoyed with it.  I got annoyed with the politics of it all but that was the only 
time I feared for it. 
Michael: Bill Attley said that it would take eight years for an 
organisation like PDFORRA to settle down and fifteen years before it would 
become effective.  He foresaw internal politics and that sort of thing, did you? 
Dick: We had no experience and to be honest with you it wasn‘t 
something we were thinking about.  We were fed up with all the different 
bodies that were looked into and Gleeson and all, and while they were all good 
in their own right, it really did become apparent that the only way we were 
ever going to address the issue – either short or long term – was having people 
represent themselves.  It was never going to work any other way, no matter 
what way you look it and it‘s nothing personal, some people were picked to go 
and see Gleeson, others were picked to go see other groups and as long as the 
vast majority of people didn‘t see them coming from within themselves, the 
CO‘s and all that it was never going to work. 
Michael: Do you think Euromil played a role in it? 
Dick: I do think Euromil played a role in it but I don‘t think they 
played the role they think they did or some people in Euromil think they did.  I 
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remember reading about Euromil once and I remember bringing it up at a 
meeting once, I think you were even there, and I said look at this group of 
people – is it worth our while to meet them because I was getting the 
impression and Pat McCartan was one of the people in the sense that there was 
a European look at the thing and maybe if you try and push it up that way 
you‘ll broaden it and soften your own people.  Euromil was a great help, it 
was a good experience to see that there were other people there who had 
representation and it worked.  I have to say I don‘t think their version of 
representation worked as well as ours but then they would argue about that. 
Michael: Is the Irish model looked at as the more desirable model? 
Dick: I would think so. 
Michael: A Euromil person said to me that they look now to Ireland as 
being more desirable, what is your view? 
Dick: I think that what we have now, and what we are working with 
now, would be far superior than what the vast majority of the Europeans have.  
Euromil were very helpful but I think that‘s all they were.  Euromil was never 
going to replace what we had, it was never going to replace it and they thought 
they did.  I don‘t think they realised how far advanced we were either.  We 
were very advanced.  If I meet Euromil people today and they talk about the 
Portuguese, they are still struggling to help the Portuguesa whereas we needed 
help but they weren‘t struggling to help us. 
Michael: Would you put the court case when the PRO ended up in 
court into the same category as just another phase? 
Dick: I wouldn‘t say to you whether it was important or unimportant.  I 
think it was another phase of it and then as soon as that was gone we moved 
on to another step.  We probably all have different views on it and we all 
probably have different feelings on it.  It was as important as most of the 
things were but then again it was another step.  If Euromil was a step, us 
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having our meetings was a step, us having an election was a step, and the court 
case was another step.  It was all part of it if you take your own grouping that 
started off. 
Michael: Do you have a sense of pride? 
Dick: I have a sense of pride that they have representation.  I mightn‘t 
necessarily be happy about the way they are doing things.  I think what they 
have lost, and I suppose every group does.  I think they need to change their 
structures to make themselves more professional and more viable.  All the 
committee type structure that we had is dead – you really need guys in each of 
the Brigades and the services that come from there really should be working 
fulltime, not more elective committees.  I think they will become more 
relevant to their own members if they change.  They have to get out of that 
military structure, that committee structure.  It is dragging it down.  I actually 
hate committees now, I can‘t stand them. 
Michael: Thank you very much for giving your time and may I come 
back to you at some juncture? 
Dick: No problem. 
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Appendix 14 
Interview with Commander McNamara 19 
November 2007 
Michael: Commander McNamara, how did you perceive pay 
and conditions in the Defence Forces in the late 1980‘s ? 
Cmdr. McNamara: I thought they were very poor.  At senior 
officer level they weren‘t too bad but certainly at the rating level they 
weren‘t good.  There‘s no question about that and people like myself 
were very concerned at what we thought was a very poor reward for 
very very difficult work undertaken by our men.  In particular those 
men who served with us at sea where they worked long and hard and 
sometimes comparisons were drawn up with the merchant navy, which 
in my view wasn‘t a valid comparison.  A much more valid 
comparison was the merchant navy yes but the ferries operating into 
and out of Ireland.  Their conditions were vastly superior to mine when 
I was a ship‘s Captain.  Their liberty was incredibly better and there 
are two elements to reward in this, there is the question of time off, and 
there is the monetary reward. In relation to time off, there was no 
comparison – these guys were doing something like ten days on, ten 
days off whereas my men were doing up to twenty one days away, in 
maybe for ten or twelve days and even in the ten or twelve days they 
were on duty.  I would try and alleviate the duties in so far as I could, 
but I was constrained by very severe regulations which bound us pretty 
well hand and foot and left very little room to manoeuvre.  Certainly 
the duties demanded of our men were gross and unreasonable and I 
always said this.  I said it to senior people and my track record is such 
that I can assure you that you will see incidences, if you research it, 
that I went to considerable lengths to give my men plenty of time off 
when I could. 
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Michael: When did you first hear about the call for 
representative bodies and associations such as PDFORRA? 
Cmdr. McNamara: I think it was some time after I came in off 
LE Eithne, I am just trying to remember - about 1990 I think, maybe 
1989, I think it would have been 1989. 
Michael: What was your immediate reaction to that? 
Cmdr. McNamara: I was always against representation and still 
am.  Do you want me to develop that? 
Michael: Not yet, did you see the existence of these 
associations as a threat or a help? 
Cmdr. McNamara: I perceived them very very negatively.  I 
thought it was impacting on the professionalism of the Defence Forces 
and I still do. 
Michael: Do you want to expand on that? 
Cmdr. McNamara: Yes.  I believe that a country like ours, 
particularly in the era we were in, in 1990, where there was significant 
subversion, deserves of its military professionals total commitment to 
the security of the State in every sense.  The state deserves a bottom 
line, in other words a body of defenders who are totally committed to 
that state.  It doesn‘t mean, and I am not entirely altruistic in this as I 
will develop further, because as pay and conditions go of course we 
need to keep up with the times and I left it could best be done by direct 
linkage to elements of the civil service.  They had far more negotiating 
clout than PDFORRA which I don‘t think have great clout at all and I 
don‘t think has any either.  I think the various staff bodies in the civil 
service are intimately more professional than us and I think would 
have far greater clout.  I think if we were to link directly to them then 
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we will do every bit as well on pay and conditions.  The Gardaí are the 
bad example to give.  When they set up the GRA there were all sorts of 
things talked about but the bottom line is we had a police mutiny with 
the Blue Flu.   It fits the word mutiny.  The definition of mutiny by the 
way is when more than one person, a number of people, conspire to 
defy lawful authority that is mutiny.  It can be extreme or it can be very 
minor but it is mutiny nonetheless and it was very serious in the case of 
An Garda Síochána and nobody in my opinion, not even the media, 
referred to it as mutiny but mutiny it was. 
Michael: So what measures did you take in light of the fact that 
you had heard what this was about and perceived it as a threat and as 
possibly being detrimental?  What measures, if any, were you able to 
take to try and prevent its emergence? 
Cmdr. McNamara: There was none I could take, not at my level 
of command, and I felt also the Chief of Staff was going to be beaten 
because of our political system.  Our political system, which is a PR 
Sytem of Electorate, creates very weak governments.  We have been 
beset by weak governments, even the current one is relatively weak – 
although stronger than some.  They are dependent at times for survival 
on one or two TD‘s.  Depending on where those TD‘s are located they 
can have a gross and disproportionate amount of power, take Jackie 
Healy-Rae for example and Gregory for example.  I was well aware 
that the men involved with PDFORRA, those trying to get it going, 
were aware that Fianna Fáil were particularly vulnerable in Kildare, 
which it was, and I knew that the Fianna Fáil cabinet would walk a 
very narrow line but at the end of the day would do anything to 
ameliorate PDFORRA and I knew PDFORRA was going to win.  That 
didn‘t stop me saying anything and I am telling you the rationale, and 
there are other witnesses that could back me up on this e.g. Brendan 
Stockdale and others who were my Executive Officers at the time, 
saying I knew we would be beaten and that PDFORRA was going to 
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win this one.  It didn‘t stop me and I was going to tell Warrant Officer 
Martin when he came in what my position was, and why. 
Michael: Which you did do.  When it seemed inevitable to you 
that it was going to emerge and come into existence, did you believe 
that it would affect your ability to command your personnel, was there 
going to be an impact on that? 
Cmdr. McNamara: Not so much when they set but, but when 
they gave uncertified sick leave.  You had people ringing in sick and it 
means you are no longer in command because if a group of them 
decide together, whether you call it a mutiny or whatever you want to 
call it, that‘s what it is.  I was appalled when they conceded uncertified 
sick leave and I said to Joe Deasy the next time they need one hundred 
men for a guard of honour up in Cork or whatever, I will provide them, 
provided the lads feel like coming in and doing it. 
Michael: So you saw that as a direct effect on your ability to 
command because it left the decision on whether to appear or not up to 
the individual rather than the Commander? 
Cmdr. McNamara: Correct. 
Michael: Do you think that the Chief of Staff letter contending 
that membership of any organisation other than an internal one – what 
did you think of that letter where he said it was divisive and 
unnecessary? 
Cmdr. McNamara: I think it was divisive. 
Michael: How did you perceive officers who were seeking 
representation? 
Cmdr. McNamara: I was against it for the same reasons I was 
against PDFORRA. 
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Michael: Is there anything else that comes to mind for you 
about the emergence of the representative bodies, do you see the actual 
right of association as being a human right or do you think it is 
something else? 
Cmdr. McNamara: I see the right of association as very much a 
human right but I qualify it by saying it happened anyway, it‘s history, 
it‘s there but I still cite the example of the true fighting professionals, 
that is the British and the Americans.  They don‘t have representation, 
they are much richer countries than us.  They wouldn't have 
representation for five minutes, they allow the market forces to dictate 
pay and other things and they are true democracies, Britain and the 
States.  They don‘t believe in representation and never did.  They‘d die 
laughing.  I was chatting with guys around the time you were getting 
going who had served in the US Marine Corps.  His daughter was a 
nurse and a friend of my daughter.  He said ‗are the Irish Government 
mental, letting these guys organise, ‗if they don‘t like the Army get the 
**** out of it‘ (expletive deleted).  That‘s the attitude and he had seen 
action in Vietnam.  They are real fighting forces, we are only a girl 
guides outfit by comparison. 
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Appendix 15 
Interview with Gerry Rooney General 
Secretary PDFORRA 26 November 2007 
 
Michael: Thanks very much for your time Gerry; first of all can 
you just tell me about your first recollection of PDFORRA, when you 
first heard about it and where? 
Gerry: I think probably the first time I heard about it would have 
been in the barracks, probably during coffee break or some occasion. I 
can‘t remember where it was and it was to the effect that they were 
looking for individuals to research or look at the question of 
representation for Irish soldiers. 
Michael: How long had you been in the army at this stage and 
what is your own background in terms of when you joined, how much 
service you had when you heard it first? 
Gerry: I would have been about fourteen years in service at that 
stage (in the early ‗90s) and I had previously served on the border for 
three years, roughly from 1978 to 1981.  I had then transferred to Dublin, 
trained as a laboratory technician and been stationed in St.Bricin‘s 
Hospital.  I had done a trip overseas and another one was in the offing at 
that time. 
Michael: You hadn‘t heard anything about it previously when you 
were serving on the border? 
Gerry: No, I served in the border in the late ‗70s so there was no 
word of representation at that stage at all. 
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Michael: Can you remember your reaction when you heard it first, 
that this group was trying to set something up? 
Gerry: Well I would have been quite pleased to hear of such a 
development and I think it was a matter I had probably discussed with 
other soldiers previously.  I would have thought it was a positive 
development.  I was probably a bit unsure about the details, what people 
were looking to do, what they proposed themselves but certainly it 
would have been seen as a positive development. 
Michael: Did you see, from your experience in the army and the 
hierarchal structure and all, any sort of mismatch between the notions of 
something like a union being in an institution like the army where you 
had this discipline and so on, did you see any difficulties? 
Gerry: No, perhaps naively, I didn‘t at that stage.  I would have 
thought that representation was something that could have worked in the 
Defence Forces.  Probably since then I have seen a hell of a lot more 
difficulties that were probably espoused by the military authorities at the 
time, though I didn't, I thought it was something that should come about.  
Having said that, without thinking of the detail of that, the question of 
whether there should be a conciliation and arbitration scheme, whether 
there would be consultations, third party involvement, I hadn‘t given that 
any consideration at that stage.  That‘s probably why I thought it was 
such an easy thing to do. 
Michael: What do you remember conditions were like at that time 
for you as a serving soldier in terms of pay and conditions? 
Gerry: Well I certainly would have felt it was poor, I didn‘t 
necessarily think in many others because in consultations I had at the 
time, they certainly thought they were poor and we were the exception.  
We were the only ones that had poor conditions.  I would have been 
aware certainly that others, for example, local authority workers, health 
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board workers, private sector workers would have had equally as poor 
conditions and indeed some of them would have been in circumstances 
where they were unionised.  I certainly felt it was poor but I wouldn‘t 
have attributed it to be the exception.  I would have thought it reflected 
that, at the end of that decade, the 1980s, the economy went downhill.  I 
remember interest rates being absolutely astronomical.  I had a 
mortgage, just two kids at that stage and they were young but we were 
struggling.  We weren‘t on the bread line but there wasn‘t a lot of spare 
cash about certainly at that stage. 
Michael: Apart from the pay and conditions, the direct pay every 
week and so on, what about career structure and promotion and 
opportunity?  Did you see room for improvement in those areas? 
Gerry: Probably would have had a vague sense, probably would 
have thought that there could have been more opportunities for senior 
NCO levels and that would have been related to our own circumstances.  
There was a group of us in the laboratory who would have been quite 
highly, qualified in an educational sense and we would have thought our 
circumstances would have warranted greater promotional opportunities 
which were not there.  That was down to the attitude of the military 
authorities in the Medical Corps, who to my mind were unable to look at 
enlisted personnel groups in a rational way in terms of what their 
promotional opportunities should be, or indeed their pay and conditions.  
They felt that once the medical officers were looked after, then there 
were no other deserving cases in relation to that.  The bigger one for me 
would have been around the terms and conditions; you know the pay, 
those kinds of elements.  As I say I would have looked at it in quite a 
general sense.  We weren‘t the exceptions; there were other people in 
similar circumstances to ourselves. 
Michael: Can you remember any of the reasons being advanced for 
those that didn‘t want to join an association? 
226 
 
Gerry: One guy in particular I remember, the Company Sergeant of 
the Company, certainly saw it as drawing undue attention to himself and 
conflict, particularly with his role as CS he felt his role would be in 
conflict with representative role and/or membership.  Certainly that was 
a view expressed by him.  Another time I remember attending a meeting 
in St. Bricin‘s and all the enlisted personnel of the unit were present, 
Sergeant Major, Battalion Quartermaster, all the way down and the issue 
was the alternative structures being proposed by the military authorities.  
They had proposed a separate form of representation where smaller units 
were amalgamated, something along those lines.  Word had gone around 
from the PDFORRA leadership that there were to be no compromises 
along those lines anyway and at our unit level there was 99.9% rejection.  
A Sergeant Major in the unit, again an old timer, saw himself as a 
military man.  He was saying no, that we should give the new structures 
a chance but 100% of the rest of the unit would have said no, 
PDFORRA. We stick to our own procedures and structures and I 
remember myself and a BQ saying no, we are not going to do it; we are 
sticking to the new one.  Between myself and the BQ we set the tempo 
for the meeting and it was a rejection.   
Michael: Do you remember the letter sent by the Chief of Staff in 
which he said that membership of any organisation other than the one 
that was being proposed by the Government would be divisive? 
Gerry: I do remember that. 
Michael: Did that have any impact on you as a soldier, as a serving 
member? 
Gerry: No. 
Michael: And your reaction to it? 
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Gerry: To some extent, thinking back at the time, it was a sign that 
they were up against a formidable opposition, a credible group that was 
looking to establish representation.  If that was their decision then there 
was a struggle on and it was a good thing there was a struggle on.  We 
had to continue on the road.  I do remember we were a bit vague as to 
what was going to be the outcome but that there would be independent 
representation is what people would have thought would have been the 
correct thing to do. 
Michael: What sort of constraints were on men doing it 
themselves, not so much the men but the serving soldiers themselves? 
Gerry: I think there would have been a general understanding that 
such an action was unlawful, whether that was precisely correct, and that 
there would have been consequences for anyone who stuck their head 
over the parapet on that particular issue. 
Michael: What was the core element that made it unlawful, what 
do you think? 
Gerry: People focussed in very much on the secret societies section 
of the Defence Act and that was the one I seem to remember.  As always 
there are plenty of back room lawyers available who will give you plenty 
of advice and it wasn‘t based on any analysis of it but that was the 
section that said no you couldn‘t do that.  In that whole period when the 
women were standing and NASA was campaigning in the beginnings of 
PDFORRA those calls seem to get louder.  There would always be 
people who said ‗no you can‘t do that‘.  There may have liked there to be 
representation but they would have still said that, in their opinion, it 
would have been unlawful. 
Michael: Do you remember the announcement of the setting up of 
the independent commission, the Gleeson Commission?  Do you 
remember when that was? 
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Gerry: What I probably would remember more so is the setting up 
of earlier one, the Brady Commission and the dissatisfaction with the 
outcome of that.  At the end of the process people felt it was a whitewash 
job. 
Michael: Can you remember can you talk through it briefly what 
your recollection of the Brady award, what the sequence of events was 
for that and why the disappointment arose? 
Gerry: If I remember correctly there was pay rises due anyway 
which were subsumed into Brady if I remember correctly and the timing 
of it was probably prior to Christmas, it was the end of year period 
anyway.  There was a general dissatisfaction with people, strangely 
enough even among officers.  I remember speaking to officers in the unit 
who were similarly dissatisfied and similarly felt that this had been an 
effort to buy them off and as they saw it ‗on the cheap‘.  I certainly 
remember that dissatisfaction with the outcome and some element of 
criticism of the Minister at the time, I think it might have been Noonan if 
I am not mistaken.  I always remember he wasn‘t a particular good 
media performer so if there was a chance to do a bad job publicly I think 
he did that which of course then went on to the Gleeson Commission. 
Michael: Did you see any validity in the arguments of the military; 
had you any sympathy with the arguments of the military who suggested 
that the operation of a representative body in armed forces was 
detrimental to the exercise of command and discipline because some of 
them had said that? 
Gerry: No I wouldn‘t have because I aware there was 
representative in other armies.  I wouldn‘t have given any credence to 
that.  There may have been an issue if you got into the detail of how you 
can or cannot talk about your scope of representation but I wouldn‘t have 
said that because there is a danger that there might be representations 
made on operational matters that ergo you don‘t have representation.  I 
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wouldn‘t have looked at it in that sense at all.  I would have been aware 
that there were countries that had it and the question is what model do 
we want. 
Michael: Do you think that the duty of care (traditionally enjoyed 
by Commanding Officers with regard to their subordinates) has been 
diminished somewhat by the emergency of representative associations or 
has it been enhanced? 
Gerry: It has definitely been diminished because part of it is taken 
care of elsewhere.  I think we have big difficulties with that because they 
want to be the bearers of good news if there is a message to come out 
from a meeting if something is agreed, particularly the conciliation 
council because obviously they are there as part of management 
generally.  After a conciliation council meeting a concession can be 
made to us which we could have out to a particular barracks, or all 
barracks, within 48 hours in written form in the form of an information 
circular.  They can‘t do that because they don‘t have such instruments as 
information circulars.  One officer who was OIC of Military C & A said 
they should consider having a separate information stream for industrial 
relations matters in the sense they were losing a war there because we 
were out first about we did this tough negotiations and delivered this 
despite all that. 
Michael: I suppose because of the position you occupy eminently 
you see the emergence and operation of PDFORRA as a very good 
thing, have you seen any negatives sides to its existence? 
Gerry: Well yes I suppose the same as any group of people coming 
together collectively there are groups who would seek to advance their 
own position which wouldn‘t be our intention.  I mean we do have a 
long standing agreement for pre 1994 entrants that they would not be 
subject to the same fitness and health criteria as those who joined after 
that date.  The result of that is that we have quite a large body of serving 
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soldiers who don‘t do certain duties, they don‘t go overseas.  The 
downside of that is that there is a greater burden carried by those who 
joined after that date who are liable to all those.  That‘s a downside of it 
and I suppose another one that occurs also is that you get some people 
who would have personality grievances which can be pursued through 
the representative process.  It‘s not the place to do it but it can be done. 
Michael: Despite the claims that were made (in the late 1980s) 
would be detrimental to the exercise of command and discipline, that it 
might undermine the security of the state, do you think the existence of 
PDFORRA for 17 years now has proved the case to be otherwise? 
Gerry: I think most definitely.  We don‘t see any evidence of those 
effects.  Those fears came mostly from the military authorities.  They 
feared that and there is no evidence at all of it occurring.  Indeed there 
was an incidence where there were suggestions that services being 
provided by the Defence Forces were being subject to set days and 
various tactics like that.  It certainly didn‘t emanate from headquarters or 
from policy of the association on any occasion.  The other side I have 
noticed is that the military authorities will de-facto cooperate with us in 
terms of claims, now never anything that will impact on the operation of 
the Defence Forces but in terms of our claims for pensions, greater 
annual leave, greater educational opportunities, and particular 
allowances.  They de-facto would probably support most of that and 
have acknowledged the importance of it in terms of the Defence Forces 
in the future.  I think it has turned out entirely contrary to what was 
thought. 
Michael: Do you think that the existence of the representative 
associations in Ireland and the operation of the representative 
associations has in any way politicised a section of community – maybe 
they were or they weren‘t – but do you think it has politicised a group 
who might not otherwise have been politicised? 
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Gerry: Yes I mean you can argue about the numbers involved but I 
think there is a core group of people in PDFORRA who have remained 
activists.  Some people have come and gone and moved in and out of it 
but we have a steady group of maybe 150-200 who continually consider 
these issues in terms of, if you were to press them they would probably 
say industrial relations rights, political rights etc. but it is some form of 
view of how society should be organised and what their place in it is and 
there is that group.  There is absolutely no question about that.  I think 
with the vast bulk of the membership, the relationship they would have 
on it is around cash, remuneration and pensions.  There is an economic 
relationship there.  They don‘t necessarily see it as a right – that‘s the 
view of the bulk – but there is a group, a broad leadership group, who 
certainly who would see beyond the economic issues there. 
Michael: Is there anything else that you would like to say Gerry? 
Gerry: In conclusion I would like to say looking I think the basis 
for the demands of representation, you have identified the border being 
an area, and I think you are correct about that in terms of the fact that 
they were working next to Gardaí and the Gardaí have always been a 
well remunerated group. I think in the Dublin area there were also a 
number of incidents which highlighted dissatisfaction and which 
ultimately became a trigger. In 1987 and 1988 I was part of a detail that 
had been deployed in aid to the civil power to man the prisons as a result 
of an industrial dispute in which the prison officers were on strike. We 
had to take up the duties of the absent officers including overseeing the 
feeding, exercising and care of the prisoners. It was very noticeable that 
the food we were serving to the prisoners was far superior to what we 
had been accustomed to on the border. It was certainly in the Eastern 
Brigade side of the country, possible others as well.  In ‘87 and ‘88 there 
were two strikes.  There was a prison strike and there was the ambulance 
strike and I was involved in both of those.  In the prison strike, soldiers 
got to see how the prisoners were treated and in terms of the food that 
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was available I would suggest to you that the food was better in 
Mountjoy Prison than what it was in certain circumstances by soldiers.  I 
think the treatment soldiers would have received when they became 
involved in the strike was less than what it should have been so I think 
there were certainly issues which allowed soldiers – in the Border it was 
very much with Gardaí, in the East it was strikes which showed them 
how firemen were paid, how prisoners were treated, how prison officers 
were treated and I think that showed them that it was quite bad the way 
they were being treated.  I said to you earlier that I would have been 
aware personally that we weren‘t particularly well remunerated but I was 
also aware that there were many others in those circumstances.  I think 
that what was absolutely indefensible was when I saw – I had done an 
NCOs Course in 1987 and the food was utterly disgraceful and I went to 
Mountjoy Prison the same year and the food was better – there were 
certain incidences that showed that there was an exception and 
ultimately the people responsible for that were the military authorities. 
Michael: So did you see those two as vehicles that pushed people 
towards the idea of needing a representative association and can you 
remember were that articulated anywhere? 
Gerry: I don‘t ever remember it being articulated but certainly it 
was only just after those incidences (‘87 the Fire Brigade, ‘88 the Prison 
Strike) and in ‘89 there was the women and we were into issues 
concerning representation.  We certainly knew that it was being broadly 
thought about.  I think they would have made people far more amenable 
to the idea. Michael: Thank you very much Gerry. 
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Appendix 16 
Interview with Department of Defence 
Secretary General Michael Howard 4 December 
2007 
Michael Martin: Thank you very much for giving me the 
opportunity to speak with you this morning and I would like to take you 
through some of the questions surrounding the emergence of the 
representative associations in Ireland.  Can you just tell me what your 
role was at the time and what your recollections are? 
Secretary General: At that time I came to the Department  at the 
end of 1986, formally as what they called Assistant Principal for 
Analytical Duties.  It was a staff appointment.  I had done a Masters 
Degree in Analytical Studies in Trinity and I was assigned to the 
Department of Defence to work in a general planning role.  For no 
particular reasons, other than I think a perception of personal aptitude for 
the job,  I was then put in charge of media relations and because of that I 
was in a position to interact with both senior civil servants and with the 
Ministers at the time to be made aware of what was going on firstly and 
secondly to advise on and very often to manage how the official position 
would be presented in the public airwaves. My first recollections of it 
when this broke, was I think it was an August ‗silly season‘ news story 
when there was a tremendous outbreak of protest by what was then the 
Army wives because obviously the men had no outlet.  I have a distinct 
recollection of the wives picketing what was the Millennium Ball in 
1988 which had been hosted by the Chief of Staff to mark the Army‘s 
contribution to Dublin‘s Millennium – women parading up and down, 
that their husbands were warriors and not washers because of the 
numbers involved.  It would be fair to say that it produced quite a shock 
reaction. 
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There is one issue that I think bears minding here.  Senior 
Defence Forces people were concerned about pay levels, a lot of the 
other protests were about working conditions and about the way soldiers 
were treated so the agenda that was perceived to have been started by 
senior military people, and the agenda that was subsequently pursued 
first by NASA and later by the embryonic PDFORRA, were not the 
same.  The latter two had a slightly broader agenda and were bringing 
into questions things like the way enlisted personnel were treated.  The 
bizarre thing is, on the civil side of the Department there was actually 
some sympathy with that, but not on the pay side.  I think it might be 
worth explaining some of the background to public sector pay here.  
There would have been a feeling that senior military people had a very 
limited understanding of how the public sector system of pay worked.   
Michael: Did you think that the Brady Inter-Departmental 
committee had addressed what the perceived difficulties were in army 
pay? 
Secretary General: The answer to that question is that they had 
made a very good effort given the constraints that they were under.  
What I remember is the costing of this.  The allowance increases granted 
under Brady cost as much as the basic pay increases subsequently given 
by Gleeson but didn‘t get anything like the warmth of reception 
proportion to that amount.  I am going to say something here that you 
will find provocative.  Army pay wasn‘t doing any worse than anybody 
else‘s.  What had changed, and I remember at the time, because we were 
actually mystified ourselves in the Department,  where did it come from? 
I came across a statistic, and this was the first iteration of the age crisis, 
in 1977 two thirds of private soldiers were single men, in 1987 two 
thirds of them were married.  In a relative sense the pay hadn‘t declined 
but what was a good wage for a single young fellow living in a barracks, 
could be a very bad wage for a man with a family.  What had actually 
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happened was the Army had got older, it hadn‘t got paid less.  It was that 
the employee profile had changed. 
Michael: So you were about to tell me about Public Sector Pay? 
Secretary General: Public Sector pay in the late 1980s, and 
people nowadays tend to forget, the economy was in a desperate 
condition and there was a complete absence of hope and an absence of a 
sense of control.  For the previous number of years we had been running 
unsustainable deficits – the economy was stagnating while the world was 
booming around us – and the first serious attempt to get this under 
control was the 1987 budget.  In 1988 and 1989 the regime of financial 
control was very tight.  We were then in the embryonic stages of the 
National Partnership and there was perception that pay increases had to 
be on the basis of one size fits all and if you make an exception for 
anybody you will bring the whole house down.  That fear, and it was a 
very real fear, pervaded everything the Department did at this time and 
very heavily influenced the Department of Finance attitude to this as 
well.  
Michael: In terms of the rank and uniform issue and where that is 
now, it seems in 1990 to have been an extremely important and volatile 
issue, do you think it has been resolved to the satisfaction of everybody? 
Secretary General: The basic answer is yes.  The first thing I 
would say to you is that I remember that being an extremely 
controversial issue and people on both sides of the discussion having 
quite strongly held views, including by the way, senior civilian officials, 
who again would have felt a need to defend, as they would have seen it, 
the prerogatives of military commanders.  By contrast I would say off 
the top of my head it is probably ten years since I have last heard of it 
being raised in any serious way and in fact the culture in the Defence 
Forces has probably proved to be a lot more flexible and more adaptable 
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than people expected it would.  There is no hint now of conflict around 
all of this.  The thing that is interesting too is that people don‘t wear 
uniforms in military representative associations and I know that it gives 
military people a sense that they are in a different place.  
Michael: In the context of civil-military relations and the 
relationship between a military institution and its government do you 
think that military intervention took place in Ireland in the late 1980s? 
Secretary General: That‘s a very interesting question.  I think 
you‘d have to say objectively that it did because the policy position that 
was there, and I am not necessarily advocating it, the settled policy 
position was that there should not be a representative association.  The 
decision that there would be a system of representation was a political 
decision and it was taken because like all political decisions, influence 
was brought to bear – I don‘t mean in any improper sense.  Governments 
and democratic societies respond to pressures and influences.  That 
influence was fostered by some serving military personnel in a variety of 
means and some of it was the informal culture that takes place in Ireland, 
in that they would have interacted with politicians and they would 
generate an acceptance of the idea among TDs generally.  Some of it 
would have been by participation, authorised or otherwise, in public 
debate which would have effected public opinion on the matter and a lot 
of it took place because of army spouses and had some sort of a public 
debate and would have succeeded you will recall having army spouses 
running in a general election campaign.  They would have succeeded in 
creating an impression in public markets that there was a problem and 
that an element of a fair solution had to include representation.  This all 
took place within the Defence Forces because the spouses didn‘t go out 
there spontaneously on their own.  There was a political influence 
brought to bear and it did change to a degree the standing and 
relationship of the Defence Forces with the political system.  I wouldn‘t 
necessarily say it is a bad thing, you know I have conservative views 
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about that myself as you know but, in a changing society you need 
pressure relief valves and I remember one particular instance when this 
system of representation was being set up, when for example, two 
members of the Oireachtas were produced to act as intermediaries.  That 
was a very clear example of the political system in negotiating with the 
Defence Forces, in whatever way you like to call it. 
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Appendix 17 
Interview with Petty Officer (retired) James 
(Jimmy) Halligan former chairman PDFORRA 
Naval regional committee. 2 October 2008  
Michael: Thank you very much Jimmy for the opportunity to speak 
to you this afternoon. Can you tell me about your earliest involvement in 
PDFORRA?  
Jimmy: I remember hearing about it first in the canteen one 
lunchtime I think it was late nineteen eighty nine. At that stage a secret 
meeting was being organised in a private function room in a local pub. I 
didn‘t see anything wrong with the idea of an association for soldiers, in 
all other jobs I was in, there were unions and workers could have their 
complaints addressed about pay, working conditions and the like so why 
not in the Navy. I attended that meeting at which there was only fifteen 
people and remember thinking that from a workforce of thirteen 
hundred, only fifteen were prepared to stand up and be counted. There 
were several other meetings and then over time I found myself involved 
at committee level eventually becoming the chairman of the regional 
committee for the Navy. I remained in that position until I retired from 
the Navy in 1997.  
Michael: Given you had spent your early working life in a civilian 
workplace what were your impressions of military training?  
Jimmy: Because I was a full adult when I joined, not a seventeen 
year old, I suppose i thought some of it was nonsensical and 
discriminatory, When we were doing our square bashing training, the 
Petty Officer in charge of us marched us around the drill square and then 
down along the depot lines where he gave the order for us to wheel left. 
This routing had us marching down an inclined slipway towards the sea. 
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When the lads in the front stopped inches before entering the water, the 
instructor balled them out and told them that regardless of what they 
might think they should do, never, ever take it upon themselves to do 
anything other than what they were told to do. We were left in no doubt 
that in such circumstances if no rescinding order was given then it was 
expected that we should march on into the water. They never made us 
actually do it. But there were lots of times we were marched to within an 
inch of some obstruction. I think myself it was a power thing. Young-
fellows with stripes that probably never had any standing outside of the 
forces, laying it on thick for us civilians. 
Michael: What about pay and conditions then. Do you have any 
recollection of the Brady committee report and award?  
 Jimmy: I remember thinking that the pay we got was Okay if it 
was for a forty hour week but the problem in the Navy was that you had 
no regular hours, you could be away for weeks at a time and when on 
ships working ninety hours a week not forty. On top of that they had us, 
for a period of time, working overtime until nine o‘clock every night 
with only a promise of time off in lieu which we never got. Rumours had 
been doing the rounds that this Brady group, I didn‘t know then who 
Brady was or really what he was doing, but rumour had it we were going 
to get a big increase in our pay. When it came it was a right kick in the 
teeth. We had been led a merry dance for months on end, made believe 
that a special look was being taken at us. Duped into believing that our 
just cause would reap an honest response, only to have our hopes dashed 
in the dawn of another new year of struggle on low pay. I recall saying to 
myself, if there was never an argument for a trade association in the 
forces before there was certainly one now.  
Michael: You were saying to me earlier that you remember a great 
satisfaction at seeing the PDFORRA name on notice boards, can you 
explain that now? 
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Jimmy: There had been a load of codswallop about the military not 
accepting us as PDFORRA. We all knew that discussions were going on 
with our representatives in Dublin. Some of the officers on the base 
didn‘t seem to believe anything was going to happen, it was as if they 
didn‘t believe us. I felt some of them were sneering at us. Then it all 
changed and we were there for real and for all to see. I remember seeing 
our PDFORRA information sheet on the notice board at the Naval Base 
as if it was yesterday. Our logo and our name not just posted up but 
referred to properly in the accompanying instruction. It was a great day 
for all the efforts made by all the people who had had to hide the name 
PDFORRA and their involvement in it for so long. Despite the content 
of the sheet which was important in itself, for me the posting of it on the 
official Naval Base notice board symbolised legitimacy of our 
organisation and a visible manifestation of it at long last.  
Michael: Had you any sense of the relationship between the military in 
the Navy and the Department of Defence?  
Jimmy: I had no firsthand knowledge of that but whatever way it 
was it didn‘t make for easy execution of your duties at the coalface. For 
example my captain was responsible in every way for the maintenance, 
care and operational integrity of a £35,000,000 state ship, all of the 
personnel in the crew, their welfare, their working arrangements and the 
resources with which they could carry out their tasks. Yet if he needed 
something as trivial as a shackle or a filter for his ship, somewhere along 
the administrative purchasing line there could be an eighteen year old 
civil servant with little life experience and no military inkling who would 
be endowed with the capacity to delay, question or even seek justification 
for the purchase. This was most frustrating as a tradesman, you had all 
the means to do the work but administration and red tape stopped it 
getting done or at least delayed it way beyond the timeframe that it would 
take in civilian life.  
Michael: In addition to pay matters that we mentioned earlier, what 
are your recollections of conditions?  
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Jimmy: Horrific. There were thirty two panes of broken glass in 
the main dining hall and galley for shore based enlisted personnel. In 
some cases the glass was totally missing, allowing entry in and out of a 
food storage area to cats and rats, there was even a fox seen in there one 
night. The roof was made of corrugated asbestos. Efforts to have repairs 
carried out were dismissed by the commanding officer on the basis that 
they were seeking to have a new complex built, however that took many 
years and the disastrous unhealthy conditions at the galley remained. 
This was at a time when asbestos had been recognised as a dangerous 
substance and as far as I knew its use had been banned. I saw a photo 
once of the NCOs mess taken  in 1957, it was derelict building then with 
sheet iron on the windows. When it was operating as an NCOs mess in 
the eighties and nineties there wasn‘t even a proper toilet facility in the 
building, there was a only a urinal. At a mess meeting in the early 
nineteen nineties I suggested that we should no longer be expected to 
entertain NCOs from visiting Navy ships as this facility was a disgrace 
to our country, to our President on whose behalf we were entertaining, to 
our Naval Service in general and in particular to the NCOs who were 
expected to use it. These conditions were all the more aggravating when 
compared to the Taj Mahal type facilities that the officers had at that 
time. It is with great pride, joy and satisfaction that I now look today at 
the new galley and NCO facility on the Naval Base. Personnel serving 
there have a lot to be grateful for in terms of the efforts made by the 
early founders of PDFORRA like you and others who paved the way for 
these improvements.   
Michael: Is there anything else you would like to say? 
Jimmy: and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the 
founder members, the fourteen men and myself that started PDFORRA 
in the Naval Service. I continue to wish everyone at the Navy and in 
PDFORRA the very best for the future and would like to think they have 
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both improved however marginally as a result of us having passed 
through them.  
Michael: Thank you very much for your time Jim.  
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Appendix 18 
Interview with Lieutenant General (retired) 
Gerry McMahon former Chief of Staff 2 January 
2008   
Michael: Thank you very much General McMahon for the 
opportunity to speak to you this afternoon.  
Lt. Gen. McMahon: I suppose I should start by giving a bit of 
background first to my personal view of this.  In the 1980s as a Comdt. 
and Lt. Colonel I was well aware of the issues that existed in the 
Defence Forces, particularly with regard to pay and conditions.  My own 
situation, and being aware of it from that point of view I remember at the 
time cashing my cheque into cash and putting the pound notes in brown 
envelopes – an ESB envelope, telephone envelope, groceries and so on.   
Michael: When were you CO? 
Lt. Gen. McMahon: From eighty five to eighty seven, three years 
in there. 
Michael: And you were aware of it. 
Lt. Gen. McMahon: I was aware of it from there and also from 
people I know.  I knew for instance that although there was an 
instruction in operation at that time that you were not allowed to have a 
second job.  I knew the only way people could survive and bring up 
family was to have a second job and of course we were all reminded of 
this instruction from time to time and we all looked the other way.  
Unfortunately Officers didn‘t seem to be able to get away with it in the 
same way that NCOs and Privates did but that‘s another story.  I was 
also aware of the conditions all through my military career.  From 1955 
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on until I would say the ‗90s I occupied offices I would be ashamed to 
bring anybody into.  Now again the kind of billets that soldiers had to 
live in – some places were great i.e. Athlone where they were very good, 
in some places they were appalling.  I was aware of that from my 
experience and I can remember the wives marching up and down.  I 
thought about this this morning and I can remember the General Election 
in which the pressure was put on the various political parties.  I 
remember to this day my gut reaction was that if politicians have turned 
their back on us, if the Department of Defence and Finance had turned 
their back on us, I‘m delighted somebody is creating havoc and my 
support would have been covert rather than overt but it was with them.  
It certainly wasn‘t ‗what are they doing‘?   
Michael: Did you feel personally that the Government had turned 
their back on the military at that time? 
Lt. Gen. McMahon: Of course, yes. 
Michael: Was that was the widespread belief among the officer 
corps? 
Lt. Gen. McMahon: The eighties were truly appalling as regards 
the economy.  The Defence Forces were stretched with Border service 
etc. and the Government didn‘t seem to be able to grasp the nettle, or 
weren‘t able to because Finance told them there was no money to do it, 
they weren‘t able to have and pay a support financially and otherwise a 
Defence Forces that they were totally dependent on at that time.  That‘s 
what I fear about that.  Again going back to the background, in 1989 
when Brian Lenihan signed RACO and PDFORRA into existence I 
remember, I was in Defence Forces Headquarters for a year at that stage 
but I left shortly after that was signed in – I left the pot simmering and 
disappeared to New York. When I came back a year and a two or three 
months later the representative associations were up and running, now 
nothing like they are up and running today but they were up and running 
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and they existed on the ground.  I was promoted at that time to Colonel 
in 1991 and I was appointed Director of P & R in which situation I was 
dealing with the representative association in so far as there was a 
military forum which really to my memory, and it‘s a long time ago 
Michael, we weren‘t really negotiating because pay and conditions had 
been taken out of the thing.  A lot of our talk, which I appreciated, had to 
do with you and John Lucey trying to find out what the military 
management attitude to things that were happening was and also what I 
thought what the military management attitude would be to things that 
ye had planned for the future.  I think that worked out very well.  After 
one year in that in 1992 I was dealing with you and John I was promoted 
and left representation behind.  I went down to the Military College but I 
was thinking this morning when I was in the Military College as College 
Commandant. I negotiated the amalgamation of the Military College as 
it existed at that time and the general training (1) which looked after the 
training of Officers and the other (2) was looking after the training of 
NCOs.  I amalgamated both of those with negotiation.  I wouldn‘t do 
that a year later because the representative association would have been 
in but we sat down together and negotiated with the NCOs.  It was hard 
and tough but we got the job done and in about four months it was up 
and running and there were promises that I made at the time.  I 
remember it came down to – there were three NCOs on that side of the 
camp and more or less the NCOs said to me if we could get one proper 
one and I said yes and I was able to deliver it some years afterwards as 
QMG.  We were able to negotiate.  I think that had that kind of thing 
gone on in the Defence Forces much earlier we would not have had a lot 
of the problems but it was a different Defence Forces.  A lot of problems 
could have been held off but the ones with pay and conditions could not 
have been because really military management were tasked with that and 
the government ignored them and the Department of Finance and their 
agents the Department of Defence ignored them.  I can remember Tadhg 
O‘Neill as Chief of Staff expressing, I was only on the edge of the 
conversation, extreme frustration with the fact that nobody would listen 
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to him anymore.  I think the time had come for something like the 
representation.  The only thing I would say is that there were a lot of 
fears about it and this goes on to one of your first questions.  Personally I 
don‘t think I had any fears, I was a mere Commandant. Lt. Colonel 
newly promoted in the eighties and I didn‘t have any axe to grind but the 
people, that is, the top military management, they saw themselves, and 
were in effect responsible to government for the running of the Defence 
Forces.  I would say that they saw this as an historic thing, that it went 
back to independence and that this is the way that things had always 
operated.  Here was something completely new and there would have 
been outright resistance to it from that point of view, what could this do 
that wasn‘t able to be done already. 
Michael: Do you think that they might have felt somewhat 
disempowered? 
Lt. Gen. McMahon: Absolutely, as I said earlier, that‘s part of the 
nineteen eighties for me.  Suddenly nobody was listening.  I am sure at 
the time they would have asked the military attaché s here in Dublin 
what did they think but you have to look at who they got advice from – 
the American military attaché (unheard of in the US), the British military 
attaché  (unheard of) and the French military attaché .  They were the 
resident attaché s and I can‘t see that giving them any kind of steel at all 
other than negatively but I don‘t know.  I suppose we will have to wait 
for the papers to be released in twenty years time. 
Lt. Gen. McMahon: When you look at the army, you see we 
weren‘t in NATO but we had met other European armies.  They were 
totally different to our army, they weren‘t professionals, they were 
mostly officers and senior NCOs that were professionals, but everybody 
else were doing their two years.  I can remember a very well equipped 
Dutch battalion beside us in Lebanon who had great equipment but their 
soldiers had hairnets.  I think that this whole concept of European armies 
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who had representation didn‘t convince people at the time that they were 
leaving the future Defence Forces in hands that would be able to deal 
with it.  I think also, I know,  the fear that the military chain of command 
would break down into officers, NCOs privates. That almost seamless 
kind of run would be over, that you would have this thing stuck in and in 
fact eventually I suppose they do not cross the line (and you remember 
this yourself) came down to operational stuff, no involvement in 
operational stuff and that actually is the way today.  I can remember in 
the early days that ye were denied visits to go to Lebanon.  The reason 
that happened was that I suppose there was a genuine fear that it was 
involving you because the battalions overseas were purely operational, it 
was like putting you, in your way, on to a ship at sea, that there was a 
resistance and that resistance no longer exists now.  That‘s something 
that has grown up. 
Michael: And is that when you think that the military became 
reassured that there was no intention of people to interfere ? 
Lt. Gen. McMahon: I think the big problem right through my 
service, towards the end of 1998, it was starting to sort itself out, was the 
lack of trust, a lack of trust on the part of  the representative associations 
in the military command structure and the military management and the 
lack of trust in military command.  The other fear I would say that was 
there and I am still talking about the fears, fears that the Department of 
Defence would deal directly with the representative association and 
undermine the whole military structure that they the Department didn‘t 
understand or that some of the representatives they were meeting didn‘t 
understand.  Finally, I suppose it did enter the back of somebody‘s mind, 
fear of labour disruption and the undermining of the Defence Forces.  I 
would say they were to my mind the possible fears at the time.  Now 
your second question was the activities of the Department of Defence 
and the Defence Forces on the developing situation.  I would say that 
officers knew the Department of Defence very well at that stage.  People 
248 
 
who were coming into prominence in the representative association did 
not know them and the raison d‘être to this day I still hold, is not one of 
the welfare of the Defence Forces or soldiers, that is not why the 
Department of Defence exist.  The Department of Defence exists as an 
agency of the Department of Finance.  It is a very hard thing to say but I 
have seen other Departments operate in Europe.  For instance I visited, at 
a time when there was 400 civil servants in the Department of Defence 
here, with the Secretary General of Denmark and I remember asking the 
Chiefs who had 30,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen under his command.  
I remember asking how many civil servants were involved and he said 
68.  Is there anything else?  You also asked me about the frustrations and 
I would say yes.  As I said I can remember Tadhg O‘Neill.  From day 
one an officer is learning it in the cadet school, then learning it on the 
ground in exercises – officers are supposed to look after their men first 
and I can remember being on exercises and being starving coming into 
camp down after crossing a mountain down in the south and going up 
and the CO and my Company Commander saying now you will go over 
and make sure that every one of your men is fed before you even drink a 
cup of tea.  Okay maybe these days you look back and you say wasn‘t 
that very paternalistic but it wasn‘t, it was our duty as officers to look 
after our duty of care to our men and I would say that went all the way to 
the top where the Chief felt his duty was to intercede with government 
on behalf of us.  When nobody was listening there was huge frustration 
but very little they could do because the whole prospect of having a 
representative association was such fear-inducing one that was it really 
the way through or would it cause more havoc.  I think these genuine 
fears existed.  Now how has it evolved is the last question?  I retired ten 
years ago and I really am not involved.  I took an interest for maybe 
three years after I retired but life changes and you move on to other 
things.  I feel now purely from casual observation (I have a lot of 
dealings with PDFORRA now in my capacity as Chairman of the ONE) 
I would say that the trust exists there now.  I feel we have long departed 
from and I have said this to you before, I remember as Chief of Staff 
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going to an AGM Conference in Tralee and normally the President 
swaps speeches with the Chief the week before and if there was anything 
you thought you didn‘t want to explode in public, you had your people 
speak to his people.  On this occasion, I got the speech as I got into the 
helicopter and it was complete and utter attack on the officers of the 
Defence Forces by an individual who didn‘t have the experience on the 
ground, I knew him quite well we get on very well.  I don‘t think he had 
the experience on the ground to really know what he was talking about 
and I can remember turning over that speech and writing one on the 
helicopter going down.  I got there and I said you are all trained soldiers, 
you have been trained to recognise the enemy and take him under fire, 
you have recognised the wrong enemy. I found it all the time and as 
Chief of Staff too, this may not be germane to your thesis but I will say it 
anyway.  I have found it very easy to deal with PDFORRA, not because 
they weren‘t tough because they were tougher than any of the others but 
because they knew why they were there.  They knew their mission, they 
knew the job, they knew the parameters they could operate and this is 
from early days which is down to people like you, John Lucey and Jim 
Brady, people like that who had a big picture, who knew exactly where 
they were going.   
Michael: In a general question in that sense, do you think that there 
would have been difficulty among officers in terms of identity where 
management, representative associations were like a working forum 
whereas we are management and we will be management?  Do you think 
that there was a bit of an identity crisis? 
Lt. Gen. McMahon: There was an identity crisis for both sides, 
there were some people at 12 years, 15 years on your side who felt they 
were going to be Chief of Staff.  There were people on our side who saw 
ye as complete subversives but I think that that time, for instance I 
thought that particularly PDFORRA during the time that we were under 
severe pressure when I was Chief of Staff, from Price Waterhouse and 
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from various reorganisations.  I sought a meeting with PDFORRA where 
we discussed the issue and we coordinated our actions, we couldn‘t 
agree on everything but we agreed that 70-75% of our interests were 
similar interests and we co-operated very very well. 
Michael: One officer said to me, during the interview with him, 
that they were conscious of all the problems that were there, they were 
aware of the frustrations and the incapacity to help financially and so on 
but they didn‘t think that representation was part of the solution, what 
was your view? 
Lt. Gen. McMahon: I said that earlier.  I would agree with that 
completely.  Since the beginning of the state the officers represented the 
men – it might be looked on as being a bit paternalistic but it was our 
duty, this would have been seen from Chief down – and suddenly, not 
suddenly, but over the eighties there was complete ignoring of this but 
there was a great and genuine fear that representation was not the way 
forward.  I would agree with that 100% 
Michael: Yes, that it wasn‘t part of the solution and of course the 
state was having genuine difficulties at the time with subversion and 
subversives and so on, and while it is difficult to think about that now in 
2008, but back then it was a real fear.  Did you ever, or can you 
understand that there may have been senior military personnel who 
would have had a worry that these organisations may be either infiltrated 
or influenced by groups that wouldn‘t be in the interest of the state? 
Lt. Gen. McMahon: It never crossed my mind.  What would, and I 
said it earlier, what would cross my mind was that the representative 
associations would undermine the cohesiveness of the Defence Forces in 
doing the job it was doing with great difficulty.  Maybe what you are 
saying is true, it may have crossed somebody‘s mind but in talking to me 
I would be very open and would say it never crossed my mind. 
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Michael: I want to thank you on record for your contribution and 
may I leave the door open to speak to you at some stage to clarify 
something.  I am deeply appreciative for you making the journey just for 
this.  I know you didn‘t have anything else on in Dublin today. 
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